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ABSTRACT 
 
Cost-sharing is neither a new subject nor a recent practice in the financing of students’ higher 
education in Zimbabwe. The practice of cost-sharing in Zimbabwe’s higher education dates back 
to the colonial period. Unlike those African countries that have historically had free higher 
education, in Zimbabwe cost-sharing has always been part of its higher education financing 
formulae.  As a result, whereas the challenge in other African countries has been to shift from 
free higher education to cost-sharing, the challenge in Zimbabwe has been that of moving from 
one cost-sharing model to another. While Zimbabwe has experimented with various cost-sharing 
strategies, literature on the country’s experiences with the practice is limited.  This study fills the 
knowledge gap by identifying and accounting for the shifts in the conception and practice of 
cost-sharing in the financing of students’ higher education in Zimbabwe. 
Consistent with the study’s focus on describing and understanding historical processes 
(shifts in cost-sharing policy over time) in higher education financing in Zimbabwe, a qualitative 
approach was adopted to gather and analyze data. In particular, the study used an historical 
research design to identify and account for the policy shifts in higher education financing in 
Zimbabwe from 1957 to 2009. The scope of the study was limited to student funding in the 
public university sector. The study used documents as the major sources of data, while 
interviews and focus group discussions with key actors in higher education financing in 
Zimbabwe provided additional data to validate data generated from document sources. 
 The study demonstrates that Zimbabwe adopted cost-sharing in higher education 
financing at the very point of inception of the first university in the country, the University 
College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which is now the University of Zimbabwe in 1957. Starting 
(in 1957) with a deferred tuition fee policy that was complemented by a mortgage type loan 
system and government grants, a confluence of global, national and local forces combined in 
specific fashion in specific historical epochs over time to ‘negotiate’ and ‘renegotiate’ the 
student funding models. 
 It is further shown that during the colonial era, while the cost-sharing model rode on the 
back of a favourable Government loan and grant system aimed at promoting access to higher 
education, the racist basis of colonial education policies created bottlenecks that severely 
curtailed access to higher education by the majority black population. Colonial education policy 
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regimes deliberately limited the feeding streams into university enrolments by black students, 
resulting in a proportional mismatch between the number of white students entering university 
and that of black students. Thus, during the colonial era, access to higher education was largely a 
function of the ‘barrier’ system in African education that defined inequality between whites and 
Africans. Independence in 1980 saw the new socialist government embracing the loan and grant 
based cost-sharing model and further implementing radical measures to democratize access to 
education. However, the increase in student numbers and in higher education institutions, 
coupled with poor loan recovery, and the ascendancy of neoliberalism at about the turn of the 
twenty-first century presented serious challenges to the state’s capacity to adequately fund higher 
education. In the process, the loan and grant system declined gradually and was eventually 
replaced by an upfront tuition fee policy that took a toll on access to higher education. Noting the 
inadequacies of policy interventions through the introduction of the Cadetship Scheme, the 
‘successor’ to the loan and grant system, the study recommends the resuscitation of the loan 
system. It is however, important that such reintroduction of the loan system be predicated on  the 
development of a robust framework that ensures that loans are allocated to students who are in 
real financial need and that there is in existence, effective and efficient loan recovery machinery.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The post-World War II period has witnessed a significant transformation of higher education 
globally (Marcucci and Usher, 2011).
1
 The transformation processes are attributable to 
continuing change necessitated by globalization (Wangenge-Ouma, 2008), increases in 
participation and fiscal pressures (Johnstone, 2009; World Bank, 2010) as well as demographic 
change (Mohamedbhai, 2008). The dynamics of these change processes have in turn, resulted in 
profound shifts in the organization, governance and financing of higher education systems across 
the globe (Marcucci and Usher, 2011). With respect to financing, higher education institutions 
(HEIs) are increasingly being required to raise significant proportions of their revenue from 
private sources as opposed to relying on public funding (Johnstone, 2003; 2006; 2009; World 
Bank, 1994; 2010). The emphasis on private sources of financing as opposed to the hitherto 
heavy reliance on governmental transfers has seen cost-sharing taking centre stage in higher 
education financing debates and policies in virtually all countries of the world (Johnstone, 2003; 
2006).  
While cost-sharing is for many African countries a new phenomenon characteristic of the 
post-colonial era and  a result of World Bank induced Structural Adjustment policies (SAPs), 
and, globally, a creation of globalization that has ushered in the neoliberal development 
paradigm, there are a few cases in Africa where its practice predates these periods. Zimbabwe is 
one such case. These exceptional cases bring to the fore many questions that centre on why these 
countries, Zimbabwe in particular, chose the cost-sharing policy ‘path’ and how they have been 
                                                          
1
 In developed countries, the rise in demand for higher education is attributed in large part to the demographic boom 
in births (baby boomer period) that accompanied the end of the 2
nd
 World War (Mohamedbhai, 2008). 
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able to sustain it, when experiences from other countries in Africa and globally are replete with 
the challenges of shifting from free higher education to cost-sharing (Mamdani, 2007; Musisi 
and Muwanga, 2003; Wangenge-Ouma, 2008, 2012; World Bank, 2010). These questions form 
the backdrop to the present study.  
1.2 Background to the Problem 
 
The global demand for higher education has increased significantly in the post-World War II 
period (Freeman, in Teixeira and Dill, 2011; Asian Development Bank, 2009; Mohamedbhai, 
2008; the Economist, 2005; World Bank, 2010). For example, by 2005, countries in North 
America and Western Europe had reached almost universal higher education (Mohammedbhai, 
2008)
2
, while those in Central and Eastern Europe were close to achieving mass education 
(Mohamedbhai, 2008)
3
.  Africa also experienced a rapid increase in student enrolments 
during this period, although the enrolment ratios remained very low (Mohamedbhai, 2008).   
 However, beginning with the 1980s, global evidence began to suggest that higher 
education was growing faster than financing capabilities, to the extent of reaching levels where 
the lack of resources was gradually resulting in a decline in the quality of higher education 
instruction and service delivery (World Bank, 2010). The deterioration of higher education 
funding was, and continues to be, worse in Africa, where, due to a combination of endogenous 
and exogenous factors, the capacity of governments and universities to adequately finance and 
support ever- increasing student enrolment was severely curtailed (World Bank, 2010). 
                                                          
2
 Trow (2000) coined the terms elite, mass and universal higher education, with elite representing a national 
enrolment ratio of up to 15%, mass representing a ratio of up to 50%, and a ratio in excess of 50% representing 
universal higher education. While the classification is appropriate for defining higher education systems in 
industrialized countries, in developing countries, including those in Africa, mass education is characterized by a 
very rapid increase in student enrolment maintained over several years although the enrolment ratio is very low 
(Mohammedbhai, 2008).   
3
 In developed countries, this was largely attributable to the baby boomer phenomenon while in Africa it was largely 
a deliberate policy response to the socio-economic demands that followed independence (Mohammedbhai, 2008). 
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 While there are variations in the intensity of the higher education funding crisis on the 
continent, most of the HEIs in sub-Saharan Africa  (and in other parts of the developing world) 
have similar experiences, characterized by among other factors, fractured infrastructure; 
declining quality of teaching, research and students;  paralysis of governance systems 
(Omari,1991, World Bank, 2010); perennial student unrests and protests (Mamdani, 2007) and 
an inward-looking intellectual community not supportive of development debates or the transfer 
of intellectual technologies and cultures to the continent (Omari, 1991; Mamdani, 2007).  
   As a result, and against a background of growing demand for higher education and 
insufficient public supply, many governments globally have sought to transform their HEIs by 
reforming the institutions’ financing and governance patterns, creating evaluation and 
accreditation mechanisms, reforming curricula, and introducing technological innovation, among 
other innovations (Woodhall, 2007; World Bank, 2010).  
In the area of financing, various initiatives designed to increase cost-efficiency have been 
implemented. One policy strategy that has become a worldwide trend as governments and higher 
education institutions seek to ‘modernize’ or ‘re-invent’ the financing of higher education is 
cost-sharing – the introduction of shared responsibilities of higher education expenses between 
governments and the beneficiaries ( that is, students and their families) (Johnstone, 2003; 2006). 
The cost-sharing strategy (Johnstone, 2006:16) is now pervasive in higher education systems 
globally. While there is a lack of consensus over the desirability of cost-sharing in higher 
education, there is a clear international trend: cost recovery has become mainstream (Li, 2007) 
and “it is here to stay” (Woodhall, 2002:6).  
The introduction of cost-sharing in higher education in Africa is growing, to include even  
some Francophone countries, such as Cote d’ Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
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where free higher education had traditionally been the norm (World Bank, 2010). For example, 
as of 2009, at least twenty-six African countries had embraced the cost-sharing ideal in higher 
education (World Bank, 2010). The cost-sharing ‘wave’ has also taken root even in those 
countries that adopted free higher education at independence (World Bank, 2010; Mamdani, 
2007; Musisi and Muwanga, 2003; Wangenge-Ouma, 2008). The shift in policy from heavy 
reliance on public funding of higher education to the adoption of alternative funding sources, 
such as cost-sharing, is now ubiquitous in the global higher education system. 
The next section of the chapter provides a brief description of Zimbabwe, which forms 
the context of the study.  
 
1.3. The Context   
 
Zimbabwe is situated in South Central Africa. Lying between the Limpopo and Zambezi Rivers, 
it is bordered by Zambia to the North and North-West and by Botswana to the South-West. 
South Africa lies to the South, while to the East and North-East of Zimbabwe is Mozambique.  
Formerly the British colony of Southern Rhodesia, it gained independence in 1980. 
The colonial history of present day Zimbabwe dates to 1889 when the Queen of England 
granted Cecil John Rhodes (of the British South Africa Company) a Royal Charter to occupy the 
territory that was to become Southern Rhodesia, a British self-governing colony, in 1923. In 
1953, Southern Rhodesia joined Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia and Nyasaland, now Malawi in 
the ill-fated Central African Federation. In 1963, growing African nationalism forced Britain to 
dissolve the federation (Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009). Following the independence of Zambia 
in 1964, Southern Rhodesia became Rhodesia, and in the same year issued a Unilateral 
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Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain, a development that attracted the imposition of 
United Nations’ economic sanctions in 1966 (Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009). Meanwhile, the 
struggle for African independence under the leadership of the Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People’s Party (ZAPU) was intensifying and would result in 
independence on 18 April 1980, under a ZANU-PF government (Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 
2009). At independence, the country became Zimbabwe. 
 Higher education in Zimbabwe commonly refers to universities and university-level 
specialized (degree awarding) colleges. Currently, the higher education sector is made up of 
thirteen universities (nine public and four private) and one public degree awarding institute of 
technology. A second group of specialized professional institutions that is generally referred to 
as offering tertiary education, consists of more than 300 institutions that offer short-cycle 
vocational programmes such as teacher training, as well as training in nursing, agriculture, 
engineering, and secretarial studies.   All public HEIs are owned and funded by Government. 
Currently, Government funding of the university sector constitutes about 40% of the institutions’ 
income.  The balance is raised by the institutions from dividends on investments, cost-sharing, 
and income generating activities, among others (Ministries of Education, Sport, Arts and Culture 
and Higher and Tertiary Education, 2010).   
The history of higher education in Zimbabwe dates back to 1957, when the British 
colonial government established the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (UCRN). 
“The university was a joint venture of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland as 
part of the short lived federation, from 1953 to 1963” (Teferra and Altbatch, 2003: 636). The 
UCRN was a university college of the University of London and it awarded University of 
London degrees. It became the University of Rhodesia in the early 1970s, and eventually became 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
the University of Zimbabwe (UZ) at independence in 1980. 
 The University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland opened with a student population of 
68 in 1957; by independence in 1980 (and now the University of Zimbabwe), it had a student 
population of 2 024 (Raftopoulos, in Mandaza, 1986:289). It remained the only university in 
Zimbabwe up to 1990. Since then, twelve more universities have been established. These are 
shown in Table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.1: Universities Established in Zimbabwe since 1980 
 
University Name Year of Establishment Ownership 
National University of Science 
and Technology 
1991 Public 
Africa University 1992 Private 
Solusi University 1994 Private 
Zimbabwe Open University 1999 Public 
Catholic University 1999 Private 
Midlands State University 2000 Public 
Bindura University of Science 
Education 
2001 Public 
Chinhoyi University of 
Technology 
2001 Public 
Great Zimbabwe University 2002 Public 
Women’s University in Africa 2002 Private 
Lupane State University 2005 Public 
Harare Institute of Technology 2005 Public 
Source: Southern African Regional Universities Association (2010) 
Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, Zimbabwe (2010) 
The student population in the public university sector is about 50 000, while the combined 
student population in the private universities is about 5 000 (Ministry of Higher and Tertiary 
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Education, 2009).  
 
All higher and tertiary education institutions are run by the Ministry of Higher and 
Tertiary   Education (MHTE). The mission statement of the Ministry, vis-a-vis higher education 
reads: 
 
[T]he mission of the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education is to provide, 
regulate and facilitate higher and tertiary education and training through the 
planning, development and implementation of effective policies, the provision of 
resources and management of institutions in order to meet the human resources 
requirements of the economy and equip individuals to realize their full potential 
(Zimbabwe National Commission for UNESCO, Ministry of Education, Sport and 
Culture and Ministry Higher Education and Technology, 2001; 5).  
 
1.4. Statement of the Problem 
 
Zimbabwe presents an interesting and somewhat unique case in the sense that cost-sharing in the 
financing of students' higher education in Zimbabwe is neither a new topic nor a recent 
experience. Cost-sharing dates back to the colonial period, starting with the establishment of the 
first university in the country in 1957, the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which 
is now the University of Zimbabwe. At independence in 1980, the new black government 
embraced the cost-sharing ideal and has since sustained it to date. Unlike those African countries 
that historically have had free higher education (Mamdani, 2007; Nyagoti-Chacha, 2007; World 
Bank, 2010), in Zimbabwe, cost-sharing has always been part of the higher education financing 
framework. As a result, while the challenge in other African countries has been that of shifting 
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from free higher education to cost-sharing (Mamdani, 2007, Wangenge-Ouma, 2008), the 
challenge in Zimbabwe has been that of moving from one cost-sharing model to another.  
 While numerous comprehensive studies have been undertaken to account for the shifts in 
higher education financing policies in Africa, for example, in Uganda (Court, 1999; Musisi and 
Muwanga, 2003; Mamdani, 2007; World Bank, 2010), in Kenya, (Wangenge-Ouma, 2008) and 
in Tanzania and Zambia (Maliyamkono and Ogbu, 1999), literature on cost-sharing in Zimbabwe 
is inadequate.  There is limited documented literature that explains the shifts in the philosophy 
and practice of cost-sharing. The existing literature on education in the country has tended to 
dwell mainly on the primary and secondary levels of education (for example, Austin, 1975; 
Stoneman, 1981; Mandaza, 1986), on the growth and achievements of the University in the 
colonial period – hinting now and then at the academic problems and pressures of racial issues 
lying at the foundation of the system (Gelfand, 1978), and, more recently, on the transformation 
of higher education in the post-colonial period in areas of curriculum change, 
internationalization, governance, student participation, and human resources development 
(Zinyemba, 2010). The scarcity of literature on higher education includes the area of financing 
and, in particular, the subject of cost-sharing has received scant attention. 
 For example, no study known to the researcher has sought to explain why cost-sharing in 
higher education in Zimbabwe started at the very point of inception of the University College of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1957, then with only 68 students, if evidence globally suggests that 
cost-sharing in higher education is a function of a decline in public expenditure per student 
against an increasing student population (Johnstone, 2003; 2006). Similarly, it has not been 
shown why and how, in 1980 and to date, the independent government embraced and 
consistently implemented the cost-sharing policy in higher education when other, or most 
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countries on the continent, including Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, Tanzania and the francophone 
countries, adopted free higher education policies at least at independence (Mamdani, 2007, 
Musisi and Mutanga, 2003, Wangenge-Ouma, 2012; World Bank, 2010).  
This study therefore is a response to the knowledge vacuum in existing literature on 
higher education financing in Zimbabwe. It seeks to identify and account for the policy shifts in 
the conceptualization and practice of cost-sharing in higher education financing in Zimbabwe.  
 
1.5. Research Objectives 
 
1.5.1. The Purpose of the Study  
 
The primary objective of the study is to identify and account for the shifts in cost-sharing policy 
in financing higher education in Zimbabwe from 1957-2009.  
1.5.2. Specific Objectives 
The specific objectives are to, 
 
(i)  identify the cost-sharing epochs and identify the cost-sharing models and strategies 
adopted in specific epochs between 1957 and 2009; 
(ii) explore and account for the logic underpinning the transition from one cost-sharing 
model to another; and 
(iii) identify and discuss the mechanisms established to address issues of access to higher 
education following the adoption of cost-sharing as a strategy to finance students’  
higher education. 
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1.6. Research Questions 
 
The questions that guided the research study are: 
(a) How has cost-sharing in higher education in Zimbabwe been defined, modelled and 
practised between 1957 and 2009? 
(b) What logic determined the adoption of particular cost-sharing models and practices in 
particular epochs in this period of the history of higher education financing in 
Zimbabwe?  
(c)  How did the cost-sharing measures impact on access to higher education? What specific 
mechanisms were implemented to deal with the impact, and how successful were the 
interventions?  
 
1.7. Rationale and Significance of the Study 
 
The rationale for undertaking the study is twofold. Firstly, “higher education occupies a key and 
important place in the development of societies” (Barriga, Cardiel, Maldonado, Rojas and 
Lopez,1998: 608). In that sense, a discussion and/or analysis of the characteristics of its 
financing constitutes a topic of great relevance. At the same time, it is necessary to acknowledge 
that, notwithstanding the identity of the global higher education financing systems, each country 
has developed peculiarities that make generalizations about the subject difficult 
(Schwarzenberger and Opheim, 2009;Wangenge-Ouma, 2008); hence this study, with its focus 
on Zimbabwe. 
Secondly, existing literature on higher education financing in Zimbabwe, especially with 
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respect to cost-sharing in students’ financing of higher education has not received adequate 
attention. This has been found to be the case in an extensive review of literature. The study 
therefore seeks to fill this knowledge gap.  It may therefore also be expected that findings of the 
research will add to the knowledge and understanding of the subject of cost-sharing and its 
practice in higher education in Zimbabwe. The study is significant in the sense that it generates 
empirical knowledge and understanding about the shifts in cost-sharing policy in students’ 
financing of higher education in Zimbabwe. As such, it:  
a) supports and enriches the theory on cost-sharing in higher education;  
b)  provides practical insights that might be useful for national higher education 
financing policy in Zimbabwe; and it 
c) provides insights or lessons from experience that might be valuable to other 
higher education systems that have adopted, or might consider cost-sharing  as a 
vehicle for reforming their higher education  financing systems. 
 
1.8. Scope of the study  
 
The study focuses on Zimbabwe and is restricted to 1957 to 2009, that is, from the time that cost-
sharing was implemented as a strategy to finance students’ university education in Zimbabwe to 
the present, taken as 2009.  The practice remains current, meaning that it is still in force as of 
2009.  
A second restriction to the study relates to its primary focus on cost-sharing as a strategy 
to finance university students’ education. That does not suggest however, that other issues 
relating to higher education financing in general, for example, research funding, infrastructural 
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development and staff remuneration are unimportant. These are discussed in the context of their 
relationship and relevance to the subject of students’ financing.  
Lastly, the study is limited to the public university sector, which in Zimbabwe is made up 
of nine universities. Even then, emphasis is put on the UZ, which, being the oldest university in 
Zimbabwe, has experienced all the cost-sharing policy shifts in students’ financing of higher 
education. 
1.9. Organization of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 sets out the perspective for the research as well 
as spelling out the motivation and inspiration for the study. The chapter shows that, for most 
countries, the encounter with cost-sharing in higher education financing is a relatively new 
experience occasioned by the ascendancy of neoliberalism and the rise in demand for higher 
education that occurred beginning about the late 1970s. In contradistinction, Zimbabwe’s 
experience with cost-sharing predates these developments. The chapter thus sets the ground for 
an interrogation of Zimbabwe’s experience in an area that for most countries is a recent 
phenomenon.  
Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical direction for the thesis. The chapter is divided into three 
parts. The first part traces the historical global development of higher education financing and 
shows that, prior to the late 1970s, a combination of Keynesianism, the then dominant 
development paradigm, and the general consensus about the public good nature of higher 
education resulted in most governments investing heavily and voluntarily in higher education. 
However, the shift to neoliberalism at about the turn of the 1980s, ushered in a new development 
philosophy that not only challenged the predominant role of the state in development, and 
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therefore its huge presence in higher education financing, but also questioned the widely held 
view that higher education was a public good. As a result, a new higher education development 
creed that championed notions of the market and cost-sharing in higher education financing 
emerged that subsequently established itself firmly in higher education financing policy 
discourse and practice.  
The second part of the chapter pitches the higher education funding debate at a theoretical 
level and explores the theoretical motivations for public and market funding of higher education. 
The debate is later narrowed to a discussion of the cost-sharing phenomenon in higher education 
funding. In particular, the gradual, but now forceful, pervasiveness and ubiquity of cost-sharing 
across global higher education systems since the 1980s is demonstrated. The chapter ends with 
an articulation of the conceptual framework within which to understand cost-sharing in higher 
education students’ funding.  
Chapter 3 details the qualitative research approach adopted for the study. In particular, 
the chapter takes the reader through the historical research design used to conduct the study, the 
qualitative data analysis methods, and the ethical issues that govern the conduct of the study. 
Chapter 4 covers the presentation of data and analysis of the findings. The chapter demonstrates 
that Zimbabwe’s experience with cost-sharing in higher education financing is a ‘tale’ of shifts 
from one cost-sharing model to the other within specific historical epochs of the development of 
higher education. At the centre of the shifts were global, national and local factors that combined 
in specific ways in particular epochs to define and redefine the cost-sharing models.  
The last chapter demonstrates that, while useful as an analytical tool to account for cost-
sharing in post-colonial Zimbabwe, the utility of Johnstone’s (2009) cost-sharing conceptual 
model is limited when applied to the introduction and practice of cost-sharing in the colonial 
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period. The study also shows the existence of strong arguments for both the public subsidy and 
cost-sharing in students’ funding of higher education, and thus recommends the resuscitation of 
the loan system as a mechanism to promote access to higher education.   
  
 
 
 
 
15 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The history of higher education funding is replete with tensions brought about by the lack of 
consensus on how best to finance it (Barriga, et. al., 1998; Stonis, 2009). As a result, across the 
globe, from one context to the other, and even within the same contexts, higher education 
funding is a subject that has been mired in debates and controversies. Indeed, while the intensity 
of the funding challenge has varied across contexts in history, the ‘one best financing model’ has 
remained elusive (Stonis, 2009). The following sections interrogate the issues that are at the 
centre of these tensions as well as trace the dynamics that have ensued in the search for the 
elusive one best model of financing higher education.  
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part traces the history of higher 
education funding and shows that globally, until the late 1970s, governments generally invested 
heavily in higher education.  The change in development paradigms that then occurred marked 
the entry and subsequent consolidation of market forces in higher education financing. The first 
part of the chapter also explores the theoretical foundations of higher education funding. In the 
process, it interrogates the theoretical arguments for state funding of higher education, on the one 
hand, and the arguments for market intervention in higher education on the other. The second 
part of the chapter demonstrates that as a result of the global triumph of neoliberalism over 
Keynesianism and notions of the welfare state, cost-sharing is now a pervasive phenomenon in 
higher education systems globally. The last part summarizes the chapter, and, in the process, 
develops the conceptual framework for the study.  
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2.2. Higher Education Funding: Historical Trends 
 
Until about the 1970s, higher education was highly valued as a great wealth in itself and a source 
of increase in wealth globally (Omari, 1991). As a result, societies invested in it gladly and 
voluntarily. Then, it was believed that the investments that governments made in education, and 
higher education in particular, could be recouped by society through the increased productivity 
of the labour force and through the resultant higher tax receipts (Tilak, 2004). There was 
therefore no need for any specific measures directly to recover the investment made in higher 
education from students or from any non-governmental sources (Tilak, 2004).  
In many cases, where higher education was not entirely funded by the state, it was highly 
subsidized (Asian Development Bank, 2009; Tilak, 2004; World Bank, 2010). In those countries 
that pursued the socialist ideology, such as countries of the former Soviet Union and other 
countries in Eastern Europe, higher education and education in general, were viewed as an 
inalienable right that required full subsidization by the state (World Bank, 2010).   
In the case of Africa, five major factors are keys to understanding trends in higher 
education development and its funding. These are: notions of the British civic universities (path 
dependencies); the envisaged role of higher education in the development of the post-colonial 
state (the developmentalist university); the need for highly skilled human resources (bureaucrats) 
to replace the departing colonial administrators; the democratization of access to education; and 
the then prevailing welfarist approach to development. The following sections discuss these 
factors in greater detail.    
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2.2.1. The British Civic University 
 
Colonial higher education in Africa was a transplant of the higher education systems in the 
metropolitan countries (Ashby, 1964). In British colonial Africa, for example, university 
education was modelled on British universities. Such was the case with the University of the 
Gold Coast (Ghana), Ibadan (Nigeria), Khartoum (Sudan), Makerere (East Africa) and in 
Zimbabwe, the University of Rhodesia, first established, as stated above, as the UCRN in 1957. 
These universities were formed as a result of the recommendations of the Asquith Commission 
that was set up to consider “the principles which should guide the promotion of higher education 
learning and research and the development of universities in the colonies” (Atkinson, 1973:145). 
The universities had a special relationship with the University of London whose degrees they 
offered. 
The establishment of these universities was premised on two assumptions about the 
philosophy of the social function of higher education (Ajayi, Goma and Johnson, 1996). The first 
assumption related to the elitist character of higher education access. The philosophy was such 
that only a select few students out of the larger pool of qualified students would gain admission 
to university on the basis of their performance in examinations. Once selected, this elite group of 
students would receive high quality education subsidized by the state. The philosophy also held 
that in addition to professional training, higher education bequeathed to students a higher moral 
ethic and attributes essential for producing future leaders and custodians of the cultural heritage 
(Ashby, 1964). Thus, writing on West African universities, Ashby notes that those founded by 
the British regarded themselves as elite (Ashby, 1964). These universities were also expected to 
create a small native middle class, which in turn would create a cadre of middle level technocrats 
and professionals in such areas as education, health, and agriculture for ‘native’ development 
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(Ashby, 1964).  
2.2.2. The Developmentalist University 
 
From the 1950s, Africa gradually gained independence from colonial rule. The attainment of 
independence on the continent generated optimistic expectations that the newly independent 
African nations would at last be able to find their own path to a future of progress and prosperity 
(Mamdani, 2007).  For most countries, this would be based on an emphasis on meeting the 
people’s needs and greater public involvement as defined by the African governments 
themselves (Mahomedbhai, 2008). 
 At independence, many of these countries were faced with specific developmental 
demands and priorities that were unlikely to be realized if the countries did not radically break 
away from the legacy of the colonial socio-economic development frameworks (Mohamedbhai, 
2008). To that end, countries formulated social and economic development plans that entailed 
ordering the pattern of development differently than it would be if it were left to the free forces 
of the economy (Mohamedbhai, 2008). The achievement of the new agenda required 
reorientation of the colonially inherited development policies through state intervention in 
economic activities (Mohamedbhai, 2008). Education, in particular higher education, was 
considered a critical vehicle for the achievement of the transformation process and, therefore, 
became a major part of the post-colonial national development project (Sawyerr, 2004). 
Universities were expected to reflect the mood of the nation (Zinyemba, 2010): to help 
the new nations build up their capacity to develop and manage their resources; to alleviate the 
poverty of the majority of the people; and to close the gap between African nations and the 
developed world. The development of capacity in existing universities and the establishment of 
new universities in Africa, following independence, became a major element of nation building. 
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The university was considered to be a key instrument for national development, hence the notion 
of a ‘developmentalist university’, that is, “a university whose work and mission are directed 
toward the attainment of concrete and demonstrable development goals” (Sawyerr, 2004:4). Like 
all other national development initiatives, the African university was explicitly a public 
undertaking financed and supported from public sources (Sawyerr, 2004). In most cases, the 
financing of higher education became the entire responsibility of the state. Universities would 
receive generous state funding to support capital investments, recurrent expenditure, and funding 
for operations and research (Banya and Elu, 2001 in Wangenge Ouma, 2008).  
2.2.3. The Human Resources Factor 
 
Following independence, many African bureaucracies found themselves confronted by a 
crippling shortage of skilled technocrats and professionals following the departure of the colonial 
white experts and administrators. Governments naturally turned to universities to fill the gap by 
training the required person power (Wangenge-Ouma, 2008). Banya and Elu (2001, in 
Wangenge-Ouma, 2008: 218) argue, 
 
[T]hroughout Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s, there was a critical shortage of 
administrative, scientific and technical manpower. The situation was particularly 
acute because higher education institutions had been established only recently and 
the senior ranks of the public services were staffed predominantly by expatriates. 
The newly independent African nations lacked personnel trained in many areas of 
high priority for their future development. 
 
The emphasis on the need for skilled manpower also found support from two other forces. First, 
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the global thinking of the 1960s argued that an important obstacle to economic growth in the 
developing countries was the absence of middle and high level human resources. The second 
factor was “the then dominant application of human capital development theory to educational 
investments” (Wangenge-Ouma, 2008: 221).  This saw African governments not only assuming 
direct responsibility for higher education funding, including student funding (Mamdani, 2007; 
Omari, 1999), but also international finance capital, notably the World Bank, investing heavily in 
higher education “based on the understanding that higher education was the development engine 
of new political economies” (Banya and Elu, 2001 in Wangenge-Ouma, 2008: 218).   
 
2.2.4. Democratization of Access to Higher Education 
 
For many countries, the transformation of colonial education began with independence. The 
primary objective of governments was to provide equality of educational opportunity in order to 
facilitate rapid transformation of society and the economy (Zvobgo 1986, in Mandaza, 1986). As 
a result, many countries placed education in the category of basic human rights in a bid to correct 
the injustices of colonial education policies that had favoured whites to the neglect of the 
majority black population (Zvobgo 1986, in Mandaza, 1986). In pursuit of the democratic ideal, 
primary and secondary education was made free in most countries. The expansion of education 
at these lower levels meant that universities had to develop corresponding absorptive capacity to 
contain expansion generated from below (Zvobgo 1986, in Mandaza, 1986) 
Accompanying the expansion in student numbers were financing policies that saw most   
countries – Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and many countries in Francophone Africa, for example -- 
providing free higher education (Wangenge-Ouma, 2008; 2012). In some cases, in addition to 
free higher education, governments even provided a host of other allowances that included 
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clothing, bedding, food, transport, and en route food allowances to students when joining 
universities (Omari, 1991; Mamdani, 2007).   
2.2.5. Welfarism and the Developmental State 
 
 
For many countries in Africa, independence also coincided with the dominance of Keynesian 
economics and welfarism (the welfare state), a development paradigm that emphasized the key 
role of the state in socio-economic development (Wangenge-Ouma, 2008). The essential base of 
Keynesianism and state welfarism was the growth of the economy, which enabled the virtuous 
circle of increasing public services and full employment (Walsh, 1994).  Keynesianism was 
premised on the notion that the state could manage macro-economic conditions in a way that 
would compensate for inadequacies created by the market (Walsh, 1994; 1995). State welfarism 
involved the extension of citizenship into social rights, on the grounds that full membership of 
society involved access to basic goods (such as education) that made effective involvement in 
social and community life possible (King and Waldron, 1988). The basis of citizenship was 
participation, as opposed to the contractarian, exchange-based approach that was to gain ground 
in the 1980s (Walsh, 1994).   
While there were variations in the degree to which countries adopted Keynesianism and 
the institutions of the welfare state, the general result was the rapid growth of state activity and 
involvement in provisioning of services (Walsh, 1994; 1995).  The basic policies of governments 
tended to converge on a common acceptance of the state’s role, both in the management of the 
economy and in providing public services (Walsh, 1995), hence the notion of the developmental 
state (Mamdani, 2007).   
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2.3. From State to Market 
 
Starting about the mid-1970s, the overheating of the world economy that was evidenced by the 
global economic recession, the oil crisis of 1973, and declining terms of trade for  Third World 
goods undermined the welfarist system of politico-economic management (Walsh, 1994). 
Virtuous circles began to give way to vicious circles of economic decline (Walsh, 1995). 
Unemployment rose, as did inflation (Walsh, 1994; 1995).  The impact on public service 
provisioning was especially strong because the late 1960s and early 1970s had been a period of 
rapid public sector growth, which had become ingrained into expectations and patterns of 
budgeting. The public sector, unlike manufacturing, was particularly affected because it was not 
easy to raise productivity or to reduce levels of provision (Walsh, 1994).  
While the extent of the crisis varied across countries globally, overall, public spending 
was widely argued to be a major factor in the global economic failure of the 1970s (Walsh, 
1994). Further, the institutions of the welfare state came to be seen as destroying market 
incentive and weakening competitiveness (Walsh, 1994). Hence, the crisis of the 1970s was 
viewed as one of politics as well as economics, the more so given the greater role and 
involvement of the state in economic activity (Walsh, 1994).  
Radical critics argued that the growth of the public sector created inflation and long term 
economic decline by destroying the disciplines of the market (Walsh, 1994). Those of a less 
radical persuasion contended that government was becoming overloaded (King, 1975) in trying 
to cope with many problems; that excessive public spending and unemployment was crowding 
out the private sector (Bacon and Eltis, 1976) and that the state was becoming bankrupt (Rose 
and Peters, 1978). 
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These criticisms led to the adoption of an alternative market approach that advocated for, 
beyond reduction of public expenditure, the rolling back of the state frontiers in development in 
favour of the private sector -- a market philosophy based on minimizing the role of the state 
rather than merely reducing its spending (Haynes, 2008). Commonly referred to as 
neoliberalism, this market philosophy is based on the virtues of the market and not simply the 
failure of the state (Walsh, 1994). Hence, beginning in the 1980s, a new development paradigm 
clothed in neoliberal economic policies gradually overshadowed Keynesianism and the welfare 
state (Haynes, 2008; Walsh, 1994; 1995). The paradigm shift from Keynesianism to 
neoliberalism was to have serious policy ramifications for higher education financing. This is the 
subject of the next section.     
2.3.1. Neoliberalism 
 
In response to the economic crisis of the 1970s, and at the instigation of the Bretton-Woods 
institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund -- neoliberal economic 
reform policies were unveiled in several developing countries in the form of stabilization and 
adjustment reform policies (Haynes, 2008; Wangenge-Ouma, 2008). Privatization, or movement 
towards privatization, became the most significant agenda of the World Bank (Richardson and 
Haralz, 1995). The underlying philosophy of the reform policies was that economic stagnation in 
developing countries was endogenous (Haynes, 2008). It was viewed as a by-product of poorly 
designed economic policies and excessive state interference in the economy (Haynes, 2008:30). 
It was argued that in order to stimulate the domestic economy and promote the creation of an 
efficient market, developing countries’ governments should eliminate market restrictions and 
limit government intervention in the economy (Haynes, 2008). 
Reducing the state’s economic and developmental role was a uniform condition for the 
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receipt of external economic assistance in the form of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
loans (Haynes, 2008; Wangenge-Ouma, 2008)). The SAPs had several aims, namely, to 
encourage a high level of fiscal and monetary discipline, to advance and promote reforms 
leading towards market economies, as well as to encourage free trade, free capital flows and 
economic cooperation among nations (Haynes, 2008). The major argument was that it is market 
forces, not government intervention, that bring about development in stagnating economies 
(Haynes, 2008). As a result, the 1980s brought about a complete shift in development thinking. 
The pursuit of the public good and social justice that informed state welfarism gave way to the 
free market philosophy that stressed individual economic values and gains (Walsh, 1994, 1995; 
Haynes, 2008).  
2.3.2. The World Bank 
 
Linked to the pro-market philosophy was the argument by the World Bank that the rate of return 
to investment in higher education was much lower than in primary and secondary education 
(Pscharopoulos, 1994).
4
 According to the World Bank, the high net cost in higher education 
yielded fewer benefits. Even if the benefit was great, it was more private than social 
(Pscharopoulos, 1994; Mamdani, 2007:11). Thus, according to the Bank, the social group with 
access to higher education had already been beneficiaries of free education at lower levels, and it 
therefore argued that students must cover their own higher education expenses (Omari, 1991). 
The Bank strongly argued that basic education is the highest priority in developing countries 
(Omari, 1991).  
                                                          
4
The rate of return to investment in education or, to be more precise, the internal rate of return to education is that 
rate of discount that equates the net present value of life time earnings of the individual, taken as the benefits of 
education, to the net present value of costs of education (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004).   
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These World Bank recommendations, cum conditionalities, argued for, firstly, the 
reduction of the role of the state in higher education and its financing, and, secondly, the shift of 
state funds from higher to lower levels of education (Omari, 1991). Since the mid-1980s, the 
World Bank has promoted reforms based on the need to restrict public higher education 
financing. Although the Bank has since softened its stance (World Bank, 1994; 2008; 2010), it 
continues to emphasize a series of modalities that are aimed at forcing HEIs to function 
according to market laws (World Bank, 2010). The Bank strongly argues for the need to 
diversify higher education and proposes the establishment of fees, sale of services, and ex alumni 
donations, etc. (World Bank, 1994).  The target is for each institution to cover at least 30% of its 
expenditure with its own resources (World Bank, 1994). In this sense, higher education is 
observed through market standards.  
The rate of return methodology has however not been free from criticism.  In the early 
1960s the method was subjected to severe criticism on the grounds that it assumes earnings of 
individuals as equivalent to their marginal productivity, or that differences in productivity of 
people are reflected in their earnings differentials (Merrett, 1966). It was also criticized for its 
inability to separate the influence of non-educational factors on earnings, and for its use of 
simulated life earnings (Omari, 1991). While later theoretical improvements answered some of 
the shortcomings, a criticism that still remains relates to the methodology’s inability to account 
for the non-economic benefits of higher education (Bennell, 1996a, 1996b, 1998; Omari, 1991). 
These non-economic benefits - social, political, cultural, etc., accrue to society as a whole 
(Omari, 1991). While the economics of education now take note of these non-economic benefits 
(also called externalities), computations of rate of return rarely account for them because it is 
difficult to measure them with any acceptable level of precision (Barriga et al, 1998). 
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 Notwithstanding the criticisms of neoliberalism, the shift in development paradigm is 
taking place all over (Haynes, 2008). Globally, countries, and, especially, developing countries, 
are in transition – a transition from a development paradigm based on Keynesianism to a 
neoliberal paradigm. The market philosophy now holds centre-stage (Haynes, 2008). This World 
Bank fronted philosophy has strongly entered the higher education sector. As a result, a reduced 
role of the state in education, more explicitly higher education, is being promoted as an 
economically and educationally efficient proposal (Mamdani, 2007). According to the World 
Bank, the role of government should be confined broadly to the formulation of a coherent policy 
framework (World Bank, 1994).  
The preceding sections have traced the development of higher education from an 
historical perspective. In tracing the historical trajectories, it has been demonstrated that, 
globally, the reduced role of governments in the provisioning of higher education was 
occasioned by the shift in development paradigms from Keynesianism and the welfare state to 
neoliberalism that occurred about the beginning of the 1980s. It has also been shown that in 
Africa other factors--chief among them the notion of the British civic universities in former 
British colonies and the envisaged ‘new’ developmentalist role and related human power training 
function of the university brought about by the advent of independence--are also critical to 
understanding the history of the development of higher education and its funding on the 
continent. The next section now considers the higher education funding debate at a theoretical 
level. In doing so the guiding question is, what are the theoretical underpinnings of higher 
education funding?  
 
2.4. The Case for Public Funding of Higher Education 
There are several arguments that justify the ‘responsible’ sustentation of state contributions to 
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higher education provisioning. The basic rationale for state intervention in higher education 
financing, as is often the case with other social services such as health, is that in certain 
circumstances, the market fails to optimally produce such services (Walsh, 1995). As such, 
public provisioning through government planning, collective decisions and financing is deemed 
more effective in advancing social values and processes – equity, fairness and justice (Stonis, 
2009) -- than would be the case if service production and distribution were to be left to the 
dictates of the market (Walsh, 1995). Hence, government intervenes in resource production and 
distribution “in order to right what are considered to be failures in the way the market distributes 
resources” (Walsh, 1995:4).  The next sections explore this subject in more detail.  
Tilak (2004) advances four major market failure related circumstances that necessitate 
government intervention in higher education funding. They are: the characterization of higher 
education as a public good, as a merit good, considerations of equity, and the existence of market 
imperfections in the higher education financing terrain.  
2.4.1. Public Goods 
 
 
To begin with, the private market will not provide adequately for public goods, that is, goods that 
are non-excludable and non-rivalrous in consumption (Hufner, 2003), or “goods which are 
inherently available to all and for which one person’s use does not preclude their availability to 
another” (Walsh, 1995:7). Because of the non-rivalrousness and non-excludability of public 
goods, the market, left to itself, will under-produce or totally fail to produce them ((Hufner, 
2003). Hence, in theory, the state can ascertain the optimum level of demand and then produce 
appropriate levels of public goods that maximize welfare (Walsh, 1995). The questions that then 
arise are, is higher education a public good, and, what does the answer to this question imply for 
higher education financing?  
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The common characterization of higher education as a public good derives from the 
recognition that such education generates indirect and shared benefits whose impacts are more 
social than private (Barriga, et al. 1998).  This recognition is premised on the social profitability 
or externalities that accrue to society from higher education (Omari, 1991, Mamdani, 2007). 
Quoting Lucas (1988), Romer (1986), and Schultz (1988), Barriga et al. (1998)  aggregate the 
benefits as including: improvement in health, reduction in population growth, reduction in 
poverty, improvement in income distribution, reduction in crime, strengthening of democracy, 
and the ensuring of civil liberties and technological externalities that are necessary for technical 
progress and economic growth. For example, the attainment of independence in many African 
countries was a result of opposition to colonial rule that was often led by graduates who were 
able to articulate criticism of colonial political and socio-economic systems and to champion 
liberal values such as self-rule (Omari, 1999; Tilak, 2004). The consumption by society of these 
‘soft’ benefits is, as stated above, neither excludable nor rivalrous. Thus, this public good 
characteristic of higher education constitutes a powerful logic for state intervention in higher 
education provisioning and financing. If it is agreed that society as a whole benefits from the 
externalities of higher education, then the state must pay for such benefits through financing 
higher education  (Nerlove, 1972; Tilak, 2004).  
While it is agreed that higher education generates positive externalities to society as a whole, 
it is also true that such education generates private benefits through its training function. This 
private profitability of higher education resides in the internal (private) rate of return that is 
measured in terms of graduate earnings (Psacharopoulos, 1994). Hildago (1998:674) argues, 
 
[T]he University is a production unit in which training is an input and the professional 
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graduate is the output. During the learning process – i.e., when knowledge is produced – 
the student receiving training increases his/her productivity, thereby raising his/her 
remuneration since his/her work is more qualified.      
Empirically however, pure public goods are thin on the ground. A good example of a 
pure public good is clean air. Often, goods fulfill one criterion (non-rivalrousness) or the other 
(non-excludability) and vice versa, or sometimes goods are public and sometimes they are not, 
varying with different modes of the good. In short, it is common to find goods that have public 
aspects but are also partly private goods and vice versa (Barzel, 1989).  
From the foregoing, it is evident that it would not be accurate to argue with a direct 
affirmative that higher education is a public good. It is equally true that it would also be 
inaccurate to argue outright that it is not. Amidst the controversy surrounding the public or 
private good nature of higher education is the agreement that it is at least a mixed or quasi-public 
good that produces a wide variety of both private and public benefits.  
  
2.4.2. Market Imperfections 
 
Imperfections that exist in capital markets make another strong argument for public financing of 
higher education. As Arrow (1993) observes, imperfect capital markets, in particular credit 
markets for education, as well as lack of market information are a common feature of many 
developing countries. The imperfections that characterize education credit markets in many of 
these countries dissuade students from borrowing against uncertain future returns of higher 
education. Woodhall (1990), for example, argues that people may not be inclined to borrow to 
finance higher education not only because of the uncertainty of its benefits, but also because of 
the relatively long gestation period that may be associated with it. Equally, lenders are 
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commonly averse to accepting risk backed only by uncertain future incomes of the reluctant 
debtors (Arrow, 1993). Imperfect capital markets and dearth of capital market information are 
thus a strong justification for public financing of higher education, particularly in developing 
countries.  
 
2.4.3. Education as a Merit Good 
 
Closely linked to the public good dimension of education is the recognition that higher education 
is a merit good, and that its consumption needs to be promoted (Barriga et al, 1998). The merit 
good perspective argues that in general people may lack the rationality to fully understand and 
appreciate the value and benefits of higher education (Tilak, 2004). As such, leaving higher 
education investment choices entirely to individuals would lead to low uptake, and therefore low 
consumption of higher education. However, the state, by virtue of it being enlightened and in 
possession of better information about the merits of investment in higher education, can in theory 
counter people’s irrationality regarding investment in higher education by financing it  (Tilak, 
2004).   
For example, while people may be aware of the positive effect of higher education on 
wages, they may not be conscious of the likely impact of higher education on the broader society 
in terms of its social profitability. Thus, government intervenes by way of higher education 
financing in a bid to cushion students and their families against consumer ignorance, and 
therefore promote consumption of higher education (Barriga et al, 1998). 
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2.4.4. Education Provides Equality of Opportunity 
 
Public financing of higher education is also advocated on the basis of equity considerations. 
Proponents of the equity perspective argue that, in the absence of state intervention, higher 
education becomes a preserve of the ‘haves’ (Omari, 1991; Tilak, 2004). Thus, the 
democratization of higher education in order to provide equal opportunity to all irrespective of 
socio-economic background is viewed as an indispensable role of the modern state (Omari, 1999; 
Tilak, 2004). As such, proponents of equity in higher education argue that it is important and 
necessary for the state to subsidize education at all levels in order to ensure equality of 
educational opportunity (Blaug and Woodhall, 1979; Johnstone, 2003; 2006; 2009). 
From about the 1980s, however, there has been a forceful argument against the role of 
government in economic activity, and more importantly on its role in social services provisioning 
as discussed in the beginning of this chapter. The debate has not been just about how the state’s 
activities can be limited and controlled, but also about the institutional character of the state. 
Generally referred to as the neo-liberal or market philosophy, this ‘new’ wave of economic 
thinking has become firmly established in higher education financing discourse. The next section 
explores in more detail the theoretical foundations of the philosophy vis-à-vis higher education 
financing .  
2.5. The Case for Market Funding of Higher Education 
 
Proponents of the market philosophy contend that the state must not only roll back its frontiers in 
development, including in public service provisioning, and therefore become smaller, but that it 
should also be different; it must become market orientated, fired by the spirit of entrepreneurship 
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(Osborne and Gaebler,1992).  
The major argument informing the philosophy is the contention that without a price and 
market mechanism, there will inevitably be state failure (Walsh, 1994; 1995). The argument goes 
further, to suggest that the state will only be able to operate effectively if it manages to mimic the 
operation of the market. In the market, it is argued, at least in theory, the system of prices and the 
exchange process allow individuals to make effective choices, which determine levels of 
production (Walsh, 1994). As such, it is argued that the state needs some mechanism of pricing 
that provides information on the value of the goods and services it produces.   
  Support for the market has, since the 1980s, forcefully entered the higher education 
sector. The long cherished and well established view that higher education is a public good that 
should be publicly financed has since come under challenge from an alternative view that 
champions marketization of higher education and advances the treatment of higher education as 
a private good (World Bank, 1994). This view is gaining ground globally as a result of, firstly, 
the phenomenon of globalization that has ushered in the widespread introduction of market-
related, neoliberal economic policies and,  secondly, a shortage of public funds for higher 
education across most national systems of higher education (Omari, 1991).  
Several arguments are raised against public provisioning of education, particularly higher 
education. There are essentially three perspectives to the arguments, namely: efficiency, equity 
and pragmatic considerations. 
2.5.1. Efficiency  
 
The fundamental rationale for the introduction of market principles in the management of the 
public sector, and therefore of higher education, is the assumption that marketization improves 
the efficiency and quality of service and reduce costs (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988).  Market 
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principles, it is suggested, will improve allocative and technical efficiency. The introduction of 
internal competition and market pressures, the separation of the political and managerial levels of 
control, and the establishment of clear standards and performance measurement systems will, it 
is claimed, improve technical efficiency in higher education through the elimination of waste and 
restrictive policies (Johnstone, 2003; 2006). Secondly, the introduction of user choice will ensure 
that higher education consumers will be able to get what they want and that higher education 
providers will become responsive to consumers’ wishes, thus improving allocative efficiency 
(Johnstone, 2006).  
Another rationale associated with efficiency, hence justifying market intervention in 
higher education provisioning, relates to estimates of rates of return to education. It is argued that 
the social rates of return to investment in higher education are lower than private rates of return. 
It is therefore recommended that public subsidies could be reduced and individuals asked to pay 
for their education (Psacharopoulos, 1994; World Bank, 1994) 
 2.5.2. Equity 
 
Arguing from the perspective of equity, proponents of the market maintain that public 
subsidization of education distorts patterns of resource distribution (Johnstone, 2006). They 
argue that it (public subsidization of education, especially higher education) increases income 
disparities by transferring resources from the poor to the rich, since, they argue, education 
subsidies accrue more to the rich than to the poor (Johnstone, 2006; Jimenez and Osaiasi, 2006; 
World Bank, 2000). As such, they argue, education subsidies are regressive. They further argue 
that education subsidies could be targeted at the poor only (Asian Development Bank, 2009; 
World Bank, 1994)   
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2.5.3. Pragmatic considerations 
 
From a pragmatic point of view, governments in developing countries in particular can ill afford 
public subsidization of higher education because of increasing resource challenges (Johnstone, 
2003).  The introduction of the market mechanism in higher education is therefore considered as 
the solution to the resource crunch they are faced with (Johnstone, 2003; 2006; World Bank, 
2010). This in fact is the philosophy underpinning economic reform policies adopted in many 
developing countries. The policies, coming in the form of stabilization and structural adjustment 
policies, are aimed at the reduction of state involvement in social services provisioning, 
including higher education (Haynes, 2008).  
There are also several other arguments informing the drive to marketization of higher 
education. Arguing on the basis of pragmatic considerations, advocates of the market do not 
agree that public subsidies are needed to promote equity or to promote democracy (Tooley, 
2000). Rather, they argue that reducing the role of the state in higher education financing would 
not negatively affect the growth of higher education, since cost recovery measures can be 
adopted (Johnstone, 2003; 2006). It is also felt that since higher education may not be price 
elastic, cost-recovery measures would not result in reduced enrolments since cost recovery 
measures would improve access (World Bank, 2010). The argument further maintains that public 
subsidies reduce the autonomy of higher education institutions by exposing them to government 
control (Johnstone, 2006). It is also argued that public subsidies in the form of grants to higher 
education institutions promote inefficiency in higher education delivery since these subsidies are 
seen as removing institutional incentives to allocate resources efficiently (Johnstone, 2006). 
Some even go further to question the rationality of subsidizing higher education when basic 
needs such as basic education and health care are not adequately funded. In short, this amounts to 
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misallocation of resources (Tooley, 2000). 
In sum, according to the market philosophy, it is difficult to justify the action of the state 
in services production and distribution on the grounds that it produces public goods, because it is 
difficult to discover such goods in pure form. Proponents of the market mechanism argue that 
there is no such thing as a public good in an objective sense. “It is a purely cultural construct” 
(Malkin and Wildavsky, 1991 in Walsh,1995:7) that cannot justify government activity on the 
basis of the production of public goods, which, in fact, “are only secondary effects of what are 
essentially private goods” (Walsh, 1995:7).   
A global consequence of the market philosophy has been the search for a new approach 
to public sector management, and, more importantly, for the “reinvention” of government 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). In that context, cost-sharing has become a significant aspect of the 
reform of higher education financing (Johnstone, 2003; 2006). The next sections interrogate the 
subject of cost-sharing in higher education finance in greater detail, and, in the process, a 
theoretical framework for the study is developed. 
2.6.   Theoretical Framework: Cost-Sharing in Financing Higher Education 
 
Cost-sharing in higher education generally refers to a shift in the burden of higher education 
costs from its being borne exclusively by government, or taxpayers, to its being shared with 
students and/or their parents. Maliyamkono and Ogbu (1999) define it as the introduction of 
shared responsibilities of education expenses between the government and the beneficiaries, who 
are the students and their families. More specifically, it is so defined: 
 [T]he introduction of, or especially sharp increases in, tuition to cover part of the 
costs of instruction or of user charges to cover more of the costs of lodging, food, 
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and other expenses of student living that may hitherto been borne substantially by 
governments (taxpayers) or institutions (Johnstone, 2006:16). 
Table 2.1: Cost-Sharing Implementation in Selected African Countries (As of 2003) 
Country Cost-Sharing Policies 
Botswana In 2002-2003, limited cost-sharing measures were introduced with plans to 
improve collection of loans 
Burkina Faso The country started to reduce grants and charge modest tuition fees in 1990s 
despite the no-fee tradition in Francophone Africa 
Ghana Introduction of cost-sharing was limited to small user fees for lodging and food. 
No tuition fees as of 2003.  
Kenya Government introduced tuition and user fees for lodging and food in 1992. 
However, tuition fees were later rolled back due to student opposition. The 
University of Nairobi introduced dual track tuition in 1992.  
Mozambique Cost-sharing introduced through tuition fees, though with reluctance 
Nigeria Government expects higher education institutions to cover at least 10% of costs 
from non-governmental revenue. While cost-sharing is contested ground, state 
universities charge nominal fees to cover lodging, food and tuition. Federal 
universities do not charge fees. 
Tanzania The country introduced cost-sharing in 1992. In mid 1990s, maintenance grants 
and lodging/food subsidies were reduced. Only dual track tuition fees were 
charged while comprehensive tuition was planned for the future 
Uganda An aggressive and financially successful dual track tuition system was 
introduced at Makerere University with 75% of students paying tuition fees.  
South Africa Though resisted, tuition fees and cost-sharing are generally a tradition in South 
Africa. 
Source:  Johnstone (2004)  
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While cost-sharing now features prominently in many countries as part of the regime to 
reform higher education financing, there do however exist large differences among countries in 
the nature and levels of its implementation across nations and even within the same national 
contexts. The select African cases presented in Table 2.1 are illustrative. 
Cost-sharing in higher education can take different forms. Examples are: the introduction 
of tuition fees where they previously did not exist; a steep rise in tuition fees where they are 
already in existence; or public HEIs charging more or nearly break-even or full cost fees for 
accommodation, board, books and other ancillary costs that may hitherto have been borne by 
government (Johnstone, 2003; 2006). It may also take the form of a reduction, or even the 
abolition of student grants (Johnstone, 2006).   
2.6.1. Rationale for Cost-Sharing 
 
Stakeholders in the higher education financing debate are agreed that higher education financing   
needs to be increased, yet general disagreement exists as to the best means of doing so 
(Johnstone, 2003; 2006). There is also an interesting dynamic in policy debates on the financing 
of education. While there is growing support for a decrease or elimination of cost-sharing at the 
primary and secondary (basic) levels of education in order to promote equity and access to 
education,
5
 there are pressures at the post-secondary level, particularly in higher education, to 
introduce or increase cost-sharing (Asian Development Bank, 2009; Psacharopoulos, 1994; 
World Bank, 1994; 2008; 2010).  
As noted in the preceding chapter, the issues that are central to, and therefore inform 
debates about the desirability of cost-sharing in higher education are: higher education is 
                                                          
5
 This is evidenced by the UNESCO Education For All (EFA) and Millennium Development Goals development 
frameworks (Asian Development Bank, 2009).  
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globally considered important for its private and public benefits (Tilak, 2004). As a result, higher 
education is in increasing demand across nations globally. At the same time, however, 
governments are faced with the challenge of accommodating and sustaining the rising demand 
against diminishing resources and ever-rising per student costs (Johnstone, 2003; 2006; World 
Bank, 1994; 2010). Under the circumstances, the issue becomes one of how best to reconcile the 
forces. These circumstances anchor the contextual backdrop under which the cost-sharing logic 
is being promoted globally (Johnstone, 2003;2006).  
Support for cost-sharing in higher education financing is influenced by three broad 
considerations that derive from the context cited above. They are: the pressing need to diversify 
higher education revenue, concerns about equity, and lastly considerations of efficiency 
(Johnstone, 2003; 2006).  
Support for diversification of higher education financing, also referred to as “the sheer 
need for other than governmental revenue” (Johnstone, 2003:3) is a function of the rise in the 
demand for higher education against governments’ or taxpayers’ inability to meet expanding 
revenue requirements (Johnstone, 2003; 2006). Most  countries, particularly those in the 
developing world, are faced with severe budgetary constraints resulting from the decline in 
taxable revenue and often rising competition from other pressing and compelling (largely 
political) public needs (Johnstone, 2003). As a result, national systems of higher education are 
having to seriously consider alternative sources to supplement governmental revenue, not only 
with cost-sharing, but with other activities such as entrepreneurship, sale of faculty services, 
fundraising, etc. (Mamdani, 2007). As such, tuition and other fees from students and parents are 
deemed to constitute a potentially rich source of additional revenue (Johnstone 2003; 2006; 
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World Bank, 1994; 2010). The philosophy behind revenue diversification underscores the notion 
that the alternative to substantial revenue supplementation through cost-sharing is worsening 
austerity in higher education institutions (Johnstone, 2 003; 2006; 2009; Woodhall, 2009). 
Considerations of equity in higher education financing demand that students, by virtue of 
their being beneficiaries of higher education, should at least share in the cost of their education 
(Hildago, 1997; Johnstone, 2003; 2006). This view is anchored in the arguments that (a) there is 
nothing like free higher education (Johnstone, 2006), and (b) the large number of higher 
education students are from middle, upper middle and upper income families (Douglass and 
Keeling, 2008:1; Johnstone, 2006) who ordinarily can afford to pay at least a portion of the costs 
of their education if they have to (Johnstone, 2006). 
From an efficiency point of view, cost-sharing is supported by the argument that the 
payment of some tuition by higher education students promotes efficiency in higher education 
financing and delivery, as such payments make students and families more discerning 
consumers, while universities become more responsive and conscious providers (Hildago, 1997; 
Johnstone, 2003; 2006).  
The sections below discuss these rationales in greater detail. An attempt is also made to 
juxtapose the arguments for cost-sharing with counter-arguments for public subsidization of 
higher education.    
2.6.1.1. Financing demand for higher education 
 
 
Proponents of cost-sharing argue that the major impediment to higher education access is limited 
supply of places, rather than limited demand (Johnstone, 2006). Dependence on public subsidies 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
is largely seen as severely limiting the number of places that can be provided by HEIs (Asian 
Development Bank, 2009; World Bank, 2010). It is further argued that, under the right 
conditions, students and their families are willing and able to pay for higher education, and cost 
recovery will increase both the resources available for higher education and enrolments (World 
Bank, 1994; 2010).  
Advocates of the public subsidy on the other hand argue that subsidies increase higher 
education enrolment by lowering private costs and thus increasing access (Tilak, 2004; 
Mohamedbhai, 2008). The underlying principle for public subsidy is the perception of 
investment in human capital (Amy, 2010). As such, without subsidies, it is argued, the cost of 
higher education would be prohibitively high and the demand for higher education would be 
insufficient to meet national manpower needs (Omari, 1991). Therefore, public assistance in the 
form of grants and loans for tuition and living expenses, for example, is seen as allowing low-
income group students to have access to higher education without serious financial burden (Amy, 
2010).    
 Evidence that supports both arguments at the empirical level is mired in controversy. For 
instance, a study by Bergh and Fink (2004) that used cross-country data for over a 100 countries 
in both developed and developing countries, including Africa, concluded that subsidized primary 
and secondary education leads to increased tertiary enrolment, while tertiary education subsidies 
do not appear to have any significant impact on enrolment (Bergh and Fink, 2004). This finding 
is supported by the assertions of both the Asian Development Bank (2009) and the World Bank 
(2010) that public expenditure on higher education does not necessarily translate to increased 
enrolments. Based on these findings, it can be argued that, in situations of constrained public 
resources, increasing public allocations to higher education at the expense of basic education 
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may actually be counterproductive. Yet, Amy (2010), in a study of higher education financing in 
Hong Kong, concluded that subsidies do have a positive impact on higher education enrolment. 
In view of the different and conflicting findings, one is tempted to conclude that there is lack of 
conclusiveness on what impact both subsidies and cost-sharing have on higher education 
enrolments.  
 In supporting cost-sharing in higher education, Fielden and La Rocque (2008) argue that 
the rapid proliferation of private higher education globally is proof of the inability of public 
provision to keep pace with demand. At the same time, the rise in private higher education 
institutions is also seen as vindicating the assertion that students and their families are able and 
willing to pay for higher education (Kapur and Crowley, 2008). However, while this argument 
may be true, it is also not uncommon, particularly in developing countries, to find the state also 
subsidizing private higher education.  
2.6.1.2. Equity 
 
 
Proponents of cost-sharing, arguing from the perspective of equity, argue that social justice 
(Clark, 1983) demands that students, by virtue of being beneficiaries of higher education, should 
at least share in its costs. The argument is rooted in the following considerations: (a) that there is 
nothing like free higher education: the assumed free higher education is in fact paid for by all 
citizens via the tax burden; and (b), that students from middle and upper income families 
constitute the greater number of higher education students (Douglass and Keeling, 2008:1) and 
that these groups of students can afford to pay at least a portion of the costs of instruction, if they 
are made to. Instead, these students and their families prefer that the general taxpayer bears the 
cost burden for a benefit that ultimately accrues to them. Yet whether higher education is 
subsidized or not has no impact on the enrollment patterns of students from more affluent 
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families (Johnstone, 2006). As such, public subsidies for higher education translate to a transfer 
payment from the state to the ‘haves’ - middle and upper income class families (Asian 
Development Bank, 2009; Johnstone, 2009; World Bank, 2010). This school of thought also 
maintains that the main obstacle to equitable access to higher education is the poor quality of 
basic and secondary education available to students from disadvantaged backgrounds, rather than 
the costs associated with higher education.  
 This being the case, to the extent that there are likely to be students from low income 
families who potentially would be excluded from higher education by the introduction of tuition 
fees, a portion of the fees collected can easily (at least in theory) support means-tested grants and 
loan subsidies, which, in turn, can maintain and even enhance the accessibility of higher 
education to the disadvantaged (Woodhall, 2004).   
However, and to the contrary, proponents of the subsidy are of the view that in the 
absence of public subsidies students from poor or disadvantaged backgrounds would be excluded 
from accessing higher education because of cost barriers (Johnstone, 2003; 2006; Woodhall, 
2004). It is argued therefore that public subsidies do have a positive impact on equitable access. 
It is further argued that subsidies will eventually be repaid by the students through higher income 
taxes since they will be better qualified and more productive (Omari, 1991).  
 At the empirical level, the impacts of both cost-sharing and the public subsidy on higher 
education access are debatable. A study conducted by Bergh and Fink (2008) dismissed the 
claim  that public subsidization of higher education translates to increased enrolments as well as 
lower inequality. The findings corroborated earlier findings by Dabla-Norris and Gradstein 
(2004) and the World Bank (2003) that concluded that in cases where higher education fees were 
eliminated,  there was not a significant positive impact on enrolment patterns vis-à-vis the socio-
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economic composition of the student body. Instead, the study established that it was the income 
related difference in access to quality basic and secondary education that was the main barrier to 
equitable access to higher education. As noted in the preceding section, however, these findings 
contrast sharply with Amy’s (2010) study in Hong Kong that established a direct correlation 
between public subsidies and increased higher education enrolments.  
   
2.6.1.3. Efficiency 
 
Neoliberal ideology requires of higher education some of the virtues of the market. One such 
virtue is the assumption of greater efficiency (Seco, 1998:23). Neoliberalists maintain that, under 
a regime of institutional grants from governments, incentives are available for higher education 
institutions to focus on bureaucratic and political interests. A shift to market-orientated provision 
of higher education is also deemed consistent with the global trend of market-based provision of 
services (Tiongson, 2006). It is also argued that cost-sharing solves the problem of academic 
malingering
6
 (or ‘professional students’) among the student population since fee-paying students 
are likely to be more conscientious (World Bank, 2010). The perspective holds that, in general, 
consumption of free goods is wasteful (Oosterbeek and Patrinos, 2008).  Countries such as 
Germany, the Netherlands and the US have responded to the problem by, among other methods, 
eliminating or reducing student aid after insufficient progress towards completion of a university 
programme (Oosterbeek and Patrinos, 2008).  
It is also argued from the perspective of efficiency that that higher education is expensive 
as compared to the primary and secondary education sub-sectors.  This is particularly the case in 
developing countries where it is reported that the ratio of unit costs of higher education to 
                                                          
6
 This is a practice by some students where they take unnecessarily long to complete programmes of study because 
the cost of tuition is paid for or highly subsidized by the state (World Bank, 2010). 
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primary schooling is in the order of 34:1. This is almost 20 times the comparable ratio in higher 
income countries (Asian Development Bank, 2008). 
The argument for the public subsidy in this context is that access to subsidized higher 
education places is based on merit (Tilak, 2004). As such, public resources are channeled to the 
most able students with the highest probability of success. In the process, the social efficiency of 
investments is maximized (Johnstone, 2006). Empirically, data on the efficiency of higher 
education institutions are severely limited. This is especially so because institutions differ 
markedly in their student intake as well as the comparable weight they give to instruction versus 
research and the competencies of graduates (World Bank, 2010). However, analysis of data from 
the US indicates that highly subsidized public institutions have lower graduation rates than 
private institutions (Woessmann, 2008). Some evidence points to an improvement in students’ 
commitment to their studies as a result of cost-sharing. For example, after introduction of a 
student loan programme in Mexico, loan recipients attained higher grade point averages and 
lower repetition rates than other students. In one study, Canton and Bloom (2004) found out that 
sixty percent of the students reported that they had increased their efforts because of the loan  
Notwithstanding the arguments for cost-sharing, it should be acknowledged that it 
remains highly contested across higher education systems. Not all stakeholders in higher 
education are convinced that it is desirable (Johnstone, 2006).  As a result, cost-sharing may not 
be easily accepted. The probability of resistance to cost-sharing is likely to be higher and more 
forceful in poorly performing economies and in countries where higher education is traditionally 
viewed as a social entitlement (Johnstone, 2004:21).  The next section discusses resistance to 
cost-sharing in more detail. 
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2.6.2. Resistance to Cost-sharing. 
   
Free higher education is supported by the view that society is the major beneficiary of higher 
education. As a result, proponents of this argument, particularly those in leftwing and radical 
political systems, are quick to ride on this economic rationale in resisting cost-sharing. 
Resistance to cost-sharing can also be severe in cases where students are a strong political force. 
For example, student opposition to the introduction of loans in Ghana contributed to the fall of 
the government in 1971, and to the abandonment of the scheme in the following year (Woodhall, 
2004). 
Resistance to cost-sharing can also emanate from academic leaders and faculty’s 
strongly-held traditional view that a proper higher education should be insulated from market 
forces such as privatization and commercialization, which in their view leads to academic 
mediocrity (Mamdani, 2007).  
2.6.3. Cost-Sharing Financing Options 
 
Johnstone (2003) notes that the introduction of cost-sharing as a reform measure is likely to meet 
with resistance and is therefore best implemented incrementally over time. He (2003) therefore 
advances a typology of cost-sharing that consists of eleven stages. At the lower end of the cost-
sharing implementation matrix are reforms that seek to introduce small, non-instructional costs 
such as application, registration, examination, student activity and other small fees. The 
introduction of these small earmarked or ancillary fees easily lends itself to political acceptability 
and is therefore easier to implement as a first step in the direction of establishing a culture of 
cost-sharing (Johnstone, 2003). However, while meeting relatively little resistance, these small 
fees generate little revenue. At the upper end are reforms aimed at full cost-recovery of higher 
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education expenses such as will effect large increases beyond the rate of unit cost increases. 
While these have a huge potential for revenue generation, they are prone to political and public 
resistance (Johnstone, 2003; 2006; 2009; World Bank, 2010).  
Another option for countries where students traditionally receive generous living 
allowances is to reduce the level of subsidy provided for food and lodging (Ziderman, 2002). 
Similarly, for countries operating in volatile and inflationary environments, simply freezing the 
nominal level of grants effectively reduces the level of subsidy over time (Johnstone, 2006). 
A number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, Uganda, Ghana, Kenya and 
Tanzania (World Bank, 2010), and of late some universities in Zimbabwe (Dembe, 2009), have 
experimented with dual pricing systems. Under this approach, fully subsidized places are 
allocated based on secondary school-leaving examination results, while students who have 
acceptable grades but miss the subsidy ‘cut off’ are admitted as fee paying students. Despite 
being seen as somewhat arbitrary and prone to corruption (Johnstone, 2003), the introduction of 
dual pricing systems is spreading globally. The People’s Republic of China introduced a version 
of this dual track system in 1985 but suspended it under the 1997 reforms (Asian Development 
Bank, 2009). Elsewhere, as in the Russian Federation where free higher education is enshrined in 
the constitution, fees were imposed with a supporting voucher system that provided five bands of 
support (ranging from 0% to 100%) based on the students’ performance on the university 
entrance examination. About 50% of total revenue for higher education in the Russian Federation 
now comes from fees under this dual track system (Johnstone, 2004). A variant of the dual 
pricing system involves the introduction of fee-based programmes in specific disciplines within 
the overall framework of a fully subsidized system (Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Developnet, 2003).  
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Globally, the introduction of cost-sharing through tuition and other fees is commonly 
followed by a corresponding establishing of student grants and/or loans to mitigate the impact on 
students. Grant and loan programmes are ordinarily designed to support only some students, with 
allocations tied to performance on entrance examinations (merit), or to socio-economic status 
(financial need). The programmes can also be targeted to increase access or participation of 
underrepresented populations, such as women or minorities, or can be linked to specific human 
resources requirements (Asian Development Bank, 2009). 
2.6.4. Options for Student and/or Family Financing of Costs. 
 
In cases where an increased share of total costs is borne by the beneficiaries, cost-sharing raises 
three key questions, namely: (a) how should the costs be financed without excluding students 
from economically vulnerable backgrounds; (b) who should pay these costs (students or 
parents/families); and (c) when should the costs be paid (during the duration of study or later in 
life after graduation)? The type of cost-sharing, especially the type of tuition fee policy adopted 
by a country, has implications for the assistance policies that are put in place to ensure equity and 
access for the socio-economically disadvantaged groups (World Bank, 2010).  
An up-front tuition fee policy requires students and/or families to pay a tuition fee for a 
semester or academic year at the beginning of that semester or academic year. The number of 
countries in Africa where up-front tuition fees have been introduced is increasing. This includes 
even some Francophone African countries where, traditionally, fully subsidized higher education 
was the norm. Other countries on the continent have resorted to the dual track system, usually as 
a result of either prohibitive legal frameworks or strong political and/or popular resistance to 
tuition fees (Mamdani, 2007; World Bank, 2010). Table 2.2 is illustrative.  
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Table 2.2: Types of tuition fees in public higher institutions in selected African Countries 
 
Country Type of Tuition Fee 
Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia 
Dual Track 
Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Swaziland Deferred 
Kenya, Rwanda Dual Track and Deferred 
Cote d’ Ivoire, The Gambia, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Nigeria (at State level), Sierra 
Leone, South Africa 
Upfront 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe Upfront and Dual Track 
Namibia Upfront and Deferred  
 
Source: World Bank, 2010  
 
Two types of dual-track fee policies are identifiable in sub-Saharan Africa. The first type, 
practiced in such countries as Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya provides free or low cost 
places to a limited number of students on the basis of their performance in the secondary school-
leaving examination, and fee-paying places to others who score lower but however meet 
requirements for admission into university. In the case of Angola, Ethiopia (World Bank, 2010), 
and lately Zimbabwe (Dembe, 2009), fee paying places are offered to “parallel” students, that is, 
those who score lower and study in the evening, weekends or during the summer. 
 The second type, implemented in Benin, Madagascar and Senegal, for example, awards 
free places to all students passing the secondary school-leaving baccalaureate examinations in 
faculties with open access, while fee paying places are offered in more competitive professional 
faculties or institutions (World Bank, 2010). 
Another type of tuition fee policy in implementation in sub-Saharan Africa is a 
“deferred” tuition fee policy (World Bank, 2010). Here, the tuition fee is expected from the 
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student rather than the family but is deferred as a loan to be repaid after graduation or upon exit 
from the university. The advantage of the deferred tuition fee is that it disguises the implantation 
of cost-sharing. Its disadvantage however is that it foregoes the revenue that might otherwise be 
forthcoming from family contributions that are tied to an “up-front” tuition fee (World Bank, 
2010).  
2.6.5. Student Financial Assistance 
 
While cost-sharing can bring the much needed resources to higher education to expand 
accessibility and equity and even improve the quality of higher education delivery, it is important 
that safety nets are correspondingly established to mitigate its potential negative impacts on 
students from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds (Woodhall, 2004).  Woodhall 
(2004: 38) says that 
  
[A]s higher education systems everywhere face the twin pressures of financial austerity 
and rising demand, financial assistance to enable students to pay direct and indirect costs 
of higher education (tuition fees, books, and living expenses) has become an urgent issue 
in many countries; and the case for some form of student support to ensure equality of 
opportunity, equity, and social justice is rarely questioned.  
 
Woodhall (2004) further argues that while the need for financial assistance for vulnerable 
students is widely recognized, there is no consensus on what form the assistance should take. 
Various options exist. Table 2.3 provides examples of the range of student assistance 
programmes in sub-Saharan African countries. 
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Table 2.3: Student Financial Assistance Programmes in African Countries 
 
Angola Government grants for living costs 
Botswana Grant-loan scheme 
Burundi Students receive little direct financial assistance  
Cameroon Financial assistance is based on need and merit 
Cote d’ Ivoire Government grants for all qualified students 
Ethiopia Deferred tuition fees and deferred maintenance costs for all qualified students 
Kenya HELB loans. Needy students also receive means tested financial aid 
Mali National grants based on results and age 
Mauritius Means-tested grants covering tuition fees, books, living costs and exam fees 
Namibia Means-tested financial assistance scheme 
Nigeria Needs-based financial assistance and student loans 
Senegal Grants covering tuition fees and living costs based on academic merit 
South Africa Loan scheme with a possibility of conversion of 40% of the loan to a grant 
depending on student academic results 
Tanzania Means-tested deferred tuition fees and deferred maintenance costs 
Uganda Government sponsored students receive free tuition, room and board 
Zimbabwe Needy students receive financial support from government and are in turn 
bonded to work in Zimbabwe after graduation for a fixed number of years 
Source: World Bank (2010) 
 
The options include universal or means-tested grants or bursaries, scholarships, sponsorship by 
employers, subsidized job opportunities or student loans (Woodhall, 2004).  With respect to loan 
systems, their feasibility and appropriate design is contested ground. 
 Globally, most governments either provide grants in the form of scholarships or bursaries 
that may be means-tested or targeted to specific groups of students or provide and guarantee 
loans that must be repaid after graduation (Woodhall, 2004). Alternatively, some governments 
provide a combination of grants for the neediest students and loans for others (Woodhall, 2004).  
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2.6.6. Student Loan Schemes 
 
Loan systems are now ubiquitous in higher education systems the world over. Depending on how 
they are structured, loans can address equity, access, and sustainability concerns in higher 
education. However, experience drawn from a wide cross-section of particularly African 
countries reveals the failure of loans, and therefore cost-sharing, to shift a significant share of 
costs from governments to students (Johnstone, 2004; World Bank, 2010). Table 3.4 is 
illustrative. 
 
 
Table 2.4: Financial Significance of Tuition Fees in Selected African Countries 
 
Insignificant ( ≤10%) Significant (11-29%) Very Significant (≥30%) 
Tanzania+ 
Zimbabwe+ 
Madagascar* 
Malawi (residential)+ 
Mozambique* 
Rwanda (government 
supported)#  
Namibia* 
South Africa* 
Swaziland* 
Ethiopia# 
Kenya (module 1)+ 
Rwanda (privately paying 
science courses)#  
Benin (selective programs)+ 
Kenya (module II)+ 
Uganda (fee paying)+ 
Zambia (fee paying)+ 
Burkina Faso (elite 
institutions)* 
Ghana* 
Kenya* 
Malawi (non residential)+ 
Rwanda (privately paying non 
science courses)* 
Nigeria (state universities)+ 
 
#significance based on % of instructional cost; 
+significance based on % of recurrent unit cost; 
*significance based on % of institutional income 
 
Source: World Bank, 2010 
 
 
Ideally, the design of a loan programme should reflect the policy objectives of the scheme. 
Ziderman (2004) identifies five general objectives that loan programmes may be intended to 
serve, namely, income generation, expansion of higher education, equity improvement, meeting 
specific human resources needs, and easing students’ financial burdens 
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A fundamental question in the loan debate (to which answers will be country specific) is 
whether investments in higher education provide a reasonable private rate of return. If the private 
rate of return is high, and perfect education credit markets exist, some form of loan (rather than 
grant) is appropriate. If however, returns are unacceptably low, a loan based solution is not likely 
to be viable (Asian Development Bank, 2009). 
Loans take different forms, with equally differing degrees of subsidy and methods of 
repayment. For example, student borrowers may be required to repay the loan over a fixed period 
of time (mortgage type) or to commit a fixed fraction of their income until the loan is repaid 
(income-contingent). In some countries, a graduate tax has been considered and, in yet others, 
graduates are expected to repay their loans by being bonded to work in specific occupations (for 
example, teaching), in a specific area (for example, home area or rural areas) or through national 
service for a fixed period of time (Woodhall, 2004; World Bank, 2010). 
Broadly, loan repayment plans fall into two categories, namely, the mortgage type and 
the income contingent. 
2.6.6.1. Mortgage Type of Loan Scheme 
 
 
 The mortgage loan is the commonest type of loan scheme available in most countries. 
Ordinarily, the mortgage type loan has a fixed repayment schedule over a specified period. The 
student pays a fixed installment calculated on the borrowed loan over a fixed period of time 
(Woodhall, 2004). Repayments can be made monthly, quarterly, etc., depending on the 
requirements of a particular loan scheme (Chapman, 1998). The main disadvantage of the 
mortgage loan type is that usually repayment starts soon after graduation when incomes are 
usually lower than in later years (Chapman, 1998).  
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2.6.6.2. Income Contingent Loans 
 
 
Developed by the University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman in 1955 and first introduced 
in Australia in 1989, the income contingent (or income related or contingent repayment) loan is 
the second most common form of student loan (Johnstone, 2009). This loan system is premised 
on the assumption that loan viability and recovery can be improved if the borrower is allowed to 
make repayments that are dependent or contingent on one’s income after graduation rather than 
on the borrowed loan. 
In an income contingent loan, what is fixed is the monthly or annual repayment burden, 
along with the interest rate (Johnstone, 2009). What varies, however, is the repayment period, 
which is determined by the borrowers’ earning levels. Given that repayment is contingent on 
one’s earnings, it is possible that some lifetime low-earning borrowers might end their repayment 
obligations without having repaid the loan in full (Johnstone,1972; Barr, 2001). The income-
contingent loan concept also suggests full cost recovery fees, that is, that institutions should hike 
and charge full cost fees that cushion them from budget deficits. Similarly, students must have 
access to huge amounts of loans since repayment, based as it is on the borrower’s income, is not 
punitive.  
Advocates of income-contingent loans claim that this type of loan is superior to other 
loan systems in that it affords borrowers easy repayment plans. Repayments are structured in 
such a way that they do not exceed a percentage of income that is deemed manageable. 
Secondly, loan recovery costs and default levels are low because repayments are collected from 
the borrower’s pay by the employer (Barr, 2001). 
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2.6.6.3. Private Provision of Higher Education 
 
 
One other way to finance cost-sharing is to encourage private providers to support students’ 
funding of higher education.  Two common options exist. They are: the graduate tax and human 
capital contracts (World Bank, 2010). 
The Graduate Tax option involves levying an additional surcharge on the graduate’s 
income in return for government scholarships. However, a number of problems come with this 
option.  The major problems are that this approach may serve as a disincentive to increase 
earnings through extra work, or it may serve as an incentive for emigration to avoid the 
surcharge.  No country has instituted a graduate tax system. (Asian Development Bank, 2009). 
Under the Human Capital Contracts system, a private sector investor finances a student’s 
higher education in exchange for a percentage of later earnings, usually for a fixed period. This 
option is common in such countries as Chile, Colombia, Germany, and the United States of 
America (Chapman, 2005; Salmi and Hauptman, 2006; Oosterbeek and Patrinos, 2008).  
 
2.6.7. Problems Associated with Student Loans 
 
The design and implementation of loan programmes are not without problems and controversy. 
Woodhall (2004) cites a number of problems encountered by loan programmes around the world, 
which relate to (a) undercapitalization of loan systems; (b) administrative incapacity to secure 
repayment and minimize default; and (c) how to make student loans politically acceptable.The 
World Bank (2010) reports that in general, the record of student loan recovery in sub-Saharan 
African countries is exceedingly poor. Table 2.5 provides an indication of the record. 
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Table 2.5: Loan Recovery in Selected African Countries 
 
Botswana As of 2009, only P20 million had been 
recovered out of more than P4 billion loaned 
over the past 15 years 
Burkina Faso As of 2003, out of the 9 917 beneficiaries of 
FONER (loans and grants), 1 189 borrowers 
are in arrears, and bad debts amount to CFAF 
818 270 000 plus CFAF 245 481 000 in 
interest.  
Kenya 26 720 graduates have fully repaid their loans. 
Another 57 000 have not yet begun servicing 
their loans.  
Lesotho The recovery rate is so low that loans are 
essentially a grant.  
Namibia Loan recovery was very low until 2006. 10 478 
students owe money; and of these, 1 153 are 
paying back their loans, while the rest are 
either unemployed, have extended their loans, 
or their files are at the Attorney’s office  
South Africa Since 40% of the loan is converted to a grant if 
academic performance is good, recovery per se 
is not a good measure of success. 
Swaziland As of 2006, E 289 million was owed 
Source: World Bank, 2010. 
 
The Bank further argues that cost (loan) recovery primarily depends on loan programme 
design, particularly important being an interest rate that can recover all or most of the initial cost 
(World Bank, 2010; Woodhall, 2004) and cost effective collection. The following are cited by 
the World Bank (2010) as key to the failure to recover payment and ensure the financial 
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sustainability of student loans. 
2.6.7.1. Inadequate Means Testing 
 
 
It is argued that most of the loan programmes in Africa are generally available (Woodhall, 2004), 
suggesting that their allocation is made without due consideration of the student’s financial or 
economic status. Rather, allocations are made in some cases to all students regardless of financial 
need. For example, in Ethiopia, Lesotho, and Swaziland loans are available to all higher 
education students (World Bank, 2010).  
2.6.7.2. Low Interest Rates 
 
 
The politically-related fear of students’ resistance to cost-sharing is cited as one of the major 
reasons for interest rates that are set far too low. Woodhall (2004) notes that in many loan 
schemes governments not only provide student loan guarantees but also subsidize the interest 
rate charged on the loans. Some schemes provide interest free loans while others charge only the 
current rate of inflation, thus making the loans interest free in real terms (Woodhall, 2004). The 
problem is that in such cases the often substantial and costly interest on the loans becomes a 
“hidden grant” eventually borne by government (Woodhall, 2004). In Botswana, Lesotho, and 
Tanzania, for example, no interest is charged on student loans (although the Higher Education 
Students Loan Board [HESLB] in Tanzania is working to change this) (World Bank, 2010). Only 
three countries in sub-Saharan Africa, namely Ghana, Ethiopia, and South Africa charge a real 
interest rate that is greater than the prevailing inflation rate (World Bank, 2010).  
In general, in more than half of the loan programmes have significant interest subsidies 
built in (World Bank, 2010). While this obviously has a negative effect on cost recovery, 
advocates of the subsidy argue that subsidization of interest on loans encourages students from 
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poor socio-economic backgrounds who would otherwise be afraid to borrow because of the 
loans’ prohibitive costs to access higher education (Woodhall, 2004). 
2.6.7.3. Unnecessarily Long Repayment Periods 
 
 
From the World Bank’s (2010) point of view, grace and repayment periods for student loans in 
Africa are unnecessarily long. This, according to the Bank, exacerbates the losses from excessive 
subsidization of interest. The repayment periods range from very short, as in Lesotho and 
Namibia, to indefinite, as in South Africa (Shen and Ziderman, 2007).     
2.6.7.4. Prohibitive Legal Environments 
 
Some student loan programmes, such as in Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, and Rwanda, were 
established with weak or non-existent enabling legislation. This often left the boards charged 
with the administration of student loans without the legal muscle to enforce loan repayment. The 
situation has been changing, however, with the establishment of semi-autonomous boards that 
have the legal power to enforce loan recovery (the HELB in Kenya, for example). Another 
example is that of the Fond National pour I’Education et la Recherche (FONER) loans in 
Burkina Faso, whose major weakness is the lack of legal provision for recovery to the extent that 
even when debtors are tracked down, the government does not have the legal power to enforce 
employers to deduct repayments from the borrowers’ wages (Some, 2006). 
2.6.7.5. Administrative Incapacity to Manage Loan Recovery 
 
 
The success or failure of a loan programme is largely a function of effective collection, which in 
turn depends on the quality of administration, the availability of information, and the incentives 
of the lending authority (Asian Development Bank, 2009:18). Johnstone (2003:10) observes that 
“student loan programmes globally have registered an impressive record of failure”. In 
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developing countries, repayment rates are typically less than 50%. Even successful systems 
rarely collect more than 70% of funds lent (Ziderman, 2002). In most African countries loan 
recovery is weak (Pillay, 2008).     In most cases, too, the funding for loans comes from 
governments through annual appropriations. This generates little capacity or incentive to track 
and enforce repayment. In other cases, loans are often administered by understaffed, 
inadequately resourced and weak state and/or university bureaucracies. In yet others, the loans 
are administered by private banks (Woodhall, 2009) 
 To be successful, a loan programme needs a collection authority that is professional, 
incorruptible, and with the requisite technical expertise. This suggests distancing the collection 
function from government or university bureaucracies (World Bank, 2010). Such is the case with 
the Student Financing Agency for Rwanda (SFAR), the HESLB in Tanzania and HELB in 
Kenya (World Bank, 2010). Other options include contracting out the function to private firms 
with experience in capitalizing on loan recovery, sale of loans to secondary markets, and 
“securitization” (Salmi and Hauptman, 2006). 7   
Collection of income-contingent loans is even more complex since it requires reliable 
information on graduates’ annual earnings as the basis for determining repayment (Chapman and 
Ray, 2002). The problem is more pronounced in developing countries, where income is often not 
accurately reported, given the prevalence of graduate employment in the informal sector (World 
Bank, 2010). At the minimum, a workable recovery mechanism calls for a national system for 
monitoring incomes and a unique identification number that tracks graduates through their 
working lifetime (Chapman and Ray, 2002). Another problem area vis-à-vis loan recovery is 
collection from graduates who emigrate or work abroad for extended periods of time. Barr 
(2007) describes emigration as the repayment “black hole”.  
                                                          
7
 Issuing bonds financed by anticipated loan repayment. 
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The other factors that contribute to poor loan recovery relate to disbursements of loans in 
such a way that students are frequently unaware that they are incurring a real payment obligation 
(Woodhall, 2009). Such is the case when the loans are disbursed direct to higher education 
institutions to cover tuition and other related costs. In countries with fully deferred tuition fees, 
such as Botswana, Ethiopia, and Lesotho, students never see any of the money (World Bank, 
2010). This may limit their understanding of their repayment obligations. In extreme cases, 
students may construe this to mean free higher education, thus creating problems for future loan 
recovery initiatives (World Bank, 2010). In Tanzania, while the HESLB pays the loans direct to 
the higher education institutions, the student borrowers are, however, required to acknowledge 
receipt of the funds by signing a copy of the payment list issued by HESLB (World Bank, 2010). 
However, while the disbursement of loans direct to institutions may make the concept of the loan 
less real to students, it removes the risk that the money will not be used by students for purposes 
other than education (World Bank, 2010).  
 Following the global rise in the adopting of cost-sharing as a higher education funding 
strategy, it is pertinent to ask: How has the introduction of cost-sharing impacted on access to 
higher education across nations? What are the lessons from the global patterns? The next section 
addresses these questions using evidence from comparative studies. 
2.7. Higher Education Access 
 
Access has not been defined clearly in existing literature. While there are multiple assumptions 
about what access to higher education means (Hasley, 1993), a closer analysis of the literature 
reveals three major strands of definitions. Each strand posits different underlying assumptions 
about access. The first cluster of definitions views access from a socio-political perspective and 
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explores the relationship between social inequality and access. Grounded upon Trow’s (1973) 
celebrated typology of the stages of development of higher education systems from elite to mass 
and then to universal access, the literature argues for an equal representation of social groups in 
higher education as the ultimate goal of access policy. In each of the three stages – elite, mass, 
and universal – higher education access resembles the fundamental social structure of countries.  
In the elite and mass systems, those who gain access to higher education are mostly from 
the upper or middle class. It is only at the universal stage that higher education entry selection is 
removed and the composition of the higher education student body represents the social 
composition of a nation’s population. According to the literature (Brown, 1992; Hasley, 1993; 
Trow, 1973), the aim of universal access is towards the equality of social group achievement 
rather than the equality of individual opportunity as in the elite or mass systems. Trow’s 
typology has been used extensively in access research and has become a significant evaluative 
criterion of access in addition to the traditional evaluation of college enrolment numbers and/or 
ratios (Yang, 2011). 
The second cluster of literature (Clark, 1978; Furth, 1973; Scott, 1995) defines access 
from an education-system perspective that locates the access debate within national education 
systems. According to this perspective, higher education access is a function of stratification of 
higher education institutions, tracking systems in secondary schools, and rigid higher education 
entry selection. According to the literature, since differences in quality of programmes, size, and 
funding resources are characteristic of stratified or tiered higher education institutions, students 
do not have equal opportunity to access the best higher education institutions with more funding 
resources (Yang, 2011). Jallade (1989) also notes that the differentiation of secondary education 
into academic and vocational tracks limits access, since graduates from vocational schools are 
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often denied access to universities. 
 In addition, rigid higher education selection processes form legitimate barriers to access 
by forcing out a large number of students with lower academic preparation at the secondary 
school level (Clark, 1985). Thus, viewed from an education-system perspective, access is 
regarded as the pathway from secondary schools to higher education institutions. As such, access 
evaluation should interrogate such factors as institutional stratification, secondary tracking 
systems, and (rigid) higher education entry requirements (Yang, 2011). 
The third strand that has assumed prominence in comparative access research in recent 
years is the economic perspective. Scholars in this group focus on the role of higher education 
finance policies in relation to students’ economic disposition to financing their access to higher 
education (Baber and Lindsay, 2006; Blondal, Field and Giroad, 2002; Dolton, Greenaway and 
Vignoles, 1997; Johnstone, 2002; Kim and Lee, 2006; Vossensteyn, 2004). Most of these authors 
argue that tuition costs impede access, especially for students from disadvantaged economic 
backgrounds.   
For example, Barr (1993) laments the detrimental effects of reduced grants on access of 
low-income students. Similarly, Albrecht and Ziderman (1993:86) found that student loan 
programmes mostly “bestow large subsidies on the wealthier groups”, resulting in lower-income 
group students often lacking access to higher education regardless of student loan programmes. 
Studies by Heller (2006), Johnstone, (1986; 2003) and Palfreyman (2004) also concluded that as 
the costs of higher education are shifted from the government to students, it is the lower-income 
students who are most likely to be forced out of higher education, or, at the very least, forced to 
attend lower-cost or less prestigious institutions. Thus, from an economic perspective, access is 
an opportunity to pursue higher education that should not be constrained by family inability to 
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pay. Further, academically qualified students should be able to access higher education 
regardless of their economic circumstances (Palfreyman, 2004).  
Overall, the concept of access is better understood in specific contexts. It varies by 
countries’ socio-political structures, national educational systems, and economic growth (Yan, 
2011). Secondly, while higher education access can be evaluated on the basis of perspective- 
specific factors, at times the interaction of factors from different perspectives can combine to 
either promote or create even more barriers to access to higher education. 
2.8. Conceptual Framework 
 
 
The conceptual framework for this study is derived from the preceding discussion on cost-
sharing theory. The literature on cost-sharing in higher education finance (Johnstone, 2006; 
Asian Development Bank, 2009; Woodhall, 2009; World Bank, 1994; 2010) views cost-sharing 
as a function of the costs-revenue disequilibrium resulting from the failure of national budgets to 
keep pace with the costs associated with the rapid expansion of national higher education 
systems. 
 According to Johnstone (2006), at the centre of and propelling the drive towards cost-
sharing in higher education finance are two global forces. The first is the growing incapacity of 
tax revenue to meet the ever increasing higher education costs. As a result, HEIs are faced with a 
resource crunch that is manifest in low and declining per student expenditures and increasingly 
deteriorating quality of higher education (Johnstone, 2006; Woodhall, 2009; World Bank, 1994, 
2010). The second (directly giving rise to the former) is the global increase in higher education 
enrolments. The rapid expansion in enrolments is attributable to (a) the growth in the number of 
traditional university age cohorts; (b) increases in secondary school enrolments; (c) the value 
attached to the private rate of return to investment in higher education; and (d) equity policies 
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that seek to promote access to higher education by previously disadvantaged groups (Johnstone, 
2003;2006). Johnstone (2006) also sees the global rise of the knowledge economy and the 
attendant expectations placed on higher education as a key vehicle for economic development as 
yet another force moving national systems of higher education towards rapid expansion and 
diversification of access and institutions. 
 For most countries globally, the rapid expansion and diversification of higher education 
access and institutions has resulted in a cost-revenue squeeze that is characterized by the 
incapacity of public outlays via national budgets to meet the ever rising costs of financing higher 
education. It is within this cost-revenue gap that Johnstone (2003, 2006), Woodhall (2009); 
Asian Development Bank (2009) and the World Bank (2010), for example, situate cost-sharing 
as the most sustainable and potentially lucrative option to adopt when rising to the challenge of 
financing higher education. Advocates of cost-sharing however recognize its potential negative 
impacts on students from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds (Johnstone, 2003; 
Woodhall, 2009; World Bank, 20101).  
As may be inferring from the discussion, when the expansion of access entails movement 
from elite to mass and then to universal access (Trow, 1973; Brown, 1993; Hasley, 1993) severe 
fiscal constraints shift the higher education financing burden to students (Baber and Lindsay, 
2006; Blondal et al, 2002; Vossensteyn, 2004), and, in the process, it is the lower income group 
of students that is likely to suffer the consequences (Barr, 1993; Heller, 2006; Palfreyman, 2004). 
Thus proponents of cost-sharing argue that its introduction be accompanied by safety nets in the 
form of student support mechanisms to cushion vulnerable students from its potentially harsh 
effects. Such support (student financial assistance) programmes would include universal or 
means tested grants and/or loans, bursaries, scholarships, sponsorships by employers, and part-
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time student job opportunities.  
It has been demonstrated previously that student loan programmes are essentially of two 
types, the mortgage and contingent, and that the design and implementation of loan programmes 
the world over are replete with challenges stemming from, for example, under capitalization, 
inadequate means testing, incompatible and prohibitive legal frameworks as well as weak 
administrative capacity to manage loan recovery (Woodhall, 2009; World Bank, 2010). The 
discussion has also shown that the record of loan recovery in sub-Saharan Africa is generally 
weak (Pillay, 2009) and that successful loan recovery requires a collecting authority that is 
professional and incorruptible as well as a supportive legal framework (Woodhall, 2009).        
 
2.9. Conclusion 
 
This literature review has demonstrated that an understanding of the trajectories driving shifts in 
higher education funding policy requires a critical analysis of a number of factors. At the base of 
global shifts is a convergence of global-national-local (glonacal) factors (Marginson and 
Rhoades, 2002) combining in specific ways in particular periods in the history of the 
development of higher education to define and shape higher education financing patterns.  
 It has also been shown that higher education financing is indeed a controversial subject. 
While there is general agreement as to the existence of historical, contemporary and strategic 
challenges to  the reform of higher education financing, particularly in Africa, there is however 
no consensus at both the level of diagnosis of the financing problem and in the suggested 
remedies for the ‘crisis’. Equally, the literature on relative efficiency between market (private) 
and public delivery of higher education shows inconclusive evidence. This underscores the fact 
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that one cannot generalize as to which model, whether public or market, is best across countries, 
or even within countries over time. It is also a truism that, in Africa today, the role of both the 
public and private sectors in higher education delivery is undeniable.   As such, in the case of 
cost-sharing and the public subsidy in higher education provisioning, it is necessary that the two 
not be treated as alternatives, as is often the case, but rather as potentially complementary forms 
of financing.  It is no longer a question of public versus private, but rather, the best and most 
efficient mix for specific contexts  (Stonis, 2009).  
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Introduction 
 
It would be recalled that the study was aimed at identifying and accounting for the shifts in cost-
sharing policy in financing higher education in Zimbabwe from 1957-2009. As such, this chapter 
describes and justifies the research processes and procedures that were adopted for the study. It 
details the research paradigm and research design adopted, the strategies used, the research 
informants (participants) and how they were selected, the tools used to collect data, how data 
was collected, and the techniques used to analyze the data.    
  
3.2. Research Approach 
The study adopted a qualitative approach to examining and describing the shifts in the 
conceptualization and practice of cost-sharing in financing students’ higher education in 
Zimbabwe.  
 Literature on qualitative research shows that such terms as interpretive, naturalistic, 
constructivist, ethnographic and fieldwork are used to designate the spectrum of approaches that 
fall under the rubric of qualitative research (Locke, et al, 2000).  While there is no universally 
accepted definition of qualitative research, the literature points to three major characteristics that 
define it, namely, that qualitative researchers (a) seek to describe and understand human 
behaviour rather than explain it; (b) study phenomena in their natural settings; and (c) assume 
that those phenomena are multifaceted and complex (Babbie and Mouton, 1998; Ross, 1999; 
Locke, et al, 2000; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  
 Babbie and Mouton (1998) contend that the term qualitative research paradigm refers to 
social science research that attempts to always study human action from the insider’s 
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perspective. It attempts “to view the world through the eyes (perspective) of the actors 
themselves” (p.270), hence there is a preference for understanding events, actions, and processes 
in the concrete, natural setting in which they occur. Secondly, “the goal of research is defined as 
describing and understanding, rather than the explanation and prediction of human behavior” 
(p.53).  In other words, qualitative research involves a naturalistic, interpretive approach to its 
subject matter (Hiatt (1986) and qualitative researchers seek to explore meaning, purpose and 
reality (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  
 
Against the foregoing background, the choice of a qualitative approach for the study was 
informed by two major considerations. Firstly, the approach, with its emphasis on understanding 
and describing phenomena in their natural setting, was deemed consistent with the study’s major 
objective, which sought to understand and describe the shifts in cost-sharing policy in financing 
students’ higher education in a specific (naturalistic) context – Zimbabwe. Secondly, the 
appropriateness of a qualitative approach to the research process lay in the study’s aim to make 
sense of, or to interpret events, namely, shifts in cost-sharing policy, in higher education 
students’ funding in Zimbabwe in terms of the meanings or subjective reality, that is, the various 
conceptualizations of the shifts in cost-sharing policy that key actors, such as Government, 
university officials, and university students ascribed to them.  
3.3. Research Design. 
 
The study used an historical research design to examine and explain the shifts in the 
conceptualization and practice of cost-sharing in the financing of students’ higher education in 
Zimbabwe from the inception of the first university, the University College of Rhodesia and 
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Nyasaland in 1957 to the present, 2009.  
Babbie and Mouton (1998: 74) define a research design as a “plan or blueprint of how 
you intend conducting the research”. Similarly, Cheek (2008: 761) describes qualitative research 
design as “the way in which a research idea is transformed into a research project or plan that can 
be carried out in practice by a research or research team.” Maxwell (2005) offers a more 
elaborate definition that views a qualitative research design as a set of advance decisions that 
constitute the master plan, setting and specifying the methods and procedures to be used in 
collecting and analyzing the needed information. Among the most common qualitative research 
designs are historical studies, phenomenology, ethnography, grounded theory and case study 
(Babbie and Mouton, 1998; Maxwell, 2005; Blanche et. al, 2006).  
Wiersma (1995) points out that an historical research design provides a critical contextual 
link of the past to the present. It involves the systematic collection and evaluation of data related 
to the development of phenomena for the purpose of describing causes, effects or trends of those 
occurrences. Wiersma (1995) further notes that the design is ideal for studies that seek to trace,   
understand, and/or describe the evolution of an idea, theme or phenomena through history. The 
design relies on records, documents, oral histories, relics, and artefacts to describe and analyze 
historical events, philosophies, etc. It also relies significantly on inductive, logical reasoning 
(Babbie and Mouton, 1998; Blanche et. al, 2006).  Sources of historical data are normally 
grouped into primary and secondary sources (Babbie and Mouton, 1998).  The process of 
conducting historical research involves four steps, with considerable overlap. The sequence 
consists of (a) identification of the research problem; (b) collection and evaluation of data; (c) 
synthesis of data; (d) data analysis, interpretation, and formulation of conclusions (Wiersma, 
1995). 
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Noting the study’s objective to trace, describe, and understand the shifts in the 
conceptualization of cost-sharing policy in higher education students’ financing in Zimbabwe 
through history, an historical research design was considered the most relevant and appropriate. 
The use of an historical approach allowed the researcher to trace the development of higher 
education financing in Zimbabwe in general and the conceptualization and practice of cost-
sharing in higher education in particular over time, from the inception of higher education in 
Zimbabwe in 1957 to 2009. The choice of a historical research design lay in the focus of the 
study inter alia on the subjective reality of individual actors (read government), vis-a-vis cost-
sharing policy, as well as the ability of a longitudinal-historical and qualitative approach to offer 
insights into the agent-relative conceptualizations and the philosophy involved in processes and 
change that occurs over long periods (Babbie and Mouton, 1998:284).  
3.4. Unit of Analysis and Selection of Research Sites 
 
Babbie and Mouton (1998: 84) define a unit of analysis as constituted by the ‘what’ of a study. 
In other words, it refers to the research object, phenomenon, entity or process that is the object of 
study. According to Babbie and Mouton (1998:85), units of analysis are essentially the things 
that a study examines in order to develop summary descriptions of them and explain differences 
among them. The WEB Centre for Social Science Research Methods defines the unit of analysis 
as the major entity that a study seeks to analyze. Thus, Babbie and Mouton (1998) identify the 
following as common units of analysis in social science research: individuals, groups, 
organizations and institutions, social artefacts/cultural objects, social actions, and interventions. 
With reference to interventions (policies) as units of analysis, Babbie and Mouton (1998:90) 
note, “Interventions are studied to establish whether they have been properly implemented 
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successfully in terms of the intended outcomes and beneficial to the target group.” 
 Babbie and Mouton (1998:174) further note that units of analysis should not be confused 
with units of observation, which are the elements or aggregations of elements from which 
information is collected. Thus, in short, the unit of analysis is the level at which a study pitches 
its conclusions while the unit of observation is the level at which data is collected. Noting the 
study’s focus on describing and understanding the shifts in cost-sharing policies (interventions) 
in the financing of students’ higher education in Zimbabwe, the units of analysis for the study are 
thus the higher education student funding policies in Zimbabwe in the period 1957-2009.  
 Babbie and Mouton (1998) say that, unlike quantitative studies that commonly use 
random sampling, qualitative researches typically use small samples to enhance “depth” of 
understanding. They thus seek “to maximize the range of specific information that can be 
obtained from and about that context by purposively selecting locations and informants that 
differ from one another” (Babbie and Mouton, 1998: 277). Hence, while the level of analysis 
(Yurdusev, 1993; Blalock, 1972)
8
 for the study was the higher education system in Zimbabwe, 
the research was restricted to Government, particularly the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary 
Education and the Ministry of Finance, and the University of Zimbabwe. Since the mission of 
the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education is stated as: 
 
[T]o provide, regulate and facilitate higher and tertiary education and training and 
through the planning, development and implementation of effective policies, the 
provision of resources and management of institutions in order to meet the human 
resources requirements of the economy and equip individuals to realize their full 
                                                          
8
 The level of analysis is distinct from unit of analysis and unit of observation. It generally refers to the location, size 
or scale of a study. Thus such terms as micro, meso or macro levels when referring to levels of analysis. 
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potential (Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, 2001, National Report: 5), 
 
and the Ministry of Finance’s key mandate is the mobilization, allocation, management and 
accounting for public resources including the formulation and administration of the national 
budget (Ministry of Finance), these two ministries were included in the sample. 
  
Lastly, the University of Zimbabwe was selected for the study by virtue of it being the oldest 
university in the country and therefore the only one to have experienced all the shifts in cost-
sharing policy since its establishment in 1957.  
3.4.1. Selection of Informants  
 
Consistent with the search for “deep” understanding of the subject, those who were selected for 
the study as informants were those that were thought to be highly knowledgeable on the issues 
relevant to the research problem. Key informants are shown in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1: List of Selected Key Informants 
 
Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education University of Zimbabwe 
Minister Vice Chancellor 
Former Ministers Former Vice Chancellors 
Permanent Secretary Registrar 
Former Permanent Secretaries Former Students 
 
3.5. Data Collection Sources and Procedures  
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The forms of data collection in qualitative research vary widely, depending on the research 
design adopted (Creswell, 1994; Babbie and Mouton, 1998; Yin, 2003). They include document 
search, interviews, participant observation, oral histories, archival records, and physical artefacts 
(Creswell, 1994; Yin, 2003).  The data available for analysis in historical research are extensive 
(Babbie and Mouton (1998). They include the works of historians who may already have 
reported on the subject, letters, newspapers and magazines, official government documents, 
diaries, interviews, archival records, physical artefacts and focus group discussions (Babbie and 
Mouton, 1998; Creswell, 1994). 
Data collection for this study involved a document search, semi-structured interviews, 
and focus group discussions, thus adhering to the principles of triangulation.  The next sections 
provide detailed accounts of the research methods used.  
 
3.5.1. Documents 
 
Documents were used as the primary source of data. Examining the functions of documents as a 
source of data in qualitative research, Bowen (2009:27) notes that,  
 
[O]rganizational and institutional documents have been a staple in qualitative 
research for many years. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number 
of research reports and journal articles that mention document analysis as part of 
the methodology.  
 
Bowen (2009) further says that, as with other analytical methods in qualitative research, the 
examination and interpretation of data collected through the document method can “elicit 
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meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; 
Rapley, 2007, in Bowen, 2009:27). Quoting Atkinson (1997:47), Bowen (2009:27) refers to 
documents “as ‘social facts’, which are produced, shared, and used in socially organized ways”. 
Various forms of documents can be used to provide data for systematic analysis in qualitative 
research (Bowen, 2009). Such documents are found in libraries, archives, historical society 
offices, and organizational or institutional files (Bowen, 2009; Babbie and Mouton, 1998). 
While noting the immense value of documents as a data source particularly in historical 
or cross-cultural studies, where, for example, events can no longer be observed or when 
informants have forgotten the details, proponents of this method of data collection are quick to 
throw in a word of caution – the need to use document analysis in combination with other 
qualitative research methods as a means of triangulation (Babbie and Mouton, 1998; Denzin, 
1970). Thus Atkinson and Coffey note that 
 
[W]e cannot, for instance, learn through records alone how an organization actually 
operates day-by-day. Equally, we cannot treat records – however ‘official’ – as firm 
evidence of what they report…. That strong reservation does not mean that we should 
ignore or downgrade documentary data. On the contrary, our recognition of their 
existence as social facts alerts us to the necessity to treat them very seriously indeed. We 
have to approach them for what they are and what they are used to accomplish (Atkinson 
and Coffey, 1997:47 in Bowen, 2009:30).   
  
Triangulation is considered to be one of the best ways to ensure validity and reliability in 
qualitative research (Babbie and Mouton, 1998). It breeds credibility of a study by providing a 
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confluence of evidence that corroborates findings across data sets. Thus, triangulation, “the 
combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon” (Denzin, 1970:291),  
minimizes the impact of potential biases and guards against accusations of a study having been 
simply an artefact of a single method, a single source, or a single researcher’s biases (Patton, 
1990 in Bowen, 2009; Babbie and Mouton, 1998).   
Thus, the document search involved the collection of data from primary sources, 
secondary sources, running records, and recollections. The primary sources were collected from 
the National Archives of Zimbabwe, the University of Zimbabwe Library, Parliament of 
Zimbabwe Library, and the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education Library. These mainly 
consisted of Government and University of Zimbabwe documents, records, and related 
information on higher education financing in Zimbabwe from 1957-2009. The major data 
sources were Government macro-economic policy documents, higher education financing policy 
documents, annual reports of the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education and the University 
of Zimbabwe, national and institutional higher education budgets, University of Zimbabwe and 
national student enrolment and retention statistics, and ministerial reports on the development of 
higher education in Zimbabwe.  
Secondary sources of data were gathered from the works of historians who had written on 
the subject of education in general and, in particular, higher education financing in Zimbabwe. 
The sources of evidence were reviewed from time to time throughout the data collection process 
in order to ensure the availability of adequate and reliable data. Care was taken to check and 
double-check the data sources in order to ensure the reliability and validity of conclusions to be 
generated in the study.  
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3.5.2. Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Additional and complementary data were gathered through in-depth semi-structured interviews 
with key role-players in higher education financing in Zimbabwe. The actors included relevant 
officials in the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, in the Ministry of Finance, and at the 
University of Zimbabwe. At the University of Zimbabwe, interviews were held with both 
University officials and former and current students of the University. The interviews provided 
more insights into the philosophy of historical shifts in cost-sharing policy.  They commenced as 
soon as ‘saturated’ documentary data had been collected (Babbie and Mouton, 1998).  
The interviews served two purposes. Firstly, they were used to validate the data generated 
by documentary sources. Secondly, the interviews served to address issues and gaps emerging 
from documentary sources. All interviews were conducted in order to examine more closely and 
to find explanations for the shifts in cost-sharing policy in Zimbabwean higher education over 
time. The number of interviews conducted was guided by the extent to which they could address 
important gaps in the data. All interviews were conducted using a basic interview schedule that 
outlined the key issues to be addressed in the interview as had been identified in the prior 
analysis of documentary data. The interview schedules are shown in Appendices I-III. 
 
3.5.3. Focus Group Discussions 
 
Focus group discussions were used to tap into the students’ attitudes and beliefs about 
cost- sharing in higher education in general, and the Cadetship Scheme
9
 in particular. Appendix 
                                                          
9
 The Cadetship Scheme is a needs-based student grant scheme that was introduced in 2006 following the collapse 
of the loan and grant scheme. A cadet is a beneficiary of the cadetship grant. Under the scheme, government pays 
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IV provides the guidelines for focus group discussions. Babbie and Mouton (1998) contend that 
focus groups provide a platform for participants to get together and create meaning about 
phenomena among themselves, rather than individually. Kitzinger (1995) concurs, and further 
notes that the advantage of the focus group method is that the interactive or group process that 
characterize the method allows participants  to explore and clarify their views, an outcome that is 
not easily achievable in a one to one interview.  
 In addition, focus groups allow the researcher to tap into the various forms of 
communication that participants use in everyday interaction. These include jokes, anecdotes, 
teasing and arguing, thus revealing people’s knowledge of, and attitudes about phenomena in a 
manner that reasoned responses to direct questions cannot adequately capture. Kitzinger (1995) 
argues that the analysis of such interpersonal communication – humour, consensus, dissent and 
the various narratives used within the group -- enables the researcher to identify shared and 
common knowledge about the phenomena under research.  
Brotherson (1994) identifies a six-component process that guides the conduct of focus 
group research. The steps, in chronological order are (a) formulation of research questions; (b) 
selection of participants; (c) development of protocol; (d) conduct focus group; (e) analysis of 
data; and (f) reporting of findings.  
3.6. Description of Data Collection Process 
 
Data collection consisted of the document collection, interviews, and focus group discussions. It 
is important to reiterate at this point that documentary sources were used as the primary source of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
tuition fees for financially disadvantaged higher education students (cadets). The scheme pays for tuition fees only. 
Cadets (students) on the scheme are required to meet their living costs as well as ancillary fees. In return for 
government assistance, the students are bonded to work in Zimbabwe for a number of years equal to those for which 
they received funding.    
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data, with interviews and focus group discussions being used to contextualize and validate data 
generated from document sources. Thus, in the main, the process started with document 
collection followed by interviews and the focus group. However, in practice, the process did not 
always follow that sequence. There were cases when data from document sources and interviews 
were contradictory rather than corroboratory. Such instances necessarily required further 
investigation of the contradictions. In turn, that entailed movement back and forth between 
document collection and interviews until there was corroboration in the data sets. For example, 
documentary evidence clearly pointed to the existence of a student loan and grant scheme from 
the time of the establishment of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, yet 
Government, through the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education’s Memorandum to Cabinet 
(2002), implied that students were funded through grants only up to the time of independence in 
1980. It was only after the documentary sources were presented to the Ministry of Higher and 
Tertiary Education that agreement on the existence of cost-sharing from the inception of the 
University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was reached. Following is a detailed account of 
the data gathering process. 
 There were two related phases to document collection. Preliminary collection and review 
of relevant documents that were in the public domain, for example, in public libraries and 
archives, commenced as soon as the thrust of the study in terms of its objectives and research 
questions had been established and approved by the thesis supervisor. The second phase, which 
involved the collection of confidential documents only began, after the research and relevant 
protocols had been approved and sanctioned by the relevant committees of the University of the 
Western Cape. 
Before collection of the confidential documents, a research clearance to start data 
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collection was obtained from the Research Committee of the Faculty of Education and the Senate 
Research Committee of the University of the Western Cape. This followed the approval of the 
research proposal, a statement detailing the data collection instruments as well as a statement 
detailing the research ethics to be observed during the data collection process.  Once permission 
to conduct the research had been granted by the relevant committees of the University of the 
Western Cape, applications to conduct research at the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education 
and at the University of Zimbabwe were made and subsequently approved by the relevant 
authorities of the institutions.  Following the granting of permission to conduct research, data 
collection at the institutions, the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education and the University of 
Zimbabwe commenced. The Bursar’s and Academic Registry Departments at the University of 
Zimbabwe and the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education library provided useful documents 
covering the funding of higher education, particularly in the post-colonial period. Most of the 
documentary data relating to the funding of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
and later the University of Rhodesia, were obtained from the National Archives of Zimbabwe.   
 Noting the need to treat documents with a critical eye (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997 in 
Bowen, 2009), and in particular with respect to Bowen’s assertion that, “Documents should not 
be treated as necessarily precise, accurate, or complete readings of events that have occurred” 
(Bowen, 2009: 33), document sources were subjected to external and internal criticism 
(Wiersma, 1995)
10
 to establish the authenticity, credibility, and accuracy of each document. 
Measures were also taken to determine the original purpose of the documents, that is, the reason 
why specific documents were produced, and, thus, their relevance to the research.  
 
                                                          
10
  Wiersma (1995) asserts that external criticism – determination of the authenticity/genuineness  of a document --
and internal criticism – assessment of the degree, if any, of bias within the content of a document -- are essential to 
the use of documents in research. 
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Table 3.2: A Sample of Primary Documents and Data Analyzed 
Period Documents Selected  Data Analyzed 
 
 
 
1957-1979 
Government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. University 
College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1957- 1968 
Development of the University 
College of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland 
Government of Rhodesia. University College of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Estimates of Income and 
Expenditure 1957-1969 
University College of  Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland budget allocations 
Government of Rhodesia. University of Rhodesia 
Statistics, 1964 – 1979 
Student Statistics 
University of Rhodesia. Annual Statements and 
Accounts 1970-1979 
Audited Financial Statements 
Government of Rhodesia. African Education Report 
by Secretary, 1962-1970 
Development of African 
education 
 
 
 
1980-1990 
ZANU-PF (1980) ZANU-PF Election Manifesto, 
Jongwe Publications, Harare 
ZANU-PF’s election policy 
framework 
Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) (1981) Zimbabwe: 
The First Decade, 1980-1990, Government 
Publications, Harare 
Macro-economic policy 
framework for 1
st
 decade of 
independence 
Government of Zimbabwe (1981) Growth with 
Equity: An Economic Policy, Government 
Publications, Harare 
Pro-socialist policy framework 
for national development  
Government of Zimbabwe Estimates of Income and 
Expenditure, 1980-1990 
Budgetary allocations to sectors 
of economy 
 
1991-2009 
Government of Zimbabwe (1990) Economic Policy 
Statement: Macro-Economic Adjustment & Trade 
Liberalization, Government Publications, Harare 
Transition to neoliberalism  
Government of Zimbabwe (1991) Zimbabwe: A 
Framework for Economic Reform, Government 
Publications, Harare 
Transition to neoliberalism 
Government of Zimbabwe Estimates of Income and 
Expenditure 1991-2009 
Budgetary allocations to sectors 
of economy 
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Table 3.1 shows a sample of the documents collected for the study. Interviews with 
officials of the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education and of the University of Zimbabwe 
played a significant role in the verification and assessment of documents collected. 
Interviews followed document collection. Requests to interview informants were made in 
advance by letters. The letters to informants detailed the purpose of the research, ethical 
considerations, and what was expected of the informants in the interviews. A sample of the letter 
(which was addressed appropriately to specific informants) is attached as Appendix V. 
Interviews were conducted with the Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education (the political head 
of the Ministry) and other relevant officials of the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education. 
While an appointment to interview the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Higher and 
Tertiary Education had been secured, the interview did not materialize on two occasions as he 
had to attend to other pressing business at the time the interview had been scheduled. 
At the University of Zimbabwe, interviews were carried out with the Deputy Registrar, 
Academic, under whose jurisdiction policies regarding student academic matters, such as student 
admissions, records and registration, examinations, and fees are implemented. Additional data 
were gathered from interviews with former students of the University. 
An interview guide containing information about the broad issues to be covered in the 
interviews was sent in advance to all interviewees in order to allow them time to think through 
the questions and so prepare adequately for the interview. The interview guides are contained in  
Appendices I, II and III. While a notebook was used (by the researcher) to capture interview 
responses, some of the interviews were audio recorded, transcribed and safely secured on tape. 
Other interviewees however declined to be audio recorded.   
The Focus Group was conducted with a group of nine final year students who joined the 
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University in 2008. Discussions revolved around the students’ experience with cost-sharing and 
their perceptions of the Cadetship Scheme. 
3.7. Addressing Rigour 
Qualitative research, especially qualitative data analysis and interpretation procedures are often 
seen as ad hoc, intuitive, unsystematic and therefore without academic rigour (de Wet and 
Erasmus, 2005:27). Underlying such criticism is the suspicion that, unlike quantitative research, 
qualitative studies lack reliability and validity.  
Reliability in research is defined by Blanche et al (2006:563) as, “The dependability of a 
measurement instrument, that is, the extent to which the instrument yields the same results on 
repeated trials – thus allowing for generalizations”. Similarly, Babbie and Mouton (1998:119) 
contend that “in the abstract, reliability is a matter of whether a particular technique, applied 
repeatedly to the same object, would yield the same result each time”. Validity on the other hand 
is defined as a term describing a measure that accurately reflects the concept it is intended to 
measure (Blanche et al, 2006:561) 
The criticism about the lack of validity and reliability in social research is not without 
merit. As regards reliability, Babbie and Mouton (1998) provide supporting evidence where, in a 
research on Health Hazard Appraisal (HHA), a repeat of the same study with the same 
respondents yielded different results.  Against this backdrop, the need for rigour in social 
sciences becomes evident. Generally, the subjectivist nature of social science inquiry defies the 
application of reliability and validity in their purest form, as applied in quantitative studies 
(Babbie and Mouton, 1998). If pure reliability and validity are the hallmarks of quantitative 
research, so is rigour with regards qualitative inquiry. 
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Morse et al define rigour as “researchers' adoption of verification strategies and self-
correcting mechanisms (at each stage during the research process) to actively work towards 
reliability and validity in the analysis of qualitative data” (Morse et al, 2002 in de Wet, 2005:28). 
In arguing for an approach that builds into the research process strategies for ensuring rigour, 
Morse et al identify the following strategies: investigator responsiveness, methodological 
coherence, theoretical sampling and sampling adequacy, an active analytical stance, and 
saturation (Morse et al, 2002:9). The authors argue that, when used appropriately, these 
strategies force the researcher to correct both the direction of the analysis and the development of 
the study as necessary, thus ensuring reliability and validity of the completed project. To Morse 
et al, reliability and validity are defined by adherence to these strategies. 
Followed appropriately, these principles allow the researcher to move back and forth 
between design and implementation to ensure congruence among question formulation, 
literature, recruitment, data collection strategies, and analysis. Morse et. al, observe that   
[D]ata are systematically checked, focus is maintained, and the fit of data and the 
conceptual work of analysis and interpretation are monitored and confirmed 
constantly. Verification strategies help the researcher identify when to continue, 
stop or modify the research process in order to achieve reliability and validity and 
ensure rigor (Morse et al, 2002 in de Wet, 2005:10).  
 
Consistent with these strategies, this study employed triangulation, the subjection of documents 
to external and internal criticism, member checks, and prolonged engagement with data to ensure 
rigour, and therefore reliability and validity of the research results.  The specific application of 
these strategies is discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
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3.8. Data Analysis  
 
Babbie and Mouton (1998: 490) view qualitative data analysis as subsuming all forms of analysis 
of data gathered by way of qualitative techniques, regardless of the paradigmatic grounding of 
the research. Thus, according to these authors, data gathered by qualitative techniques is 
analyzed qualitatively. Taylor and Gibbs (2010) ascribe an interpretive philosophy to qualitative 
data analysis. They define data analysis as encompassing the range of processes and procedures 
involved in the movement from the qualitative data that has been collected to explanation, 
understanding or interpretation of the phenomena under investigation. 
 With respect to the analysis of documents, Bowen (2009), quoting Corbin and Strauss 
(2008) and Rapley (2007), notes that document analysis is 
 
[A] systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents…. Like other analytical 
methods in qualitative research, document analysis requires that data be examined and 
interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical 
knowledge (Bowen, 2009:27). 
 
Bowen further notes that the analysis of documents is an iterative process that combines 
elements of content and thematic analysis. It involves three broad stages, namely, skimming, 
thorough examination, and interpretation. The following sections describe the analytical process 
adopted. 
 The data from documents were analyzed together with interviews and focus group data 
that had been transcribed into text. Themes thus emerged from the three data sets. The analysis 
started with a superficial examination of all documents collected in order to identify and 
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therefore select only those documents that were considered to contain data that were relevant to 
the study.  This stage was followed by a thorough, in-depth, and systematic review of the 
remaining documents.  The review served to contextualize the study in terms of providing 
understanding of the political and socio-economic dynamics of higher education funding in 
Zimbabwe during the study time frame, 1957 to 2009. In particular, the review helped to situate 
the development of higher education and its funding in Zimbabwe within specific historical 
epochs. 
 The next stage involved coding the data into themes. Three substantive codes, namely, 
government funding of higher education, student funding, and access to higher education 
emerged from the data.  Documents were thoroughly reviewed segment by segment, document 
against document, and document against interview transcript as well as vice versa to organize 
data under the substantive codes. The data in each code were also compared in order to identify 
similarities, differences, and emerging patterns. Interview transcripts and analyzed texts were 
taken back to informants to check with them whether what had been constructed was consistent 
with their responses. Where differences emerged, further investigation was undertaken until data 
corroboration was achieved. For example, initial data sourced from the Ministry of Higher and 
Tertiary Education had suggested free higher education in Zimbabwe during the colonial period, 
yet financial records of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland explicitly pointed to 
the existence of cost-sharing, a contradiction in data that necessitated triangulation of sources 
until corroboration in the data was achieved.  
The last stage, interpretation of data, involved the scrutiny of the data through an 
interpretive lens, and in the process creating understanding and meaning out of the data. 
Commenting on data interpretation, Bowen (2009: 36) says,  
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[I]n…qualitative inquiry, the investigator is the primary instrument of data 
collection and analysis. As such, the researcher/analyst relies on skills as well as 
intuition and filters data through an interpretive lens 
 
The theoretical and conceptual frameworks developed in the literature review chapter 
were also used to interpret and analyze the data.   
3.9. Ethical Issues 
 
Safeguarding the rights and well-being of research subjects is a fundamental tenet of ethical 
research (Katz, 1972). While scientific investigation has enhanced understanding of phenomena, 
- natural, social or otherwise, and while such investigation is one of the pillars of societal 
progress and development (Beecher, 1966), yet the idea of gaining such valuable scientific 
knowledge through research involving human subjects need not, and should not, be pursued to 
the neglect of, or at the expense of human rights or human dignity (Faden and Beauchamp, 
1986).    It is no wonder therefore that many professional associations, government agencies, and 
universities, for example, have adopted specific codes, rules, and policies to systematically and 
rigorously regulate the conduct of research involving human subjects (Beecher, 1966; Jones, 
1981, Faden and Beauchamp 1986).  
 Accordingly, the research set out to ensure that the rights and interests of those 
participating in the study were fully protected.  To that end, the key ethical principles that are 
common to research involving human subjects, namely, (a) informed and voluntary consent; (b) 
confidentiality of information shared; (c) anonymity of research participants; and (d) beneficence 
or no harm to participants (Babbie and Mouton, 1998), were observed throughout the research 
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process.  
3.9.1. Informed and Voluntary Consent 
 
The researcher sought informed consent from all participants, thus ensuring that they  
participated voluntarily in the research with full knowledge of what they were getting involved 
with before they committed themselves. Thus, informants were supplied with all the information 
that was considered critical to influencing their willingness to participate in the research, and it 
was supplied in a form that they could understand and comprehend. They were advised of the 
purpose of the research, its expected duration and procedures, their rights to participate and to 
withdraw from the research once it had started, as well as the consequences of doing so. The 
informants were also advised about who to contact should they have questions, want 
clarification, etc. about the researcher and/or the research. All interview and focus group 
participants were requested to sign an informed consent form when they were first approached. 
This form is attached as Appendix VI. Refer also to Appendix V. In addition to providing 
information about the purpose and aims of the study, procedures, risks and benefits of 
participation, the form also had a clause stipulating that participation was voluntary and that 
participants had the right to withdraw from the study.  
Permission to access documentary sources was also sought from all the relevant offices 
and officials. 
 
3.9.2. Confidentiality of Information Shared and Anonymity of Research Informants 
 
Measures were taken to uphold the participants’ rights to confidentiality and privacy. 
Participants were given information about their freedom to choose how much information they 
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wanted to reveal and under what circumstances. They also received information about how their 
data would be used, and what would be done with audio recordings. Measures were also put in 
place to ensure that confidential records were secured in a safe place and that interview excerpts 
quoted in the study were stripped of personally identifiable details, unless permission to disclose 
the details had been granted from the source. Appendices V and VI provide more information 
about the measures that were taken to ensure the confidentiality of information shared and the 
anonymity of research informants. 
 
3.9.3. No Harm to Participants, Beneficence and Reciprocity 
 
The data sought was generally assumed not to be sensitive. Hence, prospects of harm to 
informants as a result of their participation were deemed to be very minimal at most. However, 
informants were provided with an outline of the potential risks involved, and the ways through 
which they could be compensated for their time and effort. That information was contained in the 
consent form (shown in Appendix VI) as well as in the introductory letter to the informants 
contained in Appendix V. 
This chapter has detailed the research process and procedures adopted for the study. In 
the next chapter, the discussion now shifts to the presentation of findings where Zimbabwe’s 
experience with cost-sharing in higher education finance is explored. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ZIMBABWE’S EXPERIENCE WITH COST-SHARING IN HIGHER EDUCATION  
FINANCING 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Noting the study’s aim to identify and account for the shifts in cost-sharing policy in higher 
education financing in Zimbabwe from 1957-2009, this chapter presents and analyses the 
findings generated in this study. The aim was two-fold. Firstly, it sought to identify and account 
for the policy shifts in student financing in Zimbabwe’s higher education from 1957-2009.  The 
second objective was to identify and assess the performance of policy interventions that were 
adopted to cushion vulnerable students against the potential negative effects of cost-sharing. 
Figure 4.1 presents a global picture of student funding trajectories throughout the period 1957-
2009.  
 
Table 4.1:  Trends in Higher Education Student Funding 1957-2009 
Historical 
Epoch 
Year Grants Loans Number of  
Universities 
 
Colonial 
Period (1957-
1979)  
1957 50% 50% 
 
1 
1968 25% 75% 1 
 
 
Post-
Colonial 
Period 
1980 50% 50% 1 
1992 25% 75% 2 
1998 20% 80% 4 
2002 0% 100% 9 
2006 0% * 0%  9 
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*the Cadetship Scheme is introduced.  
Sources: Ministry of Higher Education & Technology Memorandum to Cabinet. In 
Maringa, 2004; Government of Rhodesia, Report on Education 1964-1970.  
The discussion is organized around three historical epochs in the development of higher 
education in Zimbabwe, namely, the colonial period (1957-1979), the first decade of 
independence (1980-1990), and the transition to neoliberalism (1991-2009). The presentation 
and analysis of data revolve around three key themes in each of the historical epochs. The 
themes are government funding, student funding, and access to higher education. 
 The chapter shows that the development of policy for higher education students’ funding 
in Zimbabwe from 1957-2009 and shifts in that policy can be divided into two broad historical 
epochs. They are, firstly, the colonial era, from the time of the establishment of the University 
College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (now the University of Zimbabwe) in 1957 to the attainment 
of independence in 1980 and, secondly, the post-colonial period from 1980 to 2009.   
The post-colonial period further divides into the periods 1980-1990, the first decade of 
independence, and 1991-2009, the transition to, and consolidation of neoliberalism. The 
following sections explore these trends in depth. 
 
4.2. The Colonial Period: 1957-1979 
 
Two major factors are critical to understanding the nature and dynamics of education 
development during the colonial period. The first was the reluctance by successive colonial 
governments to develop and therefore fund education, in particular, African education. 
Accompanying this inertia was the deeply rooted racism that formed the core of colonial 
governments’ education policies (Austin, 1975; Mandaza, 1986).  
 
 
 
 
90 
 
 
4.2.1. Government Funding 
 
After the arrival of European settlers in 1890, the provision of formal education was left to 
missionaries and mission schools, with government assuming responsibility for the education of 
white children (Austin, 1975; Stoneman, 1981; Mandaza, 1986). In the area of curricula, 
measures were effected to ensure that the training that Africans received was limited to 
elementary knowledge of agriculture, carpentry, building, and other practical orientations that 
would prepare Africans for manual work as labourers in industry and agriculture (Mandaza, 
1986). Hence, a dual system of education, one for Africans and the other for whites, was created 
to “ensure that there was no competition between blacks and whites” (Zvobgo, in Mandaza, 
1986:319). 
Austin (1975:43) succinctly captures the nature of education development in colonial 
Zimbabwe thus, “….Education in Rhodesia typifies a combination of deliberate discrimination 
and subtle management, political ruthlessness …which confuses both the practitioners and the 
victims of minority government and outside observers of the phenomenon”. The colonial 
government established two separate education departments, one for Africans and the other for 
Europeans (including Asians and people described as ‘Coloureds’). Government expenditure on 
the education of a European child was ten times the amount spent on an African child 
(Stoneman, 1981). In the African sector, over 75% of government spending went to primary 
education (Austin, 1975). Education was made compulsory for all Europeans between the ages 
of six and fifteen through the Education Act of 1930, and for Asians and Coloureds in 1938 
(Stoneman, 1981). 
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For Africans, education was voluntary and, as confirmed by the Lewis Report of 1974, 
the colonial government was keen to curtail its provision to the African majority: “….for many 
years to come, primary education must be terminated for a majority, albeit a decreasing majority 
of pupils” (Lewis Report, 1974 in Austin, 1981).  
  In this regard, Stoneman (1981) observes that 75% of African children of school going 
age were eligible for enrolment in primary school. Of these, 45% dropped out of school during 
primary school, so that only 41% of the population group completed primary school. Of the 41%, 
only 19% proceeded to secondary school, with 42% of them dropping out before Form IV, 
leaving only 4% to reach Form VI (Stoneman, 1981). Thus, out of every 1000 African children, 
250 never went to school, 340 did not complete primary school, and 410 completed primary 
school.  Then, 78 went to secondary school, and of these 45 reached Form IV and less than four 
reached Form VI (Stoneman, 1981).  For example, in 1971, of the 127 790 pupils that enrolled 
for grade I, only 10 360 of them got to Form I. Of those 10 360, an insignificant 1 525 got to 
Form IV, with a mere 183 succeeding in getting to Form VI, the entry level for university 
education upon passing the General Certificate Advanced Level examinations.  By comparison, 
the enrolment patterns for European children were such that thirty-six times as many African 
children as European children reached school age each year, but by Form IV of secondary 
school, the numbers in each racial group had become almost the same (Austin, 1975).  
 Austin (1981) further notes that whereas parents of African children had to pay fees at 
both mission and government primary and secondary schools, white education was free until the 
1960s. It is at the secondary school education level that the colonial governments’ discriminatory 
education policies became most apparent (Austin, 1975). The first secondary school for Africans 
was opened by the Anglican Church in 1939. In 1946, the first government secondary school for 
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Africans, Goromonzi High School, was opened and it was not until 1957 that the second, 
Fletcher High School, was opened (Stoneman, 1981). Yet, government secondary schools for 
white children had been in existence from as far back as the 1920s. Up until 1977 there were 156 
secondary schools for Africans, broken down as follows: 81 (F1) (academic) and 57 (F2) (junior 
or technical). Of these schools, government was responsible for only 28. For European 
education, there were 43 European (all academic) secondary schools and government was 
directly responsible for 37 out of the 43 schools (Stoneman, 1981). Table 4.2 provides an 
example of funding patterns for white and African education during the colonial period. 
 
Table 4.2: Government Estimates of Expenditure on Primary and Secondary Education 
1971/72 
 
 Number Rhodesian 
Dollars 
Pounds Sterling Expenditure Per 
Student in 
Pounds Sterling 
African 747 537 21 400 000 12 412 000   16.60 
European 
Asian & and 
Coloured 
58 503 
  8 994 
18 732 000 10 864 000 160.70 
 
Source: Adapted from Austin, 1981 
 
 
It is this background that anchored, and to a large extent patterned, the development of higher 
education and the financing of higher education students in colonial Zimbabwe.     
   
4.2.2. Student Funding 
As noted in earlier chapters, university education in Zimbabwe dates back to 1955 when the then 
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Government of Southern Rhodesia established the University College of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland (UCRN).  The UCRN was established through the Royal Charter of 1955 as a 
university college of the University of London. Teaching at UCRN began in March 1957 (Birley, 
1966:3). As was the case with all British university colleges, the UCRN had to be modelled after 
the English universities of the 1950s (Birley, 1966). For example, the Inaugural Board had 
already decided in June 1953 that the sole test for admission to the UCRN should be educational 
attainments (that is, successful completion of Form VI) and good character (Birley, 1966). The 
same tests for admission applied at that time at English-language universities in South Africa, 
and at other recently established universities such as Makerere University College in Uganda 
(Birley, 1966). 
  
Table 4.3: Student Enrolment at UCRN (1958-1972) 
 
YEAR 
                                      Number of Students 
Whites African Asian/Coloured Total 
1958 102 19 3 124 
1959 132 32 3 167 
1961 173 64 11 248 
1963 331 150 20 481 
1965 454 174 43 671 
1967 432 211 74 717 
1969 464 309 84 857 
1971 510 407 76 993 
1973 586 417 73 1 076 
 
Source: UCRN (1961) Estimates of Recurrent Income and Expenditure, Appendix XVI. 
  Cefkin, 1975. 
 In 1970, the UCRN became the University of Rhodesia. 
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The UCRN opened its doors to the first intake of full time students in 1957 with an initial 
enrolment of 68 students comprising eight Africans, one Asian and fifty-nine whites. The 
teaching facilities were limited to a narrow range of subjects in the faculties of Arts, Science and 
Education. The enrolment growth over the next years was as shown in Table 4.3. 
Available records also indicate that prior to and after the inception of the UCRN, the 
Rhodesian government sponsored white Rhodesians for university education at universities in 
South Africa, namely, the Universities of Cape Town, Rhodes, Witwatersrand, Natal, and 
beginning in 1969, at the Universities of Pretoria and Stellenbosch. Table 4.4 shows statistics of 
Government sponsored white Rhodesian students at universities in South Africa between 1950 
and 1972. 
 
Table 4.4:  Rhodesian Government Sponsored White Students at South African 
Universities  (1950-1972) 
Year Number of Students 
1950    836 
1955    972 
1960 1 021 
1965 1 178 
1970 1 762 
1972 1 908 
Source: UCRN (1961) Estimates of Recurrent Income and Expenditure, Appendix XVI; 
  Austin, 1975 
 
Government support for these students came in the form of grants and loans to cover the 
costs of tuition, accommodation, and ancillary expenses. The loans were repayable upon 
completion of studies (UCRN Estimates of Income and Expenditure, 1957-1966). The grant and 
loan provisions however bonded recipients to a period of service in Government. (UCRN 
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Estimates of Income and Expenditure, 1957-1966). Attaching them to the civil service or to 
serving the country in general, was meant to make sure that repayment of loans would be 
possible. At the same time, the grants and loans were meant to encourage and ensure manpower 
was being trained for posts which would otherwise have to be filled by trained personnel from 
other countries (UCRN Estimates of Income and Expenditure, 1957-1966).  
 At the UCRN, the same financing pattern was adopted, albeit with significant differences 
in financing options for European and African students. It is important to highlight at this point 
the initial discrepancy (later resolved through triangulation) that existed in data collected from 
the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education and that from records on funding of UCRN and, 
later, University of Rhodesia students collected from the National Archives of Zimbabwe. While 
the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education’s Memorandum to Cabinet implied no cost-
sharing in higher education during the colonial period, by putting the student support levels at 
0% loan and 100% grant, records of the colonial Ministry of Education vis-à-vis student funding 
at the UCRN and later the University of Rhodesia clearly pointed to the existence of a loan 
system, which evidence was also corroborated by former students of the UCRN in interviews. 
Below are a few direct quotes from the records of the colonial Ministry of Education clearly 
showing the existence of a loan system at the UCRN : 
 
[D]emand for loan assistance continued unabated and the Ministry’s records 
indicate that a total of 230 applications for loans for 1965 were approved, at a 
total cost of approximately £23,000. This represents a record number of 
applications approved for any year …. (Government of Rhodesia, 1965:3) 
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Similarly,  
 
[T]here was no slackening in the demand for loan assistance and some 360 applications 
for 1967 were considered. As a result, a little over £37,000 was paid in new awards, this 
figure being the highest ever approved for any one year.  It is worth repeating, perhaps, 
that the loans are made to encourage boys and girls to undergo training for posts which 
would otherwise have to be filled by trained personnel from other countries. The scheme, 
therefore, plays a vital role in meeting the country’s manpower requirements.  
(Government of Rhodesia, 1967:5) 
 
The Report for 1970 also states, “Some 370 applications for loan assistance were considered. As 
a result, approximately $80 000 was paid in new awards” (Government of Rhodesia, 1970:7). 
At the UCRN, fee structures for different disciplines were differentiated; the costs of 
pursuing science related disciplines were significantly higher than the costs for Arts and related 
disciplines. For example, students studying the Arts would receive less in grants and loans than 
would students in medicine. In an interview, a former student of the UCRN said that white 
(European, Asian and Coloured) students received more in grants and loans than African 
students.
11
 
Thus, while African students accepted for admission to UCRN received grants and loans 
to cover tuition and accommodation (UCRN Estimates of Income and Expenditure, 1957-
1966),
12
 their white counterparts were also eligible for additional grants and loans to cover costs 
                                                          
11
 Interview with a former student, 4 January 2013, at the University of  Zimbabwe. Now a Senior Research Fellow 
at the University of Zimbabwe, the former student joined the UCRN as a mature entry student in 1967.  
12
 Interview with the Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education, 23 November 2011. The information was 
corroborated by the former student in an interview (referred to above) with the author on 4 January 2013 at UZ.   
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of books and other costs of student living. Again, grant and loan recipients would be bonded to 
government service.
13
 The same student further recalled that even within the African student 
population itself, students from Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) received more in loans and grants 
than their African counterparts from Southern Rhodesia. Students from Northern Rhodesia were 
funded under a Northern Rhodesia government (federal) grant administered by the Government 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.  The year 1965 saw the College expanding in scope. Two more 
faculties – medicine and social studies -- were introduced. Student enrolment also rose to 671 
from 551 in 1964. The major share of the cost of maintaining the College and continuing its 
development was borne by Government.  
 
Table 4.5: Scholarship Awards to European, Asian and Coloured Students in 1965 
Scholarships Number 
Beit Scholarships of £250 each per annum 5 
National War Fund Scholarships (two of £300 each, two of £200 each) 
 
4 
Government Scholarships of £300 each per annum 3 
Government Scholarships of £200 each per annum 
 
3 
Government Scholarships of £120 each per annum 
 
28 
Source: Government of Rhodesia (1965) 
 
In 1965, thirty African students accepted by the UCRN received full financial support to 
cover tuition and accommodation. European, Asian and Coloured students also received awards 
                                                          
13
 In an interview with the researcher on 10 December 2012, an official in the University of  Zimbabwe Deputy 
Registrar (Academic)’s Department, herself a former student of the University of Rhodesia revealed that interviews 
for government grants at the UCRN were held between government and University officials with prospective 
students while the students were in Form VI. Those chosen would be eligible for government grants, and for most 
African students, the grants were tied to teaching in Rhodesia. Most students thus found themselves in teaching 
related programmes like BA, BEd and, to a limited extent, BSc. 
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shown in Table 4.5 from the Ministry’s Scholarship Board. In addition to these scholarship 
awards, a number of government grants ranging in value from £50 to £80 per annum were 
approved in respect of certain students who had shown themselves to be of good character.  
 
Table 4.6: Private Sector Contributions to Supporting the UCRN 
Name of Scholarship 
Fund 
Notes 
Three Further Scholarship First fund received for scholarships by the College. Valued at  
£150 and £300 per annum for undergraduate and postgraduate 
studies respectively  
Bata Bursary Tenable at College and valued at £200 per annum. 
Booker Scholarship Two scholarships tenable at College and valued at £200 per 
annum 
Horaic Hickling 
Scholarship 
Valued at £200 per annum. For students in Agriculture or related 
subject 
Milward Bursary Valued at £300 per annum. Preference for students from 
Nyasaland  
Deborah Trica Bursary - 
Milne-Manro Research 
Fellowship 
Valued at £10 000 and targeted at students in Agriculture and/or 
cognate subject 
Lever Brothers (Rhodesia) 
Fellowship 
Valued at £650 per annum plus 10% annuation. For male students  
Red Locust Fellowship Valued at £3 305 over 3 years. For research into locust physiology 
Welcome Research 
Fellowship  
- 
Nuffield Research 
Fellowship 
For research into biology of monogenetic parasites of fresh water 
fish in Central Africa 
Glavo Fund Valued at £46 000. For medical education and research 
Wernicks and Micks Fund Valued at £5000. For medical research 
Mobil Scholarship For chemistry students 
Source: Government of Rhodesia, Report on Education, 1966 
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It is important to note at this point that, since its inception in 1957, policy provided for 
separate scholarship competitions for European, Asian and Coloured students, on the one hand, 
and African students on the other (UCRN Estimates of Income and Expenditure, 1957-1967). 
During the colonial period 1957-1965, although Government bore the major responsibilities of 
financing students and University developmental projects, the private sector was also active as is 
evidenced by the huge private sector donations to the state to finance students’ education. Table 
4.6 is illustrative of this fact. 
Most scholarships, bursaries, and fellowships were in the fields of agriculture, medicine, 
and the sciences. As a result, most African students could not access such financing as they were 
deliberately admitted into the Arts (particularly languages) and Education disciplines. (See Table 
4.7). 
 
Table 4.7: Distribution of African Assisted Students Across Disciplines: 1967-1970. 
 
 
Year 
       Number of  Assisted African Students Across Disciplines 
 
Education 
 
BA 
 
BSc (Econ) 
 
LLB 
 
BSc 
 
Medicine 
 
BSc Agric 
1967 60 18 4 5 12 16  
1968 92 13 4 8 12 19 1 
1969 99 36 5 8 14 23 2 
1970 112 27 2 5 7 32 6 
Source: UCRN Estimates of Income and Expenditure, 1967-1970. 
   
In another interview, a former student
14
 who was admitted into the BSc degree at the 
UCRN in 1961 said that while companies appeared to be generous with scholarships, they were 
also discriminatory. Table 4.6, for example, shows the number of African students who received 
                                                          
14
 The former student of the UCRN, who is now a lecturer at UZ, was interviewed on 19 October 2012. 
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financial support from Government in the form of grants, scholarships, and loans. The 
concentration of African students in the Education and Arts related disciplines is evident.
15
 
 
While the funding pattern continued at 50% grant and 50% loan levels until 1967, from 
1965, it was becoming evident that Government had financial difficulties owing to the 
withdrawal of support from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland following the collapse of the 
Federation in 1963. The expansion of the College also coincided with the imposition of 
economic sanctions on Rhodesia as a result of its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) 
in 1964 by Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front Government. 1965 also saw the withdrawal of 
Commonwealth Scholarships from the College by Commonwealth countries, notably Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, who were those countries with which Rhodesia mainly 
dealt concerning matters of Commonwealth education (UCRN, Annual Report, 1965). 
 1968 saw the reduction of the grant component of student funding reducing to 25% and 
the loan component increasing to 75%. The Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education and 
former students interviewed attributed the fall in student funding to the collapse of the 
Federation, the withdrawal of international donor funding to UCRN and the imposition of 
international sanctions that accompanied UDI, as well as the costs of sustaining the war against 
African nationalism led by the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU). Manungo (in Zinyemba, 2010:40) also observes that “Most 
donors left after UDI had been declared in 1965 and the United Nations also imposed sanctions 
against the illegal regime of Ian Smith”. In 1968, the practice of conducting separate scholarship 
competitions for European, Asian and Coloured students, on the one hand, and African students 
                                                          
15
 The former student interviewed on 4 January 2013 attributed  the policy change to the 1967 violent student 
demonstration waged by African students against the discriminatory funding policies that were biased against 
African students, 
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on the other was discontinued (Government of Rhodesia, 1968). For the first time in the history 
of the institution, awards were made on a non-racial basis by the Trustees of the National 
Bursary Fund as shown in Table 4.8. 
 
Table 4.8: Scholarship Awards to Students in 1968 
Scholarships Number 
Beit scholarships of £300 each per annum 
 
8 
Government scholarships of £300 each per annum 4 
Joseph Gordon Scholarship of £250 per annum 1 
Government Scholarships of £200 each per  annum 48 
Source: Government of Rhodesia (1968) Report on Education 
 
 
The student funding regime adopted in 1968 was maintained until Zimbabwe’s independence in 
1980. 
 Interviews conducted with former students of the UCRN and the University of Rhodesia 
reveal that loan recovery was very efficient during the colonial period. Upon completion of 
studies, graduates were compelled to negotiate and agree on a loan repayment plan with the 
University and Government.  The bonding mechanism that was built into the loan 
conditionalities ensured that graduates got employment soon after completion of studies. For 
most graduates, arrangements were made with the employing government ministries or 
companies to directly remit to Government an agreed portion of the graduate’s salary towards 
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loan repayment (Interview with former student on 4 January 2013)
16
. This former student said 
that, short of skipping the country, which in any case was unlikely at that time, it was not 
possible to evade the loan repayment mechanisms built into the funding conditionalities.  
 Discussion now turns to the critical question of what philosophy underpinned the 
adoption of cost-sharing at the very inception of the UCRN in 1957. The data did not generate 
conclusive evidence in terms of providing a direct and clear-cut answer to the question. 
However, close analysis of the data reveals that four propositions are possible. 
 The first proposition is that the grant and loan support to students by Government was 
consistent with the traditions of the British civic universities to which the UCRN belonged. It 
will be recalled from Chapter 2 that the philosophical assumptions at the base of the founding of 
these universities included the view that out of the pool of qualified students, only a select few 
should be admitted to university and that the education of this elite group should be subsidized 
by the state (Ashby, 1964). Indeed the UCRN met this criterion on the basis of its elitist 
character in student selection and subsidization of their education through the 50% government 
non repayable grant.      
Another argument for the introduction of cost-sharing in 1957, though debatable, seems 
to be located in the role the UCRN performed in training highly qualified personnel who would 
otherwise be imported from other countries. Taken on its own, the argument, with its basis in the 
training function of universities (Castells, 1991), appears to weigh more towards the introduction 
of free higher education with the establishment of the UCRN in 1957, noting the ‘public good’ 
element in “training highly qualified personnel who would otherwise be imported from other 
                                                          
16
 The former student noted that colonial laws were readily invoked when it came to dealing with students’ breaches 
of loan repayment contracts. The official  in the Deputy Registrar (Academic)’s Department of  UZ (interviewed on 
10 December 2012) also recalled the case of a female graduate who upon completing her BA degree, did not want to 
go into teaching, whereupon it was demanded that she pay back the total loan amount due with the agreed interest. 
With no immediate income to offset the loan amount, the graduate was forced to join the teaching profession, where 
deductions were made by the Ministry of Education towards her loan repayment.   
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countries”. Recognizing that students were highly subsidized, the argument cannot be discounted 
outright, bearing in mind the private rate of returns to higher education accruing to the students 
through the training function (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004). 
 The third argument drawn from the evidence is that the introduction of cost-sharing at 
UCRN at its founding was a mere adoption of an already existing model of higher education 
student funding. It has been shown that both prior to and subsequent to the establishment of the 
UCRN, there was in existence a cost-sharing model for white Rhodesian students at South 
African universities. The argument thus suggests that the introduction of cost-sharing at the 
UCRN in 1957 was the extension into the UCRN of a cost-sharing model developed earlier for 
government supported white Rhodesian students studying at South African universities. The fact 
that up until 1972 the population of Rhodesian government supported white students (on the 
cost-sharing model) at universities in South Africa constituted a bigger ‘university’ than the 
UCRN in terms of student numbers seems to strengthen the argument. 
The fourth and last proposition posits that the introduction of cost-sharing at the inception 
of the UCRN was a deliberate policy mechanism by the colonial government to restrict access to 
higher education by Africans. There is merit in this argument. For example, funding was 
effectively used to deny African students admission into programmes of their choice. Secondly, 
until 1976, white students outnumbered African students at the University of Rhodesia. More 
importantly,  at the time that the establishing of a university was mooted, the idea that such an 
institution should be non racial university was not widely shared among the Europeans, including 
some government officials, due to beliefs that: 
 
[T]he African population was in a backward state and had no tradition of 
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civilization enabling it to support high standards of culture in a university….The 
majority of European students would refuse to attend a university swamped by 
African students, as their backwardness would inevitably lower its standards and 
culture….[T]wo federal colleges should be started with the European one coming 
first and in time an African one which took into account their lower living 
standards (Manungo in Zinyemba, 2010:29). 
 
While a confluence of the four propositions provides persuasive logic for the introduction 
of cost-sharing with the establishment of the UCRN, the notion of influence of the British civic 
universities appears more persuasive, yet a combination of the notion of the British civic 
universities and the existence of a model for cost-sharing prior to the inception of the UCRN 
appears to be the most convincing rationale. 
 
4.2.3. Access to Higher Education 
 
Preceding sections of this chapter have shown that racism formed the core of colonial education 
policy and led to the inequality that characterized colonial education policies. This can be 
equated to the categorization of Trow (1973) as socio-political categorization of the development 
of access patterns in higher education. The dual system of education was a reflection of the 
existing inequality between the races and the stratification of society along racial lines. Minority 
whites and only a few Africans could access higher education, which was therefore elitist. 
Similarly, the bottlenecks built into the African education system meant that only a small number 
would reach Form VI, the entry level for university education (Clark, 1978; Furth, 1973; Scott, 
1995).  
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 Zvobgo says, regarding the pathway from primary to secondary school, 
 
[The] 85% intake of African children swiftly fell to 1% in the 10
th
 year of 
schooling. On the whole, 80% of African children in Southern Rhodesia, got 
schooling up to standard 2, 36% of 80% went up to standard 4 and 18% of 36% 
were able to get full primary education. Of these, only 4% got to Form 4 while 
only 1% of 2% got to Form 6….This means that the number of African pupils was 
drastically reduced at every stage of the school system (Zvobgo, in Mandaza, 
1986) 
   
A second factor influencing access to higher education was the differentiation of 
secondary education into academic (F1) and vocational (F2): this meant that those in the  
vocational stream would have no chance at all to access higher education. The tracking system in 
secondary education became a barrier to the pathway to higher education. It has been 
demonstrated in Table 4.3 that well into the 1970s, white students constituted the majority of the 
student population at the University of Rhodesia yet the ratio of Africans to Whites in Rhodesia 
then was in the order of 20:1 (Cefkin, 1975). Chetsanga, for example notes that, 
 
[T]he limited high school access for black students during the pre-independence years 
kept the number of black students with high school “A” level qualification very low. 
Racial segregation barred qualified black students from enrolling in high school…. [A]s 
the black high schools providing the feeding streams into university enrolments were 
much fewer than needed, this resulted in a proportional mismatch between the number of 
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white students and that of black students qualifying to enter the university (Chetsanga in 
Zinyemba, 2010).  
 
At the second level of analysis, that is, access to programmes of choice at university, one 
could argue that the only reason why African students were forced into the Arts and related 
disciplines was because of their poor economic backgrounds. The interview with the official in 
the Deputy Registrar (Academic)’s Department at the University of Zimbabwe revealed that, in 
principle, African students who could fund their education could pursue programmes of their 
choice for as long as they met the admission requirements for such programmes. Thus, the 
economic perspective advanced by Barber and Lindsay (2006), Blondal et al, 2002 and 
Vossensteyn, 2004) that views access to higher education as a function of one’s ability to pay is 
applicable here.  
 Factors relating to access to higher education access during the colonial period can thus 
be analyzed at two levels. The first is the matter of access to higher education in general while 
the second level relates to access to programmes of choice upon admission to university. While 
all three perspectives are critical to understanding the colonial governments’ higher education 
policies, vis-à-vis access, the socio-political perspective (Trow, 1973) and the higher education 
stratification/tracking systems perspective (Clark, 1978; Furth, 1973; Scott, 1995) are applicable 
to the first level of analysis while the third, the economic perspective (Baber and Lindsay, 2006, 
Blondal, Field, Giroad; 2002; Vossensteyn, 2004), applies to the second level. 
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4.3. The First Decade of Independence: 1980-1990 
 
The first decade of independence (1980-1990) was characterized by concerted efforts toward 
nation building and transformation of the inherited colonial political and socio-economic 
landscape. At that time, socialism and nationalism were the buzzwords in political and socio-
economic discourses.  
 
4.3.1. Government Funding 
 
The attainment of independence in 1980 ushered in a new dispensation that sought to break away 
radically from the existing political and socio-economic order. Thus the major defining 
characteristic of the state in Zimbabwe in the 1980s was its developmental nature. This was seen 
in the government’s commitment to implementing a broad based developmental and welfarist 
social programme that was aimed at redressing colonial injustices and at bringing about a 
socialist and egalitarian society (Muzondidya in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009). The reform of 
the education sector was deemed critical to the success of the process. The cornerstone of policy 
direction in the transformation project was the ZANU (PF) Constitution and the 1980 ZANU (PF) 
Election Manifesto. These documents articulated the vision for the transformation of the 
education system thus, 
 
[T]o strive for the promotion of the social, educational and cultural   welfare of 
the people of Zimbabwe; to reconstruct Zimbabwe’s economy and evolve a 
socialistic pattern in which the country’s resources are fully tapped for the 
common benefit of all the people of Zimbabwe...(Constitution of ZANU (PF) Part 
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II. Aims and Objectives). 
 
The declarations of the 1980 election manifesto included commitment by ZANU (PF) to: 
 
(a) abolish racial education and utilize the education system to develop in the younger  
generation a non-racial attitude and a common loyalty to the state; 
(b) establish a system of free and compulsory primary and secondary education; 
(c) orient the education system to national goals; 
(d) give every adult who had no or little educational opportunity the right to literacy and 
adult education; 
(e) make education play an important role in transforming society; 
(f) place education in the category of basic human rights and strive to ensure that every child 
had an educational opportunity to develop his mental, physical and emotional faculties 
(Zvobgo in Mandaza, 1986: 332). 
 
Consistent with the declarations enunciated in the 1980 ZANU (PF) Election Manifesto and 
subsequent policy documents, notably Growth With Equity (1981) and the Transitional National 
Development Plan (1982-85), the ZANU (PF) government adopted socialism based on Marxist-
Leninist principles as the ideology that would define and direct the constitution of the state and 
national development processes.
17
 In the overall scheme of the development thrust, government 
was aware that education was critical, and therefore at the centre of national development, and 
hence had to be extended to every citizen (Zvobgo in Mandaza, 1986). Further notes Zvobgo,  
                                                          
17
 Press Statement 922/82/DB, 8 October 1982, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe on ”School Curricula should orient 
children to Zimbabwe’s new order”. 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
 
[I]t was this awareness which led to the implementation of an educational system 
which was both revolutionary and ambitious. The government was convinced that 
nothing short of an educational revolution would produce the kind of changes 
necessary for effecting a social and economic revolution. The task of transforming 
an essentially capitalist economic system would not be achieved except through a 
socialist education and through socialism itself. Educational reform was seen as 
part of the struggle against capitalism, and socialism as the effective way of 
dismantling it (Zvobgo in Mandaza, 1986:333).     
 
The first decade of independence in Zimbabwe was consequently characterized by 
massive and radical transformation of the education system. Primary education was made free 
and compulsory (Zvobgo in Mandaza, 1986). The decision to democratize education led to in 
quantitative results of significant proportions. For example, following the declaration of free 
primary education, enrolment in the sector increased by 232% between 1980 and 1982. The 
secondary education and university sectors also recorded increases of 330% and 145% 
respectively during the same period (Quarterly Digest of Statistics, 1980). Table 4.9 is 
illustrative. The trend continued into the late 1980s. The greatest and most significant 
development of the decade was the expansion of the secondary school sector.  Whereas there 
were 197 secondary schools at independence in 1980, the number had risen to 694 in 1981. A 
further jump saw the number reaching 738 by 1982. 
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Table 4.9: Secondary School Enrolment  
 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Grade 8/Form I  
19962 
 
22201 
 
82262 
 
94841 
 
110725 
 
140045 
 
153439 
Grade 9/Form 2  
18094 
 
17251 
 
24855 
 
79465 
 
95539 
 
107052 
 
137943 
Grade 10/ Form 3  
14720 
 
15891 
 
15478 
 
26572 
 
93232 
 
93232 
 
101970 
Grade 11/ Form 4   
13294 
 
12926 
 
15547 
 
16416 
 
24509 
 
71632 
 
91723 
Form 5 (Matric)  
3202 
 
1815 
 
1893 
 
1858 
 
2189 
 
3164 
 
3246 
Form 6 (Lower)  
1594 
 
2641 
 
2751 
 
3243 
 
3680 
 
4218 
 
5957 
Form 6 (Upper)  
1432 
 
1413 
 
1667 
 
2220 
 
2890 
 
2962 
 
3200 
Source: Zvobgo in Mandaza, 1986 
 
 In 1983, the number stood at 790 and by 1985 had soared to over 1200 schools 
(Zvobgo in Mandaza, 1986: 342). Most of the secondary schools were established in rural and 
farming areas, localities that had hitherto suffered neglect by the colonial education system 
(Levine, 2001).  
Student enrolment at the University, now the UZ, also soared significantly, rising from 
2 240 students in 1979 to over 9 000 by 1990 (Muzvidziwa in Zinyemba, 2010: 73). (See Table   
4.10).  
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Table 4.10: Growth in Enrolments at the University of Zimbabwe: 1981-1992 
 
Faculty 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Agric 112 130 151 196 255 290 297 340 361 352 
Arts 405 452 478 610 898 1016 1096 1190 1234 1305 
Com 664 791 871 927 1136 1348 1120 1187 1027 831 
Educ 172 294 566 533 705 672 926 835 1006 714 
Eng 148 186 232 262 335 392 483 578 635 677 
Law - - - - - - 290 329 330 339 
Med 345 383 419 484 569 557 606 618 641 719 
Science 229 271 250 309 392 471 595 709 723 748 
Social 
Science 
450 566 627 766 807 1008 1207 1479 1792 1844 
Vet. 
Science 
- 18 26 44 65 89 102 120 123 135 
           
B/Tech - - - - - - - - 1201 1353 
Totals 2525 3091 3620 4131 5162 5843 6721 7385 9073 9017 
Agric – Agriculture  Com- Commerce Edu- Education   Eng- Engineering 
Med- Medicine  Vet- Veterinary B/Tech- Bachelor of Technology 
Source: Zinyemba, 2010 
 
In view of the unprecedented rise in student numbers at the University, the question to be 
answered is, What factors explain this new dynamic? One obvious reason is that, with the 
phenomenal growth in primary and secondary school enrolments, the University had to develop 
corresponding capacity to absorb the rising student numbers. There were, however, more 
compelling reasons. As noted in earlier sections of the Chapter, the rise in student numbers at the 
University, as indeed in the lower levels of education, was a response to education goals set in 
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the country’s policy documents, for example, Growth with Equity (1981), the three year National 
Transitional Development Plan (1982-83), the first Five Year Development Plan (1985-1990), 
and the second Five Year Development Plan (1990-1995).  
These documents put education in general at the forefront of the national response to the 
development agenda. Thus education
18
 received a boost in the national budgets, receiving the 
highest budgetary allocation throughout the 1981-1990 period. See Table 4.11.  
 
Table 4.11: Budgetary Allocations to Education  1981-1990 
  
 
Year 
 
Budgetary Allocations 
 
Total Government 
Expenditure 
Education 
Budget as % 
of Total 
Government 
Expenditure 
 
Education 
 
Health 
1980/81 184712000 83729000 1627534995 11.3 
1981/82 290070000 108936000 2013484000 14.4 
1982/83 408400000 130300000 2798775000 14.5 
1983/84 502628605 138999787 3052688909 16.5 
1984/85 456000000 131374000 3389163000 13.5 
1985/86 639919000 196233000 3875288741 16.5 
1986/87 704510000 229398000 4573809900 15.4 
1987/88 783966000 261689000 5173629600 15.2 
Source: Estimates of Income and Expenditure, 1980-1990, Government of Zimbabwe 
      
The second and major reason for the extraordinary growth of the University is discernible 
from the following pronouncements made by the first black vice-chancellor of the University of 
                                                          
18
 Until 1987, primary, secondary, and higher education fell under one Ministry, the Ministry of Education. In 1988  
a separate Ministry of Higher Education and Technology was created. The Ministry has since been renamed Higher 
and Tertiary Education.  
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Zimbabwe and by the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe respectively:- 
 [N]ow, with the dramatic political change and the concomitant change…there is need for 
a new orientation…a need for a radical orientation on the part of the University….It must 
now have its feet down on Zimbabwean ground….There is therefore urgent need for the 
University of Zimbabwe to play a more active and meaningful role in the development of 
Zimbabwe…. (Chideya, et al, 1981 in Zinyemba, 2010: 100)19 
And: 
[T]his institution [the university] must relate adequately, positively and meaningfully to 
our society now caught in the throes of a multi-sided process of transformation. Our own 
university must transcend its foreign origins and identify and become fully integrated into 
the new socio-cultural environment. In particular, we insist that our own university shall 
convert itself from a university in Zimbabwe into a genuine and authentic university of 
Zimbabwe….Its structure and procedures must be rationalized and infused with a 
democratic content. Its curriculum…must necessarily lay considerable emphasis on our 
national realities in all their diversity and interconnections….(Chideya, et al, 1981 in 
Zinyemba, 2010:100) 
20
 
 
The University was thus under pressure to shift towards reflecting the demands of the 
new social, economic, and political order, “which determined the new direction of national 
development if it was to remain relevant” (Zinyemba, 2010:18). Indeed, the University had to 
assume a developmentalist role and significant milestones were recorded in that direction. The 
                                                          
19
 Professor Walter Kamba articulating  a vision for the University at his inauguration as the first (black) Vice- 
Chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe in 1981. 
 
20
 The then Prime Minister, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, in a speech at the international conference on “The Role of the 
University and its Future in Zimbabwe”, held at the University of Zimbabwe, 1981. 
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democratization of access that resulted in expansion in student numbers being one such 
milestone. Another area of note, and one that was linked to the rise in student numbers was the 
review and broadening of the curricula in keeping with the new dispensation. This saw the 
establishment of new faculties, for example, Veterinary Science (1982) and Engineering (1986) 
as well as a host of new departments in existing faculties (Zinyemba, 2010). 
 
4.3.2. Student Funding.       
 
In the area of student funding, the new government adopted the cost-sharing model as a 
mechanism to finance students’ university education. Whereas in 1979 students received a 75% 
loan and a 25% grant to finance their education, in 1980 support levels to a 50% loan and a 50% 
grant (Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education Memorandum to Cabinet, 2000). The loan and 
grant support was differentiated and fell into three categories – Humanities (for students in the 
Faculties of Arts, Commerce, Education, Law, and Social Studies), Sciences (Engineering, 
Natural Sciences, and Agriculture) and Health Sciences (for students in the then Faculty of 
Medicine and Veterinary Sciences). Students in the Health Sciences received the highest loan 
and grant rates, followed by science students, while humanities students received the least. The 
support levels were determined by the costs of running the respective disciplines, with that the 
costs of students’ training rising from the humanities to sciences and then to health sciences.  
 Only the loan component was repayable, at 5% interest per annum over three to five 
years after graduation. The repayment period was pegged at least the duration of students’ degree 
programmes. Students admitted to three year degree programmes for example, would be required 
to repay the loan over three years. A two year grace period was built into the repayment plan for 
the three categories. The combined loan and grant allocation provided full sponsorship for tuition 
 
 
 
 
115 
 
fees, full board (accommodation and meals), ancillary fees, and a sizeable ‘payout’ for  books 
and other student expenses. 
Every student admitted to the University was entitled to the loan and grant provisions 
irrespective of ability to pay, race or programme of study. In other words, the loans were 
universal and generally available to all students (Woodhall, 2004). In a marked departure from 
the colonial model of cost-sharing, the model adopted at independence, apart from lowering the 
loan levels from 75% to 50% and raising the grant from 25% to 50%, was “now clear and 
definitive” (Interview with former UCRN student on 4 January 2013). For the first time in the 
history of higher education in the country, a policy of non discrimination was adopted and 
implemented. Secondly, unlike the colonial cost-sharing strategy that was used to ‘channel’ 
students (especially African students) into specific programmes, particularly education and the 
arts, the model adopted immediately after independence allowed students to seek admission into, 
and pursue, programmes of their choice.  
The adopting of the student 50% loan and 50% grant provisions by Government at 
independence raises two pertinent questions. The first  is: Why Government embraced the 
colonial practice of cost-sharing in higher education, noting the societal expectations for free 
higher education that had been heightened, at least by the ZANU (PF) 1980 election manifesto 
pronouncements on education, on the one hand, and the euphoria of independence on the other? 
The second question is:  What factors explain government’s ability to sustain the cost-sharing 
project in the first decade of independence?  
The response of the Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education response to the first 
question was that, although free higher education at independence was the ideal and politically 
feasible, the objective demands placed on the economy suggested otherwise. There were other 
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more pressing demands on the fiscus than higher education (Johnstone, 2006). The burden on the 
state could prove too much.
21
 Under the prevailing economic conditions, it was not even 
economically feasible to make secondary education free, despite the earlier political rhetoric 
pointing in that direction. The economic constraint to making higher education free seems to be 
implied in  Zvobgo’s observation thus, 
 
[T]he ambition to provide free and compulsory primary education implied a 
heavy financial, material and human resource burden on the state. While the 
democratization of education at primary level is a sound democratic ideal, a 
commitment to do the same at the secondary level, at the very early stages of 
independence, was both impractical and unrealistic. The resources needed to 
implement that declaration were beyond the reach of the government. At 
independence government was not looking at the transformation of education 
only; it was involved in a massive network of other development programmes 
such as the resettlement of persons displaced by the war, Agriculture, Health, 
Defence, Telecommunications etc, It was a campaign to achieve broad-based 
development….(Zvobgo in Mandaza, 1986:333).   
 
While policy was intended to make primary and secondary education free at 
independence as explicitly stated in the 1980 ZANU (PF) Election Manifesto and in subsequent 
policy documents, regarding primary education in particular, the same case was not made for 
higher education. It thus appears that, under the circumstances, reducing the loan component to 
50% and raising the grant to 50% accompanied by democratization of access to government 
                                                          
21
 Interview with Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education on 23 November 2011. 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
financial support was the optimum policy offer to higher education students’ funding that was 
practicable.  
 
4.3.3.Access to Higher Education  
  
With the attainment of independence, radical reforms were implemented to dismantle the racist  
socio-political inequalities and to transform the education sector to promote access, first into the 
school system, which access then fed into the higher education sector. Between 1980 and 1997, 
Government implemented policies aimed at transforming higher education from the elite to the 
mass kind (Trow, 1973).  Favourable cost-sharing policies were put in place to promote access to 
higher education. Grants and loans were made available to all students. Any prospective student 
who met university admission requirements could access university education with full support 
from government in the form of loans and grants. Accordingly, there were no cases of students 
dropping out of university for lack of financial support. Further, with weak loan recovery 
mechanisms in place, higher education in fact became free by default (Interview with former 
student of UCRN on 4 January 2013). As a result, the stratification/tracking systems (Clark, 
1978; Furth, 1973; Scott, 1995) in secondary schools and the economic (Baber and Lindsay, 
2006; Blondal et al, 2002; Vossensteyn, 2004) perspectives become irrelevant in the analysis of 
access to higher education in Zimbabwe during the first decade of independence.. 
4.4. The Transition to Neoliberalism 1990-2009 
  The period spanning from about 1990 to 2009 was marked by a paradigmatic shift from 
socialism to capitalism. This ideological shift followed the adopting by Government of economic 
reforms impelled by globalization and the Bretton Woods institutions’ neoliberal economic 
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reforms, commonly referred to as the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme. 
 
4.4.1. Government Funding 
 
It is important to note that the populist and pro-welfare policies and plans that propelled 
Government involvement in social services provisioning were formulated in the early years of 
independence. This was a period of record-breaking economic growth that rode on the back of 
transient factors -- the return to peace after the war of liberation and a once-off trade ‘gain’ that 
followed the lifting of international economic sanctions imposed on the Rhodesia Front 
government following UDI.  There were also other factors, namely, renewed access to sources of 
borrowed external capital, record high gold prices, and remarkably good rains in 1980 and 1981 
that impacted favourably on agriculture. (Kadhani in Mandaza,1986). These factors were among 
those that led the first five years of independence to be characterized by an economic boom that 
saw GDP growing phenomenally to reach 26% over 1981 and 1982 (Dansereau and Zamponi, 
2005). 
However, beginning about the mid-1980s, the combination of international recession, the 
failure of important sectors of the domestic market to perform as expected, and the vulnerability 
of the economy to outside shocks imposed serious limits on economic transformation (Kadhani 
in Mandaza, 1986). A surge in the economic problems prompted government to adopt a World 
Bank and IMF induced Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1990. 
 The ESAP was first announced in the Budget Statement of 1990 and in an accompanying 
policy statement titled Economic Policy Statement: Macroeconomic Adjustment and Trade 
Liberalization (Government of Zimbabwe, 1990), in July 1990. These policy pronouncements 
were followed by an elaborate document, Zimbabwe: A Framework for Economic Reform 1991-
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1995 (Government of Zimbabwe, 1991), in early 1991. While at the time the Government 
claimed that the reform package was homegrown, it (ESAP) contained most of the prescriptions 
typical of World Bank SAPS seen elsewhere in Africa – trade liberalization; reduction of the 
budget deficit; cutbacks to social services (including education and health) and food subsidies; 
deregulation of prices, wages, transport and investment; and commercialization and improved 
efficiency of the parastatal sector.  
 Government and its financiers, the World Bank and IMF, argued that the new programme 
would be focused on creating a modern economy that in turn would be able to pay back ESAP’s 
underpinning foreign loans (Dansereau and Zamponi, 2005). An optimistic 5% annual growth 
rate in GDP was set by government and the Bretton Woods institutions. Additionally, it was 
envisaged that fiscal restraint involving reduction in social expenditure (including education), 
divestment of public enterprises, and rationalization of the public sector would reduce the 
government deficit from the usual 10% to 5% or less (Government of Zimabwe, 1991). It was 
estimated that about USD3 billion over five years would be needed from donors to implement 
the reforms. Thus Zimbabwe would ‘leap’ into a free market economy on borrowed money 
(Saunders, 1996).  
 The ESAP thus ushered in a paradigm shift which ended the state’s populist 
developmental policy orientation and the accompanying socialist rhetoric. In came market 
philosophy. The Bretton Woods’ institutions’ loan conditionalities compelled the state to 
withdraw from its role as principal economic agent, ceding the role to the private sector which 
was now the new partner in development. The state would now perform a regulatory function. It 
would provide broad regulations on economic activity with market forces determining the 
direction and pace of economic development ((Dansereau and Zamponi, 2005).  
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 However, the market reforms did not go according to plan. The economy grew at an 
average rate of 1% in real terms during 1991-1995 compared to 4% during the pre-ESAP period 
(1985-1990).  Further, throughout the ESAP period, the budget deficit exceeded the targeted 5% 
of GDP. The performance of the public enterprise sector worsened (Dhliwayo, 2001). Public 
debt skyrocketed and the private sector began to record significant signs of disindustrialization. 
In addition, massive rises in inflation followed relaxation of price controls resulting in consumer 
demand shrinking by well over 30%. In 1992, after two consecutive droughts, the economy 
contracted by at least 7.5%. Average real wages declined sharply by the mid-1990s, falling to the 
lowest levels ever recorded since the early 1970s (Saunders, 1996). 
  Faced with worsening government deficit and climbing debt servicing, Government 
responded  by cutting real spending on public services, including education. The total education 
vote declined gradually as a percentage of GDP from 6.29% in 1986/87 to 4.82% in 1999 
(Makamure and Muzuwa, in Dhliwayo, 2001). User fees were reintroduced in the school sector, 
thus placing barriers to access to education for thousands of pupils from poor backgrounds 
(Saunders, 1996).  
 
4.4.2. Student Funding 
 
In the university sector, Government’s response to the economic malaise was to cut down on 
student funding. To that end, in 1992, the loan and grant components of student funding were 
revised to 75% loan and 25% grant. This marked the first significant change to the hitherto 50% 
loan and 50% grant levels that had prevailed since the early 1980s.  A further review that saw the 
loan component rise to 80% and the grant reduce to 20% was effected in 1998. The funding 
challenge was exacerbated by poor loan recovery that virtually made higher education free from 
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the 1980s into the 1990s. Thus observes Muzvidziwa, 
 
[E]SAP resulted in reduced expenditure on education. Cost recovery and cost-
sharing strategies were adopted. While students continued to get a government 
loan, the proportions changed downward significantly. Prior to 1990, university 
education in Zimbabwe was virtually free as all students qualified to get 
assistance under the government grant and loan scheme. This was in essence free 
money as most students never bothered to repay the loan. Otieno (2004:75) 
observed that the student loan scheme in Kenya “was criticized for its poor 
administration, high costs and low recovery rates”. This was the situation 
obtaining then with regards to loan recovery by Government for UZ graduates 
(Muzvidziwa in Zinyemba, 2010: 89).
22
  
 
The change in the support levels implemented in 1998 brought with it a new dimension 
into higher education student funding. Whereas loans had been readily available to all students 
since 1980, 1998 saw the introduction of means tests for loan applicants. The next section 
examines this new phenomenon in detail.   
 
4.4.2.1. Means Tests (1998 -2001)  
 
 
With the macroeconomic conditions worsening, Government responded by introducing means 
testing of loan applicants. This policy shift was aimed at providing loans only to those students 
                                                          
22
 Johnstone (2006) and (Woodhall, 2009) also lament the weak loan recovery machinery that is characteristic of 
most African loan systems. Pillay (2008) makes a similar observation and concludes that in most African countries 
no serious effort is made to collect loans.  
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who could not afford to pay for their university education. With the establishment of a second 
public university, the National University of Science and Technology (NUST), the number of 
university students had risen. A Means Test Committee was constituted by the Ministry of 
Higher and Tertiary Education. Its terms of reference were to: 
 
1. adjudicate on applications for loan funding; 
2. select deserving cases;  
3. assess level of financial support needed; 
4. make recommendations to the Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education; and 
5. advise the Minister on specific issues related to student funding. 
Source: Interview with Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education on 23 November 
2011. 
 
Payment of loans was to be conducted through the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ). 
The only criterion used in the means test for loans was the Gross Income of the applicant or 
his/her parents/guardians. The formula used by the Committee had four bands as shown in Table 
4.12. Evidently, the Means Test Committee used gross income (see point above) as the only 
parameter to vet applications, despite the availability of better means test formulae such as the 
Per Capita Means Test Formula (Woodhall, 2009) that determines rightful targeting. In criticism 
of the formula used, the University of Zimbabwe Student Representative Council (SRC) directed 
a Memorandum to the Means Test Committee in which it charged that: 
 
1. the Means Test Committee was improperly constituted as it did not include all 
relevant stakeholders; 
2. there was inconsistency in the awarding of student loans as twins of identical 
economic status got different awards; 
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3. the Means Test instrument should be substituted with a more appropriate and 
comprehensive formula that takes into account students’ objective socio-
economic backgrounds; 
4. that the entire loan disbursement system be overhauled as there was a lot of 
procrastination in the processing of loans, and therefore resulting in student 
strikes; 
5. the application process was also strenuous as it required costly and time 
consuming documentation; 
6. the tripartite loan disbursement arrangement that involved higher education 
institutions, the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education and the Bank was 
resulting in unnecessary delays in loan disbursements, and therefore needed to be 
disbanded (SRC Memorandum to Means Test Committee, 15 March 1997). 
 
 Table 4.12: Gross Income Bands 
 
Salary Scale % Award Loan Award in dollars (Z$) 
0 – 50 000.00 100% 12 800.00 Arts 
13 435.00 Sciences 
50 001 – 100 000.00  50% 6 400.00 Arts 
6 718.00 Sciences 
100 001 – 150 000.00 25% 3 200.00 Arts 
3 359.00 Sciences 
150 001 – Infinity NIL NIL 
Source: Ministry of Higher & Tertiary Education: Means Test Minutes, 1997. 
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At its meeting on 21 June 1999, the University of Zimbabwe Senate also noted that the 
system of loan disbursement continued to be cumbersome, with UZ submitting the 
schedules to the CBZ and CBZ in turn sending the documentation to the Ministry of Higher 
and Tertiary Education for authorization and payment.  However, following the  application 
of the Means Test, 95% of the students received loans (Means Test Annual Report, 1999), 
suggesting that most of the students lacked the financial ability to pay for their education. 
 
4.4.2.2. Introduction of Loan Funding by Banking Sector (2001) 
 
In 2001, the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education sought to privatize the funding of higher 
and tertiary education students to commercial banks with effect from the beginning of the 
2001/2002 academic year (in August 2001).
23
 Most banks, except the CBZ and Metropolitan 
Bank, however declined involvement in the higher education student loan project citing viability 
and sustainability of the proposed loan programme as well as the associated risk to shareholders.  
 The new funding policy was based on three fundamental assumptions, namely, (a) that 
private sector driven funding of students would be efficient and effective; (b) that by transferring 
the funding of students to the banking sector, the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education 
would be able to concentrate on its core business; and (c), that loan recovery would improve in 
view of the banking sector’s enhanced risk management infrastructure and competence in 
dealing with loan recovery.  
 To that end, a Higher Education Bond (HEB) was to be floated in the market in 
                                                          
23
 Referred to by Salmi and Hauptman (2006) as sale of  student loans to secondary markets. 
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September 2001 to raise the Z$1.3 billion
24
 required for disbursement as loans to students for the 
academic year that had already begun in August. The CBZ was to raise 80% of the sum, with the 
Metropolitan Bank raising the remaining 20%. The first flotation of the HEB came in September 
2001. The return to investors on the bond was pegged at 10%. The market rejected the bond 
outright, citing low returns. Government requested the CBZ to conduct a second flotation, now 
with returns at 20%. Again, the bond did not attract any meaningful market response. It was still 
perceived as having low returns, hence the second market rejection. At the end of November 
through to 18 December 2001, a third flotation was conducted with returns raised to 35% 
(Minutes of Special Meeting of Senate, University of Zimbabwe, 19 December 2001). While the 
offer appeared attractive, considering that the highest returns on the market at that time were 
around 30%, the two banks only managed to raise Z$481 million out of the anticipated Z$1.3 
billion, thus leaving the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education with the burden of raising the 
Z$900 million shortfall, otherwise the new funding formula would have collapsed at inception.  
 By 2002, it had become evident that the idea of transferring student financing to the 
private sector was not achieving the intended results. Meanwhile, five new public universities 
had come on board, the Zimbabwe Open University (1999), Midlands State University (2000), 
Bindura University of Science Education (2001), Chinhoyi University of Technology (2001), 
and Great Zimbabwe University (2002). In all, there were now seven public universities, 
including the already existing University of Zimbabwe and the National University of Science 
and Technology. In the private university sector, four universities had been established by 2002, 
namely Africa University (1992), Solusi University (1994), Catholic University (1999), and the 
Women’s University in Africa (2002).    
                                                          
24
 The amount would be enough to cover the students’ loan requirements for the 2001/2002 academic year. 
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4.4.2.3. End of Grant Funding (2002) 
 
 
With the collapse of attempts to privatize student funding, government abolished grant 
funding to higher education students in 2002. A new financing policy was introduced in that 
same year. The Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education claimed that the aim was to broaden 
opportunities for higher education and introduced a 100% loan system that would be open to all 
students in higher and tertiary education. The Ministry announced that the previous grant and 
loan system “was placing a heavy burden on the state and limiting the scope of student funding” 
(Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, 2004: 13). Under the new scheme, students in 
private universities would also be eligible for state assistance. The Ministry emphasized that the 
new funding formula would have the effect of increasing access to tertiary education and training 
(Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, 2004). 
 The abolition of the grant and introduction of the 100% loan policy was accompanied by 
the privatization of students’ common services. For example, accommodation and catering 
services at universities were wholly privatized. At the University of Zimbabwe the entire staff of 
the Department of Accommodation and Catering Services was retrenched and all equipment 
auctioned (Human Resources Department, University of Zimbabwe).   
4.4.2.4. End of the Loan System (2006) 
 
 
By the mid 2000s, signs of cataclysmic decline of the Zimbabwean economy were evidently 
showing (Raftopoulos, in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009). By 2006, GDP per capita was 47% 
lower than the 1980 level. Formal sector income levels declined drastically, as did employment 
levels in the sector. Whereas formal sector employment stood at about 1.4 million in 1998, the 
levels had shrunk to about 998 000 by 2004. Hyperinflation reached unprecedented levels, with 
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official records putting it at 230 million per cent by the end of 2008 (Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 
2009). Raftopoulos observes that by 2006, 85% of Zimbabweans were living below the Poverty 
Datum Line (Raftopoulos, in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009). 
 The world-record decline of the Zimbabwean economy is attributable to a number of 
factors. First were the legacies of the narrow forms of capital accumulation created by 
colonialism and the problematic development strategies in both the welfarist and the neoliberal 
regimes of the 1980s and 1990s respectively (Raftopoulos, in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009). 
Weighing in on these factors were immediate causes: these included the Government’s 
controversial land reform programme that attracted the imposition of international economic 
sanctions on Zimbabwe by the USA and the EU bloc in early 2000; Zimbabwe’s costly 
involvement in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo; and the unbudgeted large 
payouts made to war veterans of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle (Dansereau and Zamponi, 
2005).        
 The hyperinflationary economic situation made it increasingly difficult for government to 
sustain the loan system.
25
 As a result, Government abolished it with effect from the beginning of 
the 2006 academic year. There were by now thirteen universities in the country following the 
establishment of two new public universities, Lupane State University and the Harare Institute of 
Technology in 2005. Thus, by 2006 there were nine public and four private universities. The 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, Mr Willard Manungo, when appearing before 
the Higher and Tertiary Education Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on the state of 
Government’s funding to higher education since dollarization in 2009 on Monday, 28 March 
2011, noted that the economic collapse in the last decade had fundamentally changed 
Government’s priorities and its ability to fully fund education. Manungo further said, 
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 Interview with the Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education 23 November 2011. 
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[T]reasury discontinued the loans and grant scheme because of hyperinflation 
which made the burden of education fall on the government. The new state 
universities also increased strain on funding (Treasury Report to Higher and 
Tertiary Education Parliamentary Portfolio Committee, 28 March, 2011. In 
Zimbabwe Independent, 2011, April 1 to 7).  
 
Following the scrapping of the loan system, government introduced the Cadetship Grant 
Scheme in 2006. This scheme provides grants to students at higher and tertiary education 
institutions. Eligibility to the scheme is based on the students’ inability to pay fees, and it pays 
for students’ tuition fees only. It does not cover students’ ancillary fees and living expenses. In 
return for three to five years of grant assistance students are legally bonded to the country. To 
ensure compliance with the bonding provisions, students do not receive their examination 
(degree) certificates until the end of the bonding period (Interview with Minister of Higher and 
Tertiary Education on 23 November 2011).  
The hyperinflation that characterized the early half of the 2000s up to 2008 poses serious 
challenges to meaningful analysis of trends in higher education financing between 2006 and 
2008. However, available records indicate that the share of the higher education budget as a 
percentage of the total government budget increased appreciably from 2.4% in 1989 to 4.8% in 
1999 and rose further to 6.8% by 2005. Following the continued decline of the economy, the 
share dropped to 4.4% in 2008. By 2009, the share of the higher education budget had fallen to 
3% of total government expenditure (Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, 2009).  
With the adopting of the multi-currency system, that is, the dollarization of the economy, 
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in early 2009, a clearer picture begins to emerge of trends in higher education funding. The next 
section thus turns to an analysis of trends in 2009 and in the process pays particular attention to 
locating cost-sharing discourse within an overall analysis of the financing patterns.  
 Preceding chapters and sections of this chapter have shown that from the time of the 
establishment of the UCRN in 1957 up to the 1990s, Government provided the bulk of funding 
to higher education institutions and students. Then, Government support for higher education 
accounted for close to 80% of the institutions’ income. However, in 2009 approximately 40% of 
total university income came from Government (Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education). 
 In 2009, the budgetary bid by the nine public universities was USD1.5 billion of recurrent 
funding from Government. Not only was an insignificant USD22.6 million allocated to the 
universities by Treasury, but only USD11.3 million of the total allocation was released to the 
universities (Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education) Table 4.13 shows the allocation and 
disbursement statistics.   
Virtually all Government funding is directed to staff salaries. As can be seen from the 
Table, the amount released for capital expenditure amounted to only USD0.75 million (Ministry 
of Finance). Of the USD0.75 million released for capital expenditure, the bulk (two-thirds) was 
released to the UZ for refurbishment of student hostels and the restoration of water supplies. 
Table 4.13 vividly shows the gaps or shortfalls that exist between the resource needs of 
universities in Zimbabwe and what is realistically and practically available by way of 
Government subventions. 
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Table 4.13: Revised budget allocations and actual releases for universities, FY 2009 (USD 
‘000 rounded) 
 
                                           RECURRENT                       CAPITAL 
University Allocation Release Actual 
Disbursement 
as percentage 
of Allocated 
Amount 
Allocation Release Actual 
Disbursement 
as percentage 
of Allocated 
Amount 
Bindura 1169 517 44.2 315 0 0.0 
Chinhoyi 1995 769 38.5 130 0 0.0 
Great 
Zimbabwe 
1236 645 52.2 300 60 20.0 
HIT 598 352 58.9 300 0 0.0 
Lupane 298 256 85.9 280 95 33.9 
MSU 2438 934 38.3 230 0 0.0 
NUST 2046 900 44.0 300 0 0.0 
ZOU 1796 972 54.1 160 0 0.0 
UZ 5732 2509 43.8 929 492 53.0 
TOTALS 17308 7854 45.4 2944 647 24.5 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
 What then are the gap filling options for the university sector? The Ministry of Higher 
and Tertiary Education notes that the other sources of funding open to universities include 
student fees and levies, other income generating activities, and external (domestic and foreign) 
donor support (Interview with Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education). The discussion now 
turns to analyzing each of these other sources.   
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Student Fees: Beginning in 1999, Government allowed universities to retain fee and other 
income generated internally. Fees at universities are set by ministerial ordinance. The process 
involves higher education institutions submitting recommended fee levels for tuition and 
accommodation to the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education for approval. For state 
universities, national levels are set by the Ministry.  An obvious issue raised by thus locating  
decision making regarding the determination of fee structures at universities is the outcome of 
the process, in view of the Government’s propensity to making decisions on political grounds 
rather than on appropriate economic grounds. However, one would assume that the authority of 
the ministry in the final determination of the fee structures ensures that the university sector does 
not end up with runaway fee structures that are beyond the reach of students, particularly those 
from poorer backgrounds. 
 Tuition fees per semester at universities in 2009 were as follows: Humanities USD300, 
Sciences (Engineering, Natural Sciences and Agriculture) USD350, and Life Sciences (Medicine 
and Veterinary Science USD400. In addition to the tuition fees, students also pay ancillary fees 
to cover the costs of, for example, registration, medical insurance, caution fee deposit, laboratory 
deposit, field attachment visits, etc.  
Table 4.14: Student Fee Structure at University of Zimbabwe, 2009.  
Discipline Tuition Fees 
USD 
 Ancillary Fees 
USD  
Accommodation 
USD 
 Total 
USD 
Humanities 300 
 
105* 400 805 
Sciences 350 
 
154* 400 904 
Life Sciences 400 274* 400 1074 
 
*These are the ancillary fees payable during the first semester. In the second semester the fees 
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reduce since some of the fee items, such as caution fee deposit, health insurance and laboratory 
deposit, are one-off payments made in the first semester.  
Source: Academic Registry, University of Zimbabwe 
  
At the University of Zimbabwe in 2009, ancillary fees for the three categories of 
disciplines were as follows: Humanities USD105, Sciences USD154, and Life Sciences 
USD274.  Accommodation fees (full board) at the University of Zimbabwe were USD400 per 
semester. Table 4.14 above, shows the 2009 fee structure at the University of Zimbabwe. 
University income from student fees takes two forms, upfront fees from students not 
supported by government through the Cadetship scheme and the Cadetship grants. As noted 
earlier, Government pays the tuition fee component only for students on the Cadetship 
programme. Also important to note is that universities have full autonomy in the determination 
of  ancillary fee structures as these are not governed by ministerial ordinance. This means that in 
practice the total tuition packages differ from one institution to the other. In turn, the different fee 
structures charged by HEIs also mean that institutions have to compete for students on the basis 
of price and quality, hence the marketization of higher education.   
 Prior to about 2000, the Government funded higher education courses almost 100%, with 
student paying nominal fees (Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, 2009). During the 
hyperinflation period, fee incomes were also almost negligible because of two major reasons. 
First, because of the bureaucratic nature of the tuition fee determination process, inflation would 
erode the fee levels during the process of approval between universities and the ministry. 
Secondly, the existence of black market currency distorted the real value of fee income. A case is 
cited where at Africa University  many students had been paying tuition fees using black market 
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currency with USD50 paying for the entire academic year,
26
 yet the per semester fees at the 
University were equivalent to USD2500 (Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, 2009)  
 Dollarization in 2009 brought about a twenty-fold increase in university fees, a situation 
that made higher education unaffordable for many students, considering that the bulk of people 
in formal employment were civil servants earning between USD150-USD160 per month in 2009. 
The University of Zimbabwe failed to reopen for the second semester of the 2008/2009 in 
February 2009 after most students had failed to raise the requisite fees.  
 The Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) said at the time, “The University of 
Zimbabwe failed to open…this year. Students failed to pay the fees demanded by the 
institution….only 10% of students had managed to pay the exorbitant fees resulting in the 
college failing to open” (ZINASU, 2009:1).  
 Fee arrears are also a chronic problem at HEIs. While the ministry’s policy is that no 
student should be sent away for failure to pay fees, institutions have in fact introduced a raft of 
measures to force students to pay fees. At most institutions, students in arrears are not allowed to 
register, meaning that some students are forced to defer studies to the next semester or to such 
other time as they will have raised the fees. In other cases, the students are barred from writing 
examinations at the end of the semester or their examination results are withheld by the 
institutions pending the students’ settlement of the arrears. In yet other cases, students in arrears 
are denied access to essential academic services such as the library (Ministry of Higher and 
Tertiary Education, 2009). Figure 4.15 for example, shows the fee arrears statistics across the 
higher education sector. 
                                                          
26
 Fees at HEI were paid in Z$s at government controlled rates of exchange for the US$ to the Z$. The exchange rate 
for the US$ to the Z$ on the black market was grossly distorted in the sense that the US$ could fetch a lot more Z$s 
on the black market than on the formal market where government controlled the foreign currency exchange rate. 
Students with access to foreign currency would thus transact on the black market where USD50.00 would yield a Z$ 
equivalent of USD2500.00 on the government controlled (formal) market. Fees at HEIs were payable in Z$s.      
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The University of Zimbabwe deregistered around one-quarter of its students who were in 
arrears in November 2009, just a few weeks before the commencement of end of semester 
examinations (Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, 2009). Statistics across the university 
sector show that, on average, enrolments fell by over a quarter during the first semester of the 
2009/2010 academic year (Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, 2009), a development that 
confirms Heller (2006), Johnstone (1986; 2003) and Palfreyman (2004)’s conclusion that the 
shift of higher education costs from government to students forces lower-income students out of 
higher education.  The discussion now shifts to an analysis of the performance of the Cadetship 
scheme. 
Table 4.15: Students in arrears at universities, November 2009 
 
Institution Students in 
arrears 
Total enrolment % arrears 
Bindura 510 1941 26.3 
Chinhoyi 1397 2840 49.2 
Great Zimbabwe 2226 2731 81.5 
HIT 230 368 62.5 
Lupane 330 Na Na 
MSU 4794 15269 31.4 
NUST 2452 5762 42.6 
Source: Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education HTEI Basic Information Form  
 
 
The Cadetship Scheme: The obligations and conditions governing the Cadetship programme 
are stipulated in the Conditions and Memorandum of Agreement for Special Cadets entered into 
by and between the Government of Zimbabwe and the students who are special cadets. As noted 
earlier, through this need based scheme, government assists financially disadvantaged students to 
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meet their tuition costs in return for working for Zimbabwe for a “minimum period equal to the 
duration of the period he/she was engaged as a Special Cadet”27 (Article 2, Conditions and 
Memorandum of Agreement for Special Cadets). In 2009, USD5 million was allocated to the 
scheme to cover needy students across all the HEIs. Figure 4.16 depicts the distribution of the 
Cadetship assistance awarded in 2009. 
The first and second tranches, amounting to USD4 million, were released in September 
2009 to pay for tuition fees for the second semester of the 2008/2009 academic year and the first 
semester of the 2009/2010 academic year that had begun in February and August 2009, 
respectively. Information from the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education revealed that the 
balance of the allocation had not been released to the institutions by the end of 2009.  
 
Table 4.16: Cadetship Grants Awarded to Students in Universities (2009) 
 
Institution Number of 
Students 
Number  
Received 
% total 
enrolments 
Average $ per 
grantee 
Bindura 1941 149 7.7 304 
Chinhoyi 2840 685 24.1 310 
GZU 2731 990 36.2 301 
HIT 368 95 25.8 343 
Lupane 102 40 39.2 328 
MSU 15269 1 123 7.4 338 
NUST 5762 1 006 17.5 331 
UZ 12500 1159 9.2 327 
 
NB. Amounts are USD ‘000 rounded. Students in private universities (Catholic University, 
Africa University, Women’s University in Africa, Solusi University) and at the Zimbabwe Open 
                                                          
27
 A beneficiary of the Cadetship Scheme. 
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university (ZOU) do not receive Cadetship support. 
Source: Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education 
 
The statistics in Table 4.16 reveal that, in 2009, only 12.6% of the student population 
across the higher education sector received Government support through the Cadetship scheme. 
Three logical deductions are possible from the statistic, noting that, previously in 2001, the 
vetting of loan applicants through the Ministry’s means test instrument had resulted in 95% of 
the students being classified as poor, hence eligible for loan support, the significant decline in the 
percentage of poor students in 2009 would thus suggest two possibilities. One is that most of the 
previously poor students’ ability to pay had suddenly improved by 2009 to the extent that they no 
longer needed government support. The second explanation would be that the vetting instrument 
used in 2001 was defective in that it failed to objectively identify students who were really in 
need. By extension, this line of argument would suggest a remarkable improvement in the vetting 
instrument then used for the Cadetship scheme in 2009. The third possible conclusion is that the 
Cadetship scheme is inadequately resourced, to the extent that only a handful out of many 
deserving candidates accessed support from the scheme. The last possibility is that the majority 
of students, though poor and potentially eligible for support, resisted the scheme. An analysis of 
the propositions follows in the next section.  
 Records obtained from the Student Affairs Department at the University of 
Zimbabwe show that the major criterion used to vet applicants for eligibility to the scheme is 
gross family income. Evidence further demonstrated no significant variations in the instruments 
used in 2001 and in 2009. The same formula that used gross income bands in the 2001 vetting 
instrument is the same as that adopted for the Cadetship scheme. The only difference is that 
while the bands in 2001 were in Zimbabwe dollars, the same bands in 2009 are in United States 
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dollars. Therefore, the vetting instruments used in 2001 and in 2009 are technically the same.   
Evidence also suggests the lack of logic in the proposition that the economic status of the 
majority of students had significantly improved after 2001 such that they had graduated from the 
needy bracket, come 2009. Zimbabwe’s economic performance, though dismal in 2001, was not 
as catastrophic as it became towards the end of 2008 into 2009. It has been shown in earlier 
sections of the Chapter that, by December 2008, inflation had reached an unprecedented record 
of 230 million percent. It will also be recalled that, in 2009, civil servants such as teachers and 
nurses, professionals who would constitute the middle class in a normal economy, were earning a 
paltry USD150-160 a month.  
  The last two propositions, that the Cadetship scheme is under resourced and that there is 
general student apathy towards and resistance to the scheme, are supported by available 
evidence. According to the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, 
 
[M]any students were skeptical about the scheme because it was widely believed that 
students would be bonded to work for government and that some of the grant would have 
to be repaid through deductions from pay….The main weaknesses of the scheme cited by 
senior management, lecturers and students are that the grants are insufficient…and [there 
are] long delays in the disbursement of grants (Ministry of Higher and Tertiary 
Education, 2009). 
 
The Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU), in its 9 March 2009 briefing paper, also 
outlines the inadequacies of the Scheme: 
 
[T]o date, students who have applied for the programme for 2009 have not 
received anything from the Government. Authorities at Bindura University…who 
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wanted to submit the forms to the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education were 
forced to return with the forms, the Government was citing that the funds for the 
cadetship programme were not available. Clearly this scenario is without doubt 
creating a whole generation of dropouts forced out of college or to go abroad and 
explore other options (ZINASU, 2009:1). 
 
While the observation (mentioned above) by the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary 
Education seems to imply that the belief that students would be bonded to work for government 
was a misplaced perception, focus group discussions with students at the University confirmed 
that the bonding condition was indeed the key factor to students’ resistance to the programme. 
Indeed, the students’ skepticism was justified. Article 4 of the Conditions and Memorandum of 
Agreement for Special Cadets explicitly states that, “No Special Cadet or prospective employer 
will be allowed to buy the bonding period or part thereof for any student trained under the 
Cadetship Scheme”. Article 2 (b) also says that a beneficiary of the scheme shall “remit a 
minimum of one third of his/her salary in forex, if he/she opts to work outside the country…for a 
minimum period equal to the duration of the period he/she was engaged as a Special Cadet”. 
 Under the prevailing economic conditions characterized by high rates of unemployment 
and salaries below the Poverty Datum Line, for many students seeking employment in the 
diaspora immediately after graduation was the ultimate option. Yet, the conditions stipulated in 
the Agreement governing the Scheme, together with the withholding of qualification documents 
at graduation by higher education institutions, would, it was believed, seriously narrow 
employment options for many students.   
 What is clear from the analysis of the Cadetship Scheme is that, given all the problems 
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associated with it – its under capitalization, the late and partial disbursements of cadetship grants 
to institutions, as well as students’ resistance to the scheme -- its contribution to filling the 
funding gap in higher education is limited. The next section now interrogates the last option, 
Income Generating Activities (IGAs). 
 
Income Generating Activities: The only income generating activity worthy of note is the 
parallel programme introduced at the Midlands State University. Elsewhere, however, the 
University of Zimbabwe has begun focusing attention on postgraduate and block release 
programmes to attract additional funding.  
In 2009, the Midlands State University raised approximately USD1.7 million in 
additional funding from running parallel programmes across most of its programmes (MHTE, 
2009). The experiences of Makerere University, the University of Nairobi, the University of Dar-
es-Salam and other flagship universities on the continent have shown that the parallel 
programme route can viably contribute to significant income for HEIs.  It is necessary, however, 
to balance the potential for revenue generation by way of parallel programmes against 
considerations of quality. The deterioration of quality in higher education delivery at Makerere 
University following the introduction of parallel programmes in the 1990s through to the 2000s 
is a case in point (Mamdani, 2007).   
As mentioned earlier, the Midlands State University was established in 2000 when the 
then Gweru Teachers College was converted into a university. As a result of the introduction of 
parallel programmes in recent years, by 2009 the student population at MSU stood at 15 269 
against the UZ’s 12 500. For a relatively new university without physical structures of its own, 
other than the infrastructure inherited from the Gweru Teachers College, it remains to be seen 
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whether the newfound financing path of parallel programmes will not compromise academic 
quality at MSU, as happened at Makerere (Mamdani, 2007). Similarly, with no end in sight to 
the financing problematic, one wonders why the University of Zimbabwe continues to shun 
parallel programmes when evidence from the experience of other flagship universities on the 
continent points in that direction.  Further, whether the University of Zimbabwe’s new policy 
direction toward postgraduate studies will be a viable alternative to the now dominant parallel 
programme paradigm is a matter of conjecture.  
    
4.4.3. Access to Higher Education  
 
While prior to 1997 a combination of generally available loans and weak loan recovery 
machinery made higher education in Zimbabwe virtually free by default, thus insulating students 
from the negative impact of cost-sharing, a movement towards real cost-sharing began with the 
introduction of  means testing in 1997. At the time, the effects were not largely felt because of 
the use of a defective means testing instrument. It was not until 2009, following the introduction 
of dollarization, that the effects of cost-sharing began to take a toll on higher education access. It 
has been demonstrated that, in 2009, about a quarter of higher education students dropped out of 
universities, a development attributed by both University of Zimbabwe and Ministry of Higher 
and Tertiary Education officials to cost-sharing, and that a significant number of those remaining 
were in fee arrears. Thus, beginning in 2009, the economic perspective to access (Baber and 
Lindsay, 2006; Blondal et al, 2002; Vossensteyn, 2004) takes centre stage. 
 It has been stated that, with regards to issues of access, the higher education landscape in 
Zimbabwe reveals the dominance of the socio-political (Trow, 1973) and the 
stratification/tracking systems (Clark, 1987; Furth 1973; Scott, 1995) perspectives in higher 
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education funding during the colonial period.  The socio-political perspective is again dominant 
in the first decade of independence, a period that saw concerted efforts by government to 
dismantle the inherited socio-political inequalities and to democratize the pathway to higher 
education. The economic perspective, however, takes centre stage with the pragmatic shift in 
government policies from socialism and the associated welfare policies of the 1980s to 
capitalism, starting with the adopting of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in the 
early 1990s. However, the real and forceful effects of the economic perspective began to be felt 
with the dollarization of the economy in 2009. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has demonstrated that cost-sharing was introduced with the inception of University 
College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It has also been shown that the history of cost-sharing in 
higher education in Zimbabwe in specific epochs was a function of the confluence of an 
amalgam of global, national, and local variables that were political, economic, and social, 
operating in specific historical epochs of the country’s development. 
 Thus during the colonial period, with its racist colonial education policies, as with the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and its subsequent collapse as well as the impact and 
consequences of UDI among other historical factors, these factors combined to define and direct 
the development of higher education and its funding in specific colonial periods. At 
independence in 1980, the state assumed a developmental role and implemented a raft of policy 
measures in an effort to transform the existing political, social, and economic order. In these 
efforts, higher education became central to the development process and a radical 
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democratization of the sector ensued. However, towards the end of the 1980s, government’s 
redistribution without growth policies courted the intervention of international capital in the form 
of the World Bank and the IMF, with the subsequent introduction of neoliberal policies in 
economic development as from the early 1990s. Concomitant with these neoliberal policies was 
the shift to the marketization of higher education..  
 It has also been demonstrated that the tendency for global, national, and local factors to 
combine in specific epochs to influence higher education funding policies accounted for the 
gradual and eventually complete scrapping of grant and loan support to students in 2002 and 
2006, respectively. Of particular concern is the picture emerging from the analysis of the funding 
trends in 2009. Government’s incapacity to adequately fund the higher education institutions, let 
alone the students, is shockingly evident. At the same time, the students’ incapacity to fund their 
education is also evident if one considers the dropout statistics and the statistics on fee arrears. 
Are there sustainable options?   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
5.1 Historical Trends in Higher Education Funding Revisited 
 
This study was positioned against global adopting of the cost-sharing phenomenon in higher 
education financing. At this point, it is necessary that the context that motivated and informed 
the research be revisited. 
It was demonstrated in Chapter 2 that, up until the 1970s, governments invested heavily 
in higher education. At that time, the public good aspect of higher education was highly 
regarded. The chapter showed that the post-World War II period up to the 1970s coincided with 
the dominance of Keynesianism, a development paradigm that advocated for the central role of 
the state in development. Consistent with the dictates of Keynesian economics, the state became 
the chief agent in economic development and, in the process, adopted welfare policies that 
resulted in the state’s direct involvement in the production and distribution of social services. 
Higher education became a major beneficiary. Globally, the welfare policy regimes adopted by 
many governments resulted in free or at least highly subsidized higher education. 
 It has been further demonstrated in Chapter 2 that, following the advent of independence 
in Africa, the establishment of universities on the continent was regarded as a major part of the 
post-colonial national development project. The universities were expected to help the new 
nations build up their capacity to develop and manage their resources as well as to alleviate the 
poverty of the majority of the people and to close the gap between African nations and the 
developed world. In short, the establishment of universities in Africa and the reorientation of 
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existing ones was one major element of nation building. The university was considered to be a 
key instrument for national development; hence like all other major national development 
initiatives, the African university was explicitly a public undertaking financed and supported 
from the public purse.   
Part 3 of Chapter 2 showed that, from about the 1980s, however, financing patterns in 
higher education began to shift from free higher education to cost-sharing. The discussion also 
observed that the motivation for the shift was largely influenced by the change in development 
thinking from the Keynesian paradigm (and its associated notion of the welfare state) to 
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism advocated that the state reduce its role in the production and 
distribution of goods and services as well as that the state roll back its frontiers in development. 
Closely following the paradigmatic shift was another dynamic, namely, rising austerity brought 
about by the global rise in demand for higher education and increasing per student costs against 
ever shrinking national higher education budgets. A further dynamic that argued for a shift of 
national funding from higher to lower levels of education came from the World Bank with its 
private rate of returns to investment in higher education methodology. Thus from around the turn 
of the 1980s, cost-sharing took centre stage in higher education financing.  
 It is against the milieu of these changes to higher education financing patterns that the 
motivation for the research evolved. It should be recalled that a standpoint of the research was 
that, unlike most of the African countries that historically have had free higher education, in 
Zimbabwe cost-sharing is neither a new nor recent experience. It predates the global adoption of 
neoliberalism, starting with the inception of the first university, the UCRN, in 1957. Unlike the 
challenge in other countries of shifting from free higher education to cost-sharing, the challenge 
in Zimbabwe has been that of shifts from one cost-sharing model to another. The study sought to 
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identify and explain the shifts in higher education financing policy in the country from the 
inception of the UCRN in 1957 to 2009. 
 
5.2. Restating Objectives of the Study 
 
The primary objective of the study was to identify and account for the shifts in cost-sharing 
policy in financing students’ higher education in Zimbabwe from 1957-2009.  In order to achieve 
this primary objective, the following specific objectives were set:  
a. to situate the cost-sharing epochs and identify the cost-sharing models and strategies 
adopted  in specific epochs between 1957 and 2009; 
b. to explore and explain the logic underpinning the transition from one cost-sharing model 
to another; and 
c.  to identify and discuss the mechanisms established to address issues of access following 
the adopting of cost-sharing as a strategy to finance students’  higher education. 
Answers to the following questions were critical to the achievement of the objectives: 
i. How was cost-sharing in higher education in Zimbabwe defined, modeled and practiced 
between 1957 and 2009?  
ii What philosophy determined the adopting of particular cost-sharing models and practices 
in particular epochs in this period of the history of higher education financing in 
Zimbabwe?  
     iii How did the cost-sharing measures impact on access to higher education?  
What specific mechanisms were implemented to deal with the impact, and how 
successful were the interventions? 
Chapter 4 has shown that from the inception of the University College of Rhodesia and 
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Nyasaland in 1957 until 2005, Zimbabwe adopted and maintained a deferred tuition fee policy 
regime.  
Figure 5.1: Factors Influencing Shifts in Cost-Sharing Models: 1957-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COLONIAL 
PERIOD 
1957: Inception of UCRN and Adoption of Deferred Tuition Fee Policy: 50% 
loan 50% grant 
 British civic universities tradition 
 Existence of cost-sharing model 
 Human capital formation 
 Private sector and donor support for HE 
 Small  number of HE students 
 Efficient cost (loan) recovery  
1968:  Deferred Tuition Fee Policy: 75% loan 25% grant 
 Break-up of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
 International sanctions following UDI 
 Withdrawal of Commonwealth scholarship support 
 Costs of sustaining war against African nationalism 
 Efficient cost recovery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POST-
COLONIAL 
PERIOD  
1980-1990: Deferred Tuition Fee Policy: 50% loan 50% grant 
 Socialist orientated populist education and other social services policies 
 Economic boom in first half of the 1980s 
 Lifting of international economic sanctions and subsequent access to 
international finance 
 Favourable agricultural seasons in 1980 and 1981   
1991-2005: Deferred Tuition Fee Policy: 75% loan 25% grant (1992). Loan & 
grant components increase and reduce to 100% and 0% respectively by 2002. 
 Legacies of ill-conceived socialist economic policies 
 ESAP 
 Drought in early 1990s 
 Weak loan recovery since the 1980s 
 Failure of policy attempts to privatize loan provisioning 
 Land reform induced international sanctions 
 Zimbabwe’s involvement in DRC’s internal conflict 
 Unbudgeted-for payouts to veterans of the liberation war 
 Increased demand for HE  
 
2006-2009: Upfront Tuition Fee Policy  beginning 2006: Cadetship grants 
introduced 
 Legacies of ESAP 
 World record economic decline with inflation at 230 million% by 2008 
 Increased demand for HE. 
 
 
 
 
147 
 
This Chapter has also shown that global, national, and local factors combined in specific 
ways to influence shifts in cost-sharing policies in specific historical epochs of the development 
of higher education financing in Zimbabwe. Table 5.1 above summarizes the factors. 
It has further been demonstrated in the Chapter that the tuition fee policies from 1957 to 
2005 were supported by a mortgage type of loan system that was complemented by student 
grants. From 1957 until 1997 students’ loans were automatic. In the colonial period however, the 
loan and grant system had a racial bias against Africans. The Chapter has also shown that a 
major shift to the automatic loan policies occurred in 1997 when, for the first time in the history 
of higher education financing in Zimbabwe, a means test system was introduced.  
This policy change was to be followed by two other major milestones – the abolition of 
the grant system in 2002 and the introduction of upfront fees that followed the scrapping of the 
loan system in 2006. It was observed that the abolition of the grant and loan systems in 2002 and 
2006 respectively followed failed policy attempts at privatizing the loan system. Further, with 
the decline in Government support for higher education coupled with the failure by tuition fees 
to fill up the gap, a new dynamic – income generation -- emerged. The introduction of the dual 
track system at the Midlands State University was particularly noted. Figure 5.2 shows the shifts 
in cost-sharing models from 1957 to 2009.  
 With respect to access, Chapter 4 has shown that during the colonial era, access to higher 
education was largely a function of the barrier system that was ingrained in the primary and 
secondary school system.  
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Figure 5.2: Shifts in Cost-Sharing Models: 1957-2009 
 
Note: The arrows show the shifts in cost-sharing models and do not suggest a cyclic process 
  
It was further shown that this system had its roots in the racist colonial policies that defined 
inequality between the whites and the Africans.  
Also demonstrated was the fact that, prior to 1997, cost-sharing in higher education had 
no significant impact on access as a result of the generally available loan system and weak cost 
recovery machinery. It is only after the introduction of the requirement of upfront payment of 
Colonial Period. 
1957-1979 
Deferred tuition fee policy is 
introduced. Loan and grant 
system is biased against African 
students. Bonding is built into 
the loan system. Loan recovery 
is efficient.   
First Decade of Independence 
1980-1990 
Deferred tuition fee policy is 
embraced. Loans and grants are 
made generally available.. 
Bonding is abolished. Loan 
recovery is weak 
 
Transition to Neoliberalism 
1990-2009 
1997: Means test loan system is 
introduced. 
2001: Policy to privatize loan 
system fails. 
2002: Grant system is abolished. 
2006: Upfront tuition fee policy 
is introduced following abolition 
of loan system 
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fees that followed the abolition of the loan system in 2006 that the impact of cost-sharing on 
access began to be felt. The negative impact was compounded by the inherent inadequacies of 
the cadetship grant scheme. Thus, particularly starting with the dollarization of the economy in 
2009, the dropout phenomenon became a reality in higher education financing.       
A number of pertinent conclusions may be drawn from this study. Firstly, while the 
conceptual model of Johnstone (2009) of cost-sharing is applicable to the post-1990 higher 
education financing epoch in Zimbabwe, the introduction of cost-sharing at the inception of the 
UCRN in 1957 challenges this model in significant respects. It has been demonstrated that, 
according to Johnstone (2009), the introduction of cost-sharing across national systems of higher 
education is a function of the expansion of higher education that arises from increased demand 
against constrained fiscal (public) outlays. The utility of the model is thus limited with respect to 
explaining the introduction of cost-sharing with the inception of the UCRN at a time when the 
institution had only 68 students and in a period, pre-UDI, when the University had the highest 
funding ever in the history of higher education in Zimbabwe (Manungo, 2010).  
 Secondly, the elitist character of higher education access in the colonial period and the 
rise in enrolments at the University of Zimbabwe beginning in the first decade of independence 
as well as the subsequent proliferation of universities resulting from democratization of primary 
and secondary education, all attest to the findings of Bergh and Fink (2004) and Dabla-Norris 
and Gradstein (2004) that subsidized primary and secondary education leads to increased higher 
education enrolments.  Bergh and Fink (2004), in particular, contend that higher education access 
is determined by the nature of the pathway from primary to secondary school and therefore to 
higher education, and not by higher education subsidies. Such subsidies, they conclude, do not 
seem to have a significant impact on higher education enrolments.  
 
 
 
 
150 
 
Thirdly, the rapid expansion of enrolments at the Midlands State University following the 
introduction of parallel programmes confirms the assertions of the Asian Development Bank 
(2009), World Bank, (2010) and of Johnstone (2006) that access to higher education is 
constrained by the limited supply of places rather than by cost. The parallel programmes reveal 
the willingness of students and their families to pay for higher education, as well as supporting 
the contention that cost recovery increases both enrolments and resources available for higher 
education. The emergence of private universities in post-colonial Zimbabwe also supports Kapur 
and Crowley’s (1998) observation that the global rise of private higher education is testimony to 
students and their families’ ability and willingness to pay for higher education.  
However, the dropout and fee arrear patterns at universities following dollarization point 
to the possible negative impact of cost-sharing and they confirm the findings by Barr (1993), 
Heller (2006) and Palfreyman (2004) that it is ultimately the lower income students who suffer 
from the introduction of cost-sharing. The dropout phenomenon also supports findings by Amy 
(2010), who, in a study of higher education financing in Hong Kong, concluded that subsidies 
have a positive impact on higher education access. The dropout and fee arrears statistics further 
attest to the recommendation of Woodhall (2009) and Johnstone (2006) that the introduction of 
cost-sharing should be accompanied by effective student support measures, such as loans, in 
order to cushion vulnerable students from the potentially harsh impacts of cost-sharing. The 
Cadetship scheme has not succeeded in that direction. The study has also confirmed Woodhall’s 
(2004) contention that most loan programmes in Africa are generally available and are allocated 
to all students without consideration of students’ financial need. It has also been demonstrated 
that the history of loan recovery in higher education in post-colonial Zimbabwe is a record of 
dismal failure. Pillay (2008)’s conclusion that most loan recovery programmes in Africa are 
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weak is vindicated by this study.  
Fourthly, the failure of attempts by the Government of Zimbabwe to privatize the loan 
system, in particular the failure of the flotation of the Higher Education Bond, supports the 
observation by the Asian Development Bank (2009) that, while higher education is on average a 
good investment, the risk associated with individual student loans constitutes a barrier to lenders 
(namely, banks), resulting in less total investment than would be optimal.  
 The discussion now turns to policy recommendations that are drawn from the study. The 
funding scenario in higher education in Zimbabwe reveals a gradual and, in recent years, 
dramatic decline in Government support for both higher education institutions and students. That 
the funding situation has reached critical, if not crisis, levels cannot be overemphasized. It is 
evident that Government support to higher education institutions, as of 2009, is grossly 
inadequate. It is also evident that the other sources of income to higher education, such as student 
fees and income generating activities by the institutions are nowhere near filling the funding gap.  
 The case for improved funding of the higher education sector in Zimbabwe rests on at 
least three fundamental considerations. The first is the issue of the huge social benefits that 
derive from the externalities that are generated by higher education. It has been shown in 
Chapter 2 and elsewhere in the development of this thesis that higher education: 
 
(a) has a favourable  impact on future generations and is a real intergenerational investment; 
(b) it provides an adequate mechanism for discovering and exploiting potential talents; 
(c) it offers the labour force occupational flexibility, as a result of economic growth; 
(d) it generates opportunities for basic and applied research. For instance, in Argentina, it is 
estimated that over 60% of research is carried out in universities; 
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(e) it generates tangible benefits, such as a better political culture, social coherence and 
mobility, as well as intellectual and artistic rewards that increase the general well-being 
of society (Franz, 1987, in Hildago, 1997:684). 
 
The second consideration is premised on the now common global phenomenon of 
knowledge economies. Here, universities are an important factor in the development of 
knowledge economies and therefore of economic growth. Studies carried out in economically 
advanced countries show that three-quarters of the increase in productivity are the result of work 
qualifications and the development of science and technology (Franz, 1987, in Hildago, 
1997:684).  
Thirdly, after independence, Zimbabwe made huge investments in education. 
Consequently, its education system became the envy of many countries in Africa. That in itself is 
a legacy that needs to be jealously guarded. 
 
Recommendation 1 
 
A major conclusion drawn from both the dropout and fee arrears statistics across the university 
sector and the seeming ‘success’ of the parallel programmes at the Midlands State University in 
terms of enrolment and resource expansion is that they make a strong case for both the public 
subsidy and cost-sharing respectively. Herein lies a case for the resuscitation of a full-fledged 
loan system. The foundation for such a system already exists in the Cadetship scheme. The study 
therefore recommends that the Cadetship scheme be transformed into a loan system. Considering 
the under capitalization of the Scheme, it makes economic sense to transform it into a full- 
fledged loan system, in terms of which the release of degree qualifications (certificates) to 
 
 
 
 
153 
 
graduates is tied to the graduates’ repayment of the money paid to them in tuition fees by the 
Scheme instead of the current system where release of qualifications is conditional upon the 
graduates serving the country for a determined period of time. Repayment plans can be 
negotiated and worked out. In that way, the Scheme can become a revolving fund and in the 
process become open to more needy students.  
 The success of the policy recommendation is however premised on the development of a 
framework that ensures that loans are allocated to students who are in real financial need
28
 and 
that there is an effective and efficient loan recovery system. Noting the weaknesses associated 
with loan recovery beginning with the first decade of independence, the study supports and 
proffers the World Bank (2010) recommendation that, in order to be successful, a loan 
programme needs a collection authority that has the requisite expertise, is professional, and 
incorruptible. The Bank further suggests distancing loan recovery from university and/or 
government bureaucracies (ministries responsible for higher education). As a result, this study 
recommends either the National Social Security Authority (of Zimbabwe) or the national income 
tax system as potentially appropriate and viable collection options.  
 
 
Recommendation 2 
 
Government should seriously reconsider the proliferation of stand-alone state universities that 
have to compete for the meagre available resources. Economies of scale would suggest that with 
                                                          
28
 For example, to assess financial need, the University of the Philippines’ “Socialized Tuition and Financial 
Assistance Program” uses assessment criteria that go beyond a student’s family’s gross income or income tax 
returns that usually understate ability to pay. Instead, applicants complete a twelve page questionnaire that asks 
about family assets, parental level of education and occupation, parental residence status and location of residence. 
While the questionnaire does not stop students from providing false information, home visits and stern disciplinary 
actions that include expulsion of students who provide false information, have helped to get students answer 
questions truthfully (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1991).  
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the rise in demand for higher education the University of Zimbabwe and the National University 
of Science and Technology, for example, with their rich academic experience and developed 
infrastructure, branch campuses in strategic cities and towns should be opened. Such an approach 
limits the deployment of state resources to such areas as the full fledged administrations that 
come with the establishment of new state universities.  
 
5.3. Limitations and Issues for Further Research    
 
The study was limited to one area of higher education funding in Zimbabwe – student financing. 
Noting the funding crisis that has been evolving since the introduction of neoliberal reforms, it is 
envisaged that further research could be extended to focus on the impact of the resource crunch 
on any one or all three of the core functions of universities, that is, teaching, research, and 
community engagement. 
Another area that invites further research is the matter of how universities in Zimbabwe 
are responding to resource dependency. An area of interest could be benchmarking studies on 
this subject against the introduction and performance of parallel programmes at the Midlands 
State University or on the experiences of flagship universities on the continent that have 
embraced the parallel programme phenomenon. Still on the same subject, research that focuses 
on why parallel programmes have been shunned by the country’s flagship universities, the 
University of Zimbabwe and the National University of Science and Technology, might also be 
of interest.  
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Appendix I 
 
 
GUIDELINES FOR DIRECT INTERVIEWS WITH THE MINISTER 
OF HIGHER AND TERTIARY EDUCATION, ZIMBABWE 
 
The interview opened with a brief introduction of the researcher, the purpose of the research and 
aims of the study. 
 
The following questions were put to the Honourable Minister. 
 
A. Higher Education In Colonial Zimbabwe  
 
1. Honourable Minister, at its inception in 1957 up to independence in 1980, the University 
College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, later the University of Rhodesia and now the University 
of Zimbabwe was essentially a model of British universities where students received free or 
at least highly subsidized higher education. Why then did the colonial government introduce 
cost-sharing with the establishment of university education in the country and maintain it up 
to the dawn of independence? 
2. Why and how was the colonial government able to sustain cost-sharing as a funding 
mechanism in higher education? 
3. Where there any (prospective) students who failed to access higher education because of 
inability to finance their education. If yes, what measures were in place to assist such 
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students?  
4. Would you have any other comments about the financing of higher education in general and 
students’ financing in particular, during the colonial period? 
 
B. Higher Education in Independent Zimbabwe. 
 
5. At independence in 1980, why did government embrace, and continue with the colonial 
policy of cost-sharing in higher education? How would you describe the trends in cost-
sharing as a financing strategy in higher education from independence to date? 
6. What factors explain these trends? 
7. From the Ministry and/or Government’s point of view, should students’ in higher education 
contribute to the financing of their education by assuming the cost burden of university 
education? If yes, how specifically should students contribute and why?  
8. The cadetship scheme seems not to have been well received by students judging by the 
uptake statistics in universities and reports in the press? What is the philosophy behind this 
scheme? What are the criteria for the selection of beneficiaries? Why, from the 
Ministry/Government’s perspective is the scheme unpopular with students? 
9. Honourable Minister, would you have any other comments to make about the history of 
higher education financing in Zimbabwe in general and students’ financing in particular?  
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 Appendix II 
 
    
GUIDELINES FOR DIRECT INTERVIEWS WITH THE DEPUTY 
REGISTRAR, ACADEMIC, UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE 
 
The interview will open with a brief introduction of the research, its purpose and objectives. 
 
The following questions were put to the Deputy Registrar, Academic 
 
1. How did students finance their higher education during the time of the University 
College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and later the University of Rhodesia?  
2. Were there any notable shifts in higher education funding policy during this period?  
3. What forms of financial assistance were available to students then? 
4. How did students access the assistance if it existed? 
5. Were there any conditions attached to the financial assistance?  
6. Did the funding strategies have any significant impact on access to higher education? 
7. If so, how and why? 
8. Would you have any other comments to make about student funding in Zimbabwe 
during the colonial period? 
9. At independence in 1980, the new black government continued with the colonial 
policy of cost-sharing in higher education. What in your opinion would be the 
explanation? 
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10. What factors in your opinion, have shaped Government policy on student funding 
from independence to date? 
11. How have these factors manifested themselves, and in what specific ways did, or has 
Government responded? 
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Appendix  III 
 
GUIDELINES FOR DIRECT INTERVIEWS WITH FORMER STUDENTS OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE 
 
The interview opened with a brief introduction to the research, its purpose and objectives. 
 
1. When were you a student ? 
2. How did you finance your university education? 
3. Was there any form of assistance from government? If yes, how specifically did 
government assist students finance their higher education? 
4. If the answer to 3 above is yes, were there conditions tied to the assistance? If yes, 
what were the conditions? 
5. Did students generally meet the conditions? How and why? 
6. During your time as a student, were there cases of students or prospective students 
failing to access university education because of failure to finance their education?  
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Appendix IV 
 
GUIDELINES FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS WITH STUDENTS 
 
The discussions started with a brief description of the research, its purpose and objectives. It was 
stressed to the groups that there were no wrong answers, but rather different points of view, that 
they should feel free to express their views even if the views were different from what others 
would have said and that there was just as much interest in negative as in positive comments. 
 
1. What do you know about higher education financing in general? 
2. How would you describe the financing of students’ higher education in Zimbabwe in 
general, and the University of Zimbabwe in particular?  
3. How would you describe your university life in relation to the financing of your 
education? 
4. In your opinion, how should the University use the additional revenue generated from 
tuition fees? 
5. What is your opinion about students and/or their families being required to share the 
burden of higher education costs?  
6. How in your opinion does the sharing of higher education costs between government and 
students and/or their families impact on access to higher education? 
7. What do you know about the Cadetship scheme? What in your opinion are its objectives? 
8. How would you evaluate the performance of the Cadetship scheme?  
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Appendix V 
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION 
 
I am Daniel Chihombori, a Masters in Education (by research) student at the University of the 
Western Cape, South Africa. As part of my thesis project, I wish to interview you, Honourable 
Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education, Zimbabwe/Deputy Registrar/Former student  of the 
University of Zimbabwe for my research, which I hope will benefit the Ministry and 
Government of Zimbabwe/public universities in Zimbabwe. 
I am conducting research regarding the shifts in policy in the financing of university students 
since the establishment of the first university in the country, the University of Zimbabwe in 
1957, to the present. The aim of the study is to identify the shifts in policy, and to understand and 
explain the philosophy underlying the policy shifts.  
The results of the research will be released in a thesis. No personally identifiable details will be 
released without permission from the source. Please understand that your participation is 
voluntary, and that you are not being forced to take part in the study. However, I would really 
appreciate it if you do share your thoughts with me. If you agree to participate, you may stop at 
any time and discontinue your participation. If you refuse to participate or withdraw at any stage, 
you will not be prejudiced in any way. 
The interview will last about an hour. I will be asking you a few questions and request that you 
are as open and honest as possible in answering these questions. You may choose not to answer 
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any, or some of these questions. I will also be asking some questions that you may not have 
thought about before, and which also involve involve thinking about the past, the present and the 
future regarding students' financing of higher education. When it comes to answering these 
questions, there are no right or wrong answers. When I ask a question that upsets or unsettles 
you, we can stop and talk about it.  
If you have a complaint about any aspect of this study, you may also contact the Faculty of 
Education at the University of the Western Cape, Private Bag X17, Bellville, 7535, South Africa, 
Telephone 27 (0) 21 959 2647, E-mail vkoopman@uwc.ac.za 
Thank you. 
Daniel Chihombori  
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Appendix VI 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
CONSENT 
I hereby agree to participate in research regarding the policy shifts in the financing of students' 
higher education in Zimbabwe, 1957-2009. I understand that I am participating freely, without 
being forced in any way to do so. I further understand that I can stop this interview at any point 
should I not want to continue and that my decision to do so will not affect me negatively. 
The purpose of the study has been explained to me, and I understand the researcher's 
expectations of me, vis-a-vis my participation. I understand that this is a research project whose 
purpose is not necessarily to benefit me personally. 
I have received the contact details (telephone number, e-mail address and postal address) of a 
person to contact should I need to speak about issues arising in this interview. I understand that 
my answers will remain confidential. 
I also understand that, if at all possible, feedback will be given to the Ministry of Higher and 
Tertiary Education and/or the University of Zimbabwe on the results of the completed research. 
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---------------------------------------------------- -------------------------- 
Signature of Participant                                      Date 
ADDITIONAL CONSENT TO AUDIO RECORDING 
In addition to the above, I hereby agree to the audio recording of this interview for the purposes 
of data capture. I understand that the recordings will be kept securely and will be destroyed or 
erased once data capture and analysis are complete. 
--------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------- 
Signature of Participant                                       Date  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
